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Creativity is one of the most imperative of all psychological constructs to study, for the 
implications of understanding creativity have immense bearing upon our future as a species. 
Understanding creativity can reveal not only basic mechanisms of our minds, but also afford 
insight as to how we have devised the ideas and artifacts that improve our lives and suggest 
how we can set the stage for further societal innovation and improvement. Despite the obvious 
imperative to arrive at a fuller understanding of creativity, the field is largely lacking in terms 
of a unifying theoretical orientation that can provide descriptive and prescriptive information 
regarding creative thinking. A particularly poorly understood and contentious issue within the 
study of creativity is the extent to which relatively more or less executive processing is 
beneficial to creative thinking. To explore this issue, I adopted a Dual-Process Theories (DPTs; 
Evans & Stanovich, 2013) perspective in which cognition is characterized by an interaction 
between autonomous (Type 1) and working memory dependent executive processing (Type 2). 
I conducted several studies that test whether relatively more or less Type 2 thinking leads to 
relatively more or less success in creative thinking at the state and trait levels. At both levels of 
analysis, I found that relatively more Type 2 processing afforded relatively more success in 
making creative connections that entail the unification of disparate elements. I qualify these 
results by showing that this relation does not hold for some other indices of creativity, and in 
so doing, distinguish what I call complex creativity from other sorts of divergent thought.  In 
discussing my results, I describe the sub-processes that allow complex creative thinking to 
unfold over time and consider empirical and theoretical works from diverse areas that relate to 
this view. I situate the ability to make complex remote connections alongside other advanced 
higher-order thinking capabilities that are unique to humans and strongly suggest that to be 




"Before we as individuals are even conscious of our existence we have been profoundly 
influenced for a considerable time (since before birth) by our relationship to other individuals 
who have complicated histories, and are members of a society which has an infinitely more 
complicated and longer history than they do (and are members of it at a particular time and 
place in that history); and by the time we are able to make conscious choices we are already 
making use of categories in a language which has reached a particular degree of development 
through the lives of countless generations of human beings before us. ... We are social 
creatures to the inmost centre of our being. The notion that one can begin anything at all from 
scratch, free from the past, or unindebted to others, could not conceivably be more wrong." 
-Karl Popper (as quoted in Popper by Bryan Magee, 1973) 
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Not sure how old you will be when you decide to dust this old thing off, or even if you will. If 
what you see here doesn’t make sense when you read it now, try again in a few years.  
 
Even though you didn’t yet exist when I started this degree, you kids were the reason I finished 
it. As soon as I knew I would be a father, I felt a compulsion to work harder, accomplish more 
and be more thankful for my opportunities. This urge was not only to provide for you, but also 
to show you that anything is possible. If I could do this, you could this. If we can do this, we 
can do anything. Thank you for making me better and I hope it makes you better too.  
 
I write this to you now in part because by the time you would be old enough to talk about this 
era, I would surely be changed over the years and I want you to have insight into this important 
phase of our family history. In many ways these years have been a trade-off between career 
and family, and doing things for finances or fun. With both your mom and I going to grad 
school and having you kids, we ambitiously went for career and family, but fascinating rather 
than financially stable. Although it was hard, we never regretted anything. I am so glad we did 
it this way. Life is too short to not do things that you want to do. We don’t really need that 
much in the end anyway. Experiences are worth more than objects and doing this degree and 
growing our family has been the best experience of my life.   
 
You kids are truly blessed in that you have the most amazing mother and rich networks of 
people who love and care for you. I can’t wait for the extent of the love that already exists for 
you to reveal itself to you as you grow. It is hard to overstate how excited I am to see how you 
fit into the wide world and decide what to do with your life. There are limitless possibilities for 
you both personally and professionally. It is tough to know what to do with yourself but think 
about this: Viktor Frankl wisely said that “success, like happiness, cannot be pursued; it must 
ensue, and it only does so as the unintended side effect of one's personal dedication to a cause 
greater than oneself or as the by-product of one's surrender to a person other than oneself.” For 
me, I found that learning things and sharing what I learned with others was my cause, and that 
you are my people. I just focus on dedicating my time to that and to cherishing you, and 
wherever we end up, so be it. So far, so good. I am an incredibly lucky man  in that I consider 
myself both happy and successful, and I hope that you can be as lucky as me by following this 
simple advice: Be kind and thankful, work hard, find things and people to love and you will 
live a happy life. Once you find your cause and persons to dedicate yourself to, you will find 
your way, even if it isn’t exactly as you thought it might be. 
 
I promise to help you kids do whatever it is you want in this life, as others did for me. It won’t 
be easy, but if you really want something, let’s try and do it. There will be lots of times where 
you doubt, and where you wonder, but we will help you. Even if it doesn’t go as planned, we 
will know that we tried. It is about the journey and not the destination. No matter what happens 
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Reasoned connections: Complex creativity and dual-process theories of cognition 
 
Humans are irrepressibly creative creatures. Whereas some species have flourished on 
our planet due to advanced specialization in particular tasks or routines essential to survival, we 
are massively successful due to our resourcefulness, adaptability, and capacity to re-combine the 
elements in our environment, and in our minds, in novel ways as to better ensure our survival 
and safety. This capacity for creation and the resultant innovations have culminated in our 
species flourishing in nearly every environment on Earth, and evidence of our advances is 
manifest in every aspect of our civilization.  
We no longer forage only from the Earth that which is naturally before us, but rather feast 
upon the exploits provided through diverse techniques that we have developed over many 
generations. We hunt and domesticate animals, cultivate land, and grow crops extensively, even 
modifying the genetic code of particular organisms in such a way as to make them of greater 
utility in our collective survival. We no longer dwell in natural shelters; instead we use an 
incredibly diverse assortment of materials to create structurally sound, and sometimes even 
extravagant shelters that give us warmth, comfort, and safety. We have created tools that 
supplant our biological endowments, which in turn have allowed us to build incredible 
architecture, infrastructure, and technologies far surpassing our survival needs. We have 
established complex and diverse social and political structures that guide our interactions with 
one another and enable co-operation and co-ordination amongst billions of people. Massive 
interconnected communication networks—radio, telephones, television, cellular and satellite 
networks, and the internet—afford us the chance to interface and share knowledge with people 
thousands of kilometers away instantaneously. If we wish to actually traverse that distance, we 
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have created elaborate transportation technology that allows us to move across water or land at 
speeds far beyond that allowed by our anatomy. We have produced machines that carry us 
through the sky, and even into space, defying the limits supposed by even our ancestors of only a 
few generations ago. Still accelerating medical and sanitation advances have increased our life 
span and quality of life significantly, allowing us the chance to postpone death in a controlled 
fashion unique amongst life forms on Earth. Music and art permeate all cultures, facilitating the 
transmission of information and emotion, and encapsulating the creative spirit of expression that 
characterizes man. We share knowledge through language, writing, and teach each other in a 
way that means we need not learn only from our own mistakes. Through scientific and academic 
inquiry we have a more accurate characterization of ourselves, our world, and our universe than 
any generation before us. Isaac Newton famously said: “If I have seen further, it is because I 
stand on the shoulders of giants.” Indeed, all of us have seen further by virtue of the view 
afforded by standing on the tall, broad shoulders of our fore-bearers, as each subsequent 
generation builds upon and relates together the creations of those that came before. Our 
innovations have been innumerable and their impact immeasurable, other than to say that without 
the staggering collective creative output of our species, our world would be very much unlike the 
one we inhabit today.  
As impressive as all of our accomplishments may be, as a species we still face constant 
challenges as we progress into our collective and inevitable future -- the Anthropocene. These 
challenges will require even greater creativity than that exhibited by those who came before, as 
our world has been irrevocably altered and has become more complex and challenging as a 
function of the consequence of the innovations that led us to reach such indomitable heights. 
Humans need creativity to both challenge the longstanding obstacles to our survival, as well as to 
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solve the new problems posed by our previous creations, and this cycle seems likely to 
perpetuate so long as we populate the Earth. 
Many of the technologies that have improved our lives are proving inefficient and appear 
likely to be unsustainable in the longer horizon. A growing population necessitates ever greater 
quantities of food be produced in ever shrinking pockets of cultivable land. Simultaneously we 
must accommodate the concomitant increase in waste and pollution that comes with a population 
growing at a rate unfettered by traditional predators. This lack of predation does not mean that if 
we can maintain potable water and produce sufficient food our ascent as a species will continue 
sharply upward. The globalization enabled by advances in communication and transportation has 
led to international conflict, which, given advances in warfare technology could prove 
unprecedentedly catastrophic to all. In A Short History of Progress, Ronald Wright warns that 
“the future of everything we have accomplished since our intelligence evolved depends on the 
wisdom of our actions over the next few years” and that the “Earth has grown too small to 
forgive us any big mistakes.” (2004, p. 3). In order to ensure our long-term survival and success, 
social innovation, the generation and implementation of new ways by which people interact with 
each other and our planet, must become a priority (see Mumford, 2002; Marcy & Mumford, 
2007; Mumford & Moertl, 2003; Mumford, Medeiros, & Partlow, 2012). Such innovations will 
have to arise in diverse realms such as “education, health care, law and regulation, technology, 
social movements, organizations and methods for organizing, and finance” (Jiang & Thagard, 
forthcoming), with all categories requiring great creativity.  
Given both the centrality of creativity in understanding what we have already 
accomplished, as well as the critical role it will necessarily have to play in our species solving 
the problems we now face and those that have yet to emerge; it seems that the study of what 
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creativity is, how it unfolds, and how to cultivate it, is of utmost importance. William James, 
amongst others, promoted the idea of meliorism. Meliorism refers to the notion that substantial 
and tangible progress can be made through interfering with the default, natural mode of 
operation. Put most simply, through human intervention we can improve the human condition, a 
fact seemingly true on the basis of the advances described above.  Similarly, later in this thesis, I 
will argue that by intervening upon the default, natural mode of thinking, humans are capable of 
creating and identifying new and complex relations amongst seemingly disparate elements. I 
argue that this cognitive capacity has been a critical component of our creative accomplishments 
and is sure to figure prominently in the solutions we must generate for our mutual success.  
Before I can explain what this means more fully and can introduce the experiments that led to 
this conclusion, it is imperative to first review historical and contemporary literature on 
cognition, reasoning, and creativity to better understand what we have come to know about 
ourselves, and what it might mean for our future. 
Dual-process Theories 
Psychology is concerned with understanding the diverse ways that human mental activity 
relates to our experience and accomplishments. Accordingly, many researchers and theorists 
have attempted to generate large scale theoretical frameworks with which to understand the 
extremely broad set of processes and systems that underlie the unique mental phenomena of our 
species. One of the most ubiquitous and longstanding approaches in this effort is to distinguish 
two types, systems, or sorts of processes that together comprise the broader sphere of cognition. 
Conceptions of the mind and characterizations of thinking as being of two qualitatively distinct 
types have been around since antiquity (e.g. Aristotle) and were discussed by early pioneers of 
psychological science (e.g. James) (see Frankish & Evans, 2009). The terms ‘automatic’ vs. 
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‘controlled’ processes eventually seeped their way into common psychological parlance by way 
of the cognitive revolution and the accompanying notion of a capacity-limited information 
processor (e.g. Posner & Snyder, 1975; Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977). In his underappreciated 
article, The Multiplicity of Thought, Neisser (1963) asserted that the “psychology of thinking 
breeds dichotomies. Nearly everyone who has touched the subject has divided mental processing 
into two (or more) kinds” (p. 1). His observation was not only historically astute but prescient as 
well. Rather than dissipate over time, theories of this sort have proliferated and become more 
refined as increasing amounts of evidence come to support them in a wide variety of 
psychological domains, including reasoning, judgment, decision making, and social cognition 
(see Evans, 2008 for a review).  
Modern Dual-Process Theories (DPTs), of which there are several (see Evans & 
Stanovich, 2013), carry on the tradition of distinguishing between two qualitatively dissociable 
types of processing to understand how our minds work. Although some variability exists in the 
exact form of such theories, and much could be said about such differences, there exists general 
consensus as to the nature of the two types of processing. Type 1 processing is characterized as 
automatic, relatively undemanding of cognitive capacity, and relatively fast, whereas Type 2 
processing is seen as analytic, controlled, capacity demanding, and relatively slow (see Evans & 
Stanovich, 2013). There are many associated correlates with both types, but recent developments 
in the field of reasoning have provided a more concrete means of defining the two types of 
thinking and it is this model/view that I shall adopt throughout this thesis. Most simply, Type 1 
processing is viewed as autonomous, whereas the defining feature of Type 2 processing is the 
engagement of working memory (WM; see Evans & Stanovich, 2013). Importantly, the 
theoretical view adopted here, and that preferred by the cited authors, is that of a default-
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interventionist view in which “fast Type 1 processing generates intuitive default responses upon 
which subsequent reflective Type 2 processing may or may not intervene.” (Evans & Stanovich, 
2013, p. 227). In more general terms, such a perspective presumes that people tend to most often 
rely upon the less time-consuming and more energy efficient autonomous stream of processing, 
and relatively sparingly interject with analytic, reasoned thought. As such, theories of this sort 
provide a characterization of the states of thought that humans primarily engage in, and the 
manner in which people vacillate between autonomous and controlled thinking in a wide variety 
of scenarios (see Kahneman, 2011).  
Importantly, such theories not only focus on thinking states but also traits. There are 
thought to be minimal individual differences in Type 1 processing, or the manner in which the 
autonomous mind operates, whereas there are known consequential variations in two aspects of 
Type 2 processing (Stanovich, 2009). Specifically, one can characterize individuals along two 
correlated, but distinct, dimensions. The first, what Stanovich refers to as the algorithmic mind 
refers to one’s capacity/ability to engage in Type 2 processing and is largely synonymous with 
intelligence. The second, what Stanovich refers to as the reflective mind, relates to the extent to 
which one exhibits a proclivity to intervene upon the autonomous stream of processing (i.e. Type 
1) with controlled, WM dependent, Type 2 processing. Put simply, people differ in both their 
ability and disposition to engage in WM dependent Type 2 processing and these differences are 
consequential in many areas of psychology and cognition. As such, DPTs have the capacity to 
characterize both the moment-to-moment variation in cognitive processing states within an 
individual, but also meaningful differences at the trait-level in terms of thinking styles and ability 
across individuals, meaning that such theories have extremely broad import and exciting 
potential to account for variation in diverse areas of behaviour. As I will argue, DPTs are 
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particularly well-suited to accounting for both the state-level cognitive mechanisms underlying 
creative thought, and trait-level individual differences in creative thinking. Before re-visiting this 
argument, it is important to characterize creativity more fully.  
Creativity research: Chasms and confusions  
Psychology has long endeavored to understand the types of processes, proclivities and 
people that potentiate creative thought, as it is widely acknowledged that creative output is an 
integral component of any advanced society, and any advanced mind. Regardless of the 
particular domain of creation, there is consensus about the two major defining features that make 
something creative -- the content must be novel, divergent, or unorthodox and must fit within the 
constraints of the task. Something deemed creative, whatever the domain, describes an output of 
a particular sort that is a result of a series of cognitive processes. Someone thought to be creative 
is one more inclined to generating creative output. As such, creativity can be seen as a process, 
an outcome, and a trait and is often interchangeably described in such terms, lending to the 
mystique of an already elusive construct. Given the value of creativity and such a broad, varied 
definition, it is not surprising that there exists a great deal of diversity in the types of research 
aimed at elucidating the nature of creative thought. A lack of mutual understanding as to the 
proper focus of research aimed at elucidating the nature of creative thought has resulted in huge 
differences in methodological/theoretical approaches across researchers purportedly studying the 
same construct. This diversity, though producing a large volume of research, has precluded a 
unified account of creativity and resulted in a fractionated literature in which advances in one 
domain are often isolated from other areas of creativity research (see Hennessy & Amabile, 
2010). Creativity still might be considered, as it once was, as: “one of the vaguest, most 
ambiguous, and most confused terms in psychology” (Ausubel, 1964, p. 551). In this 
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dissertation, I will advocate for the adoption of a DPT perspective in creativity research as it can 
accommodate the full breadth of processes and traits surrounding the construct and is a 
burgeoning presence in the field of psychology at large, providing potential for greater 
unification of diverse topics. 
Creativity research: Autonomous vs. controlled processing  
It has long been understood that different types of thinking must necessarily play a role in 
creative thought. This notion was perhaps most famously expounded by Graham Wallas (1926) 
in The Art of Thought, wherein he described the four stages of the creative process -- preparation, 
incubation, illumination, and verification -- which although not explicitly grounded in DPT 
terminology, was clearly suggestive that a vacillation between unconscious/conscious and/or 
automatic/controlled processing was required for creativity to emerge. Indeed, eighty-five years 
later, Allen and Thomas (2011), in the tradition of Wallas (1926) and drawing on the work of 
Ochse (1990), who identified the commonalities in most classic characterizations of the stages 
involved in creativity, described the stages of problem finding, conceptualization, incubation, 
illumination, verification, and dissemination in the context of DPTs. More recently, Sowden, 
Pringle, and Gabora (2014) connected creative thinking to DPTs by relating Type 1 processes to 
generative components of the creative process and Type 2 processes to evaluative components. 
Their framework draws on previous work by Gabora (e.g. 2003, 2010) centred upon contextual 
focus, that is, the shifting between a de-focused (i.e. Type 1 process) and a more focused 
attentional state (i.e. Type 2 process). Barr, Pennycook, Stolz and Fugelsang (2014) have added 
both empirical evidence and theoretical refinement to such conceptions, but as this work is 
included in the current thesis (Experiment 5), a more elaborated perspective shall come after 
consideration of further evidence. 
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Despite the growing acknowledgment that DPTs have utility in understanding creativity, 
a particularly thorny issue, which has yet to be fully clarified in the context of DPTs or other 
theoretical orientations, surrounds the relative utility of engaging executive processing in the 
creative process, either at the state or trait level. Randall W. Engle, a leading researcher in WM 
research has advocated a view in which WM capacity is conceptualized as “executive attention” 
(see Engle’s 2002 paper; Working memory capacity as executive attention). Given this 
conceptualization of WM, and that the defining feature of Type 2 processing is the engagement 
of WM resources (Evans & Stanovich, 2013), it should become obvious that a DPT orientation 
can inform the as of yet ambiguous role of executive processes in creativity.  
When one inspects the literature on the issue, it becomes immediately obvious that a stark 
divide exists between those who believe engaging such executive, or in the current terminology, 
Type 2 processes, is helpful and those who consider it a hindrance. One side has argued that 
“superior executive functioning, such as increased attentional control, may in fact be detrimental 
to reaching creative solutions” (Jarosz, Colflesh, & Wiley, 2012, p. 488). Others, however, point 
to a growing body of research showing the opposite -- that “executive cognition is… central to 
creative thought” (Nusbaum & Silvia, 2011, p. 36), resulting in an incongruous set of findings in 
an already fractionated literature (Hennessey & Amabile, 2010).  
Those holding the view that executive processing can hinder creative problem solving 
often point to evidence that high attentional control and/or high working memory capacity 
(WMC) does not benefit creative problem solving as it does analytic problem solving, often 
leading to fixation or undue focus on aspects of a problem that will not yield a solution (see 
Wiley & Jarosz, 2012 for a review). These researchers posit that a more dispersed or fuzzy state 
of attention, such as that associated with alcohol consumption (Jarosz, Colflesh & Wiley, 2012), 
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can allow for the type of mindset required to arrive at creative solutions. Such a view implies that 
relatively less executive engagement will generally lead to relatively more creativity (for other 
examples, see Aiello et al., 2012; Reverberi, Toraldo, D’Agostini, & Skrap, 2005;  Wiley & 
Jarosz, 2012; Wieth & Zacks, 2011; Ansburg & Hill, 2003; Kim, Hasher & Zacks, 2007;; 
Schooler, Ohlsson, and Brooks, 1993; Kounios et al., 2006; Baird et al., 2012; Bowden et al., 
2005; Dijksterhuis, & Meurs, 2006; Sio & Ormerod, 2009; Zhong, Dijksterhuis, & Galinsky, 
2008).  
Observations that intelligence and executive cognition are related to cognitive 
performance (e.g. Silvia, 2008; Nusbaum & Silvia, 2011;  Beaty & Silvia, 2012; Silvia & Beaty, 
2012; Beaty & Silvia, 2013; Batey, Chamarro-Premuzic & Furnham, 2009; Batey, Chamarro-
Premuzic & Furnham, 2010; Gilhooly, Fioratou, Anthony & Wynn, 2007; Gupta, Jang, Mednick, 
& Huber, 2012; Atchley, Strayer & Atchley, 2012; Benedek, Franz, Heene & Neubauer, 2012; 
Ball & Stevens, 2009; Chein & Weisberg, 2014) have led others to adopt an alternative stance in 
which executive processing is seen as indispensable to creative thought. Such views often 
presume greater ability to maintain and manipulate information in the face of interference, and 
more effective strategy use as being the means by which such success is reached. This view 
would predict that relatively more executive engagement will generally lead to relatively more 
creativity. 
In this dissertation, I will describe a series of studies that focus both upon the state-level 
of creativity (i.e. the moment-to-moment processing within an individual) and the trait-level of 
creativity (i.e. meaningful individual differences in creative ability) that hone in on the question 
of whether more or less executive intervention helps or harms creative thinking. Such an 
approach is grounded within the broad framework afforded by the adoption of a DPT orientation 
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and will use diverse methods, manipulations, and measures. My aim is to illuminate whether 
relatively more or less analytic thinking is beneficial to the creative process and attempt to 
understand the interplay between distinct types of thinking in creativity, heeding previous 
suggestions that the study of creativity could benefit from a DPT perspective (see Allen & 
Thomas, 2011; Sowden et al., 2014) while addressing the lack of specification regarding the 
optimal balance between Type 1 and Type 2 thinking. In the context of state-level manifestations 
of creativity, I explore whether inducing (i.e. via experimental manipulation) or cuing (i.e. via 
instructional manipulation) relatively more or less intuitive/analytic thinking enhances or reduces 
creative performance. At the trait level, I explore the roles of cognitive ability and analytic 
cognitive style (as in Stanovich, 2009) and their roles in predicting creative ability using an 
individual differences approach. At the state level, if Type 2 processing helps the ability to make 
creative connections, then experimental/instructional manipulations that promote analytic 
thinking should enhance reasoning relative to manipulations that promote more intuitive 
approaches. At the trait level, if higher cognitive ability and a more analytic cognitive style are 
associated with increased creativity, it would suggest a greater benefit of executive processing 
than would be predicted by some accounts of creativity (e.g. Wiley et al., 2012). In contrast, if 
lower cognitive ability and a less analytic cognitive style is associated with increased creativity, 
it would suggest a greater benefit of non-goal directed, potentially unconscious processing than 
would be predicted by some accounts of creativity (e.g. Beaty & Silvia, 2012).  
Analogical reasoning and complex creativity 
As already noted, creativity can describe many things, so it is beneficial at this juncture to 
constrain our discussion to a particularly important type of creativity that will be of primary 
focus throughout this manuscript -- the ability to make connections amongst remote, and 
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seemingly unrelated, elements. Given the complexity of the modern world and the problems 
which we face as a species, innovation cannot exist in a vacuum. Put another way, given the 
extent of our collective knowledge base and the intricacy of societal needs, generating novel 
ideas in isolation from extant ideas is not of most importance, or even necessarily possible- 
rather, creative ideas and solutions must be meaningfully connected to other concepts and 
evidence that bear on the problem at hand. Indeed, such connections between elements are 
considered to be indispensable to scientific discovery and technological invention (Thagard, 
2012), are involved in all social innovations (Jiang & Thagard, 2014), and accordingly form an 
important cornerstone of not just our cognition, but our society. As such, the primary focus of 
this work will be what I call complex creativity -- that is, novel and useful connections that are 
relationally complex.  
A particularly interesting, useful, and theoretically rich example of complex creativity is 
creative analogical reasoning. An analogy is said to exist when the pattern of relations amongst 
one set of elements, situations or objects is shared with that of another set. Analogical reasoning 
has been said to be at the “core of cognition” (Hofstadter, 2001) and is thought by many to be the 
critical component of a cognitive toolkit that discriminates humans from other species (see 
Gentner & Smith, 2012), and as such, is an extremely important example of complex creativity. 
The comprehension of analogies falls under the purview of second-order relational reasoning -- 
that is, reasoning about the relations between relations. An increasing body of work looks at 
creativity in the context of analogical reasoning, as this type of reasoning has been shown to 
have great utility in a variety of domains related to creative output. Analogical reasoning has 
proven to be consequential for solving complex problems in real world settings (Thagard & 
Holyoak, 1995; Chan, Paletz, & Schunn, 2012), with distant analogies being particularly 
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important to science, in that they are commonly used in the process of generating new scientific 
theories (Kuhn, 1962; Dunbar & Blanchette, 2001). For example, Holyoak and Thagard (1995) 
identify the earliest known major scientific analogy as having been developed in the era of 
Imperial Rome. Chrysippus of Soli (c. 240 B.C.), a Greek Stoic philosopher, identified the 
analogical relation rooted in the common behaviour of water waves and sound, shedding new 
light on the ways in which one could predict and understand the nature of acoustics based on 
existing understanding of the manner in which water behaves.  
Analogies not only lead to new understanding at the collective level (i.e. scientific 
advancement) but also at the individual level as well (i.e. scientific education) (e.g. Dagher, 
1995a; Dagher, 1995b; Cosgrove, 1995; Wong, 1993; Zook, 1991). For example, Joel Levy 
(2011) published A Bee in a Cathedral And 99 Other Scientific Analogies, a book in which more 
familiar notions about the world are mapped to unfamiliar concepts to yield new understanding. 
In the flagship example from which the title of the book is derived, Levy draws an analogy 
between the relative of size of a bee in a cathedral and that of the relative size of a nucleus in an 
atom. In calling attention to this underlying common relation, one is afforded new insight into 
the way to conceive of the composition of something not able to be observed organically based 
on a relation that can be easily visualized or imagined. Given the obvious benefits of 
understanding creative analogies, it becomes important to consider both states of mind, and 
individual dispositions, abilities, and traits that could lead to enhanced creative performance.  
Stimuli and Task 
Certain core components of the stimuli and task adopted in my dissertation are constant 
across the multiple experiments discussed here. Given the centrality of these conceptual and 
methodological details to the arguments outlined here, it is worthwhile to introduce these 
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aspects, and the logic underlying their inclusion, prior to explicating the particulars of each 
respective experiment.  
A long tradition of research in analogy (see Sternberg, 1977) requires participants to 
solve verbal analogies of the form A:B::C:D (i.e. A is to B as C is to D). Such 4-term pairs are 
thought to encapsulate much of the necessary conceptual depth and relational complexity 
required to mirror the types of reasoning one might go about in the real world, while also being 
relatively easier to experimentally explore than more complex and messy relations that one could 
potentially study. Our work draws on such stimuli and distinguishes analogies that are more or 
less creative by capitalizing on a distinction between analogies in which the A:B terms come 
from the same category, or domain, as the C:D terms, and those that do not. For example, a 
within-domain analogy, in which both relations are drawn from the same categories such as 
Lambchop is to Lamb as Porkchop is to Pig, is considered to be less creative than a cross-domain 
analogy such as Lambchop is to Lamb as Chapter is to Book (see Green, Fugelsang, Kraemer, 
Gray & Dunbar, 2010).  
In all of the experiments outlined here, participants were presented with such 4-term 
analogy problems, half of which are cross-domain and half of which are within-domain, as well 
as filler non-analogy stimuli that serve as foils, which also systematically vary by domain. 
Although procedural details vary (experimental/instructional manipulations will be employed), 
participants in these experiments will invariably be asked to, as quickly as possible, identify 
whether the presented pairs are analogically related. As a means of avoiding item-level effects as 
a consequence of idiosyncrasies in the stimuli, common A:B pairs were used here, and in the 
other experiments, for cross-domain, within-domain, and invalid analogies (half were cross-
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domain, half were within-domain). In other words, for any given A:B pair, there were three C:D 
pairs; a cross-domain valid analogy, a within-domain valid analogy, and an invalid analogy.  
The categorical distinction between cross and within-domain pairs is formalized by 
semantic distance values obtained via latent semantic analysis (LSA: Landauer & Dumais 1997; 
Landauer, Foltz, & Laham, 1998) for each item. LSA essentially describes how distantly related 
concepts or relations are in semantic space, providing a useful means of describing creativity that 
is grounded in models of the way that knowledge is encoded. More technically, the LSA 
application  
 
calculates the similarity between the contextual-usage meanings of words as measured by 
the cosine of the included angle between vectors assigned to those words within a very 
high-dimensional ‘‘semantic space,’’ comprising extensive corpa of English text. A 
vector is added for multiword inputs such as the word pairs constituting our analogy 
stimuli. (Green, Kraemer, Fugelsang, Gray & Dunbar, 2010, p. 71). 
 
Norming, done by a panel of 84 independent raters (see Green, Fugelsang, Kraemer, 
Gray & Dunbar, 2010), indicated greater than 90% agreement as to the validity (i.e. is this a 
valid analogy?) and domain classification (i.e. are these word pairs from the same domain?) 
providing support that the semantic distance ratings effectively relate to human subjective 
judgment and index what they are meant to. The words were also equated for a number of other 
dimensions, including word length, word frequency, and concreteness. Another advantage of 
these stimuli, beyond being very well-controlled, is that they have been extensively studied in the 
context of neuroimaging studies (Bunge et al., 2005; Green, Fugelsang, Kraemer, Shamosh & 
Dunbar, 2006; Green et al., 2010; Green, Fugelsang, Kraemer, Gray & Dunbar, 2012), and as 
such, we can relate the behavioural results here to the burgeoning evidence pertaining to the 
neural correlates with relative confidence.  
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By clearly delineating non-creative from creative analogical connections, one can, in a 
controlled fashion, explore the cognitive factors underlying such reasoning in relation to the 
relative creativity of these dichotomous types of analogies. Through the imposition of constraints 
more typically associated with reasoning tasks, rather than focusing primarily on divergent open-
ended responses, one can get a more refined sense of how the creative relations were identified, 
as only certain conceptual combinations will yield insight into the underlying common relation 
shared by the constituent pairs. Although ostensibly an identification task, such a paradigm does 
index creative generation, as correct identification of a creative analogy is contingent upon the 
generation of the covert relational mappings that form the basis of the analogical relation (see 
Green et al., 2012). In other words, although not mirroring some standard creative generation 
paradigms, this task still has a generative component in that participants must create the 
appropriate common underlying relation that binds the A:B and C:D pairs. Support for the notion 
that such a task is suitable for gauging creative generation comes from evidence that the task of 
generating solutions to open-ended analogies and the task of identifying them draw on a largely 
synonymous set of neural regions, with both eliciting unique activation as a function of semantic 
distance parametrically (Green, Fugelsang, Kraemer, Gray, & Dunbar, 2010, 2012) 
The selected stimuli are well-aligned with several key concepts discussed in analogical 
reasoning research (italicized terms and quotes drawn from Gentner & Smith, 2013, p. 130). All 
items used have structural consistency, “the property of having a clear set of matches between 
two analogs” (i.e. A:B::C:D structure), thus providing some modicum of experimental control 
that serves to simplify the cognitive processes under study. All valid analogies in the set are 
defined by relational similarity, that is, “likeness based on relations common to both domains or 
situations (whether or not the objects in the two systems resemble each other)”, whereas the non-
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analogies are defined by the absence of this likeness of relations. The distinction between cross 
and within-domain pairs effectively systematically varies surface similarity, the “likeness based 
only on similar objects and background context between two domains/situations” for both 
analogy and non-analogy pairs, precluding successful reasoning on the basis of category 
information alone. Importantly, whereas cross-domain analogies only have relational similarity 
but not surface similarity, within-domain analogies feature both relational similarity and surface 
similarity.  
Although obviously not entirely representative of the creative process as it unfolds when 
scientists connect the unconnected or artists fuse previously unrelated styles in a novel way, such 
a task carries on the general tradition in psychological science of reducing the noisiness and 
variability in many of the mental phenomena we hope to understand through laboratory controls 
and simplification of otherwise very complex and disorderly situations (e.g. Ebbinghaus, 1885). 
More specifically, our work is congruent with the creative cognition approach (Ward, Smith & 
Finke, 1999). This approach presumes that ordinary mental processes underlie creative thinking, 
and like any other cognitive phenomena, creativity is considered amenable to empirical 
investigation in the laboratory. 
Rationale and Predictions  
I have reviewed here a diverse collection of research and theory pertaining to diverse 
facets of psychology in order to characterize a contemporary problem plaguing the creativity 
literature (i.e. does executive/Type 2 processing help or hinder the creative process?), a paradigm 
in which to attempt to answer this question (i.e. creative analogical reasoning task) and a 
potential theoretical vehicle (i.e. DPTs) by which to resolve this conundrum and through which 
psychological science can drive the study of creativity to greater heights.  
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A motivating factor for the choice of problem to study, paradigm to use, and the 
theoretical perspective adopted is that an abundance of evidence exists that allows a priori 
predictions regarding the experiments at hand. Specifically, I predict that identifying creative 
cross-domain analogies will require greater analytic thought than the identification of non-
creative within-domain analogies, thus supporting characterizations of relatively more executive 
processing yielding relatively greater creative output. As I noted above, there are many 
conflicting reports regarding the role of Type 2 processing in creativity. Accordingly, rather than 
merely point to the creativity studies that support my theoretical predictions (and ignore those 
that go against it), I will instead selectively review a novel combination of evidence from 
memory and reasoning research to support my prediction. That is to say, I will inform my 
predictions regarding complex creativity on the basis of work not traditionally from the domain 
of creativity, as the waters of creativity seem too muddy to glean a clear view of what lies below 
to give an unbiased estimation of what to expect. 
Mind, Memory, and Making Connections 
An important aspect of understanding the way in which one fuses concepts on the basis 
of underlying common relations comes from a characterization of the nature of semantic 
memory. Semantic memory is described as our long-term inventory of knowledge about the 
world (Tulving, 1972), including information about categories, features, and the complex inter-
relations that exist between them (Murphy & Medin, 1985). Important developments in recent 
years regarding the structure (see McRae & Jones, 2013, for a review) and neurobiology of 
semantic memory (see Binder & Desai, 2011, for a review) have illuminated a rich, inter-
connected network that underlies the representation of knowledge integral to nearly all 
psychological phenomena. When one activates a concept in long-term memory, emotional, 
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sensory and motor regions that correspond to the features of that concept become active, as do 
what Binder and Desai (2011) call ‘convergence zones’; regions in which these modality-specific 
systems come together to enable the sorts of higher-order, abstract, supra-modal representations 
that enable cognitive feats of the sort that humans alone seem to enjoy. Such a characterization is 
supported by the plausibility and utility of recent neurocomputational simulations that rely on 
semantic pointers, which are defined as activity patterns of spiking neuron populations that 
function as condensed representations via the binding of distributed patterns of activation (see 
Eliasmith, 2013).   
Such work seems to at least begin to offer an account for the fusion of features that 
comprise individual concepts, but much more remains to be known about the way that 
meaningful connections between such representations are made. Some behavioural and 
neuroscientific evidence does exist on the nature of relations between concepts in semantic 
memory despite years of such relations often being treated as tacit connections between 
conceptual nodes in a network (see Spellman, Holyoak & Morrison, 2001). It is becoming clear 
that relations are not mere passive conduits for activation, but instead are meaningful 
components of semantic organization themselves. For example, it has been demonstrated that 
causal relations are distinct from more general associative relations both behaviourally (Fenker, 
Waldmann & Holyoak, 2005) and neurologically (Satpute et al., 2005) and it has been advocated 
that further research explore the unique representational structures of the many diverse relations 
that exist between concepts in semantic memory (see McRae, Khalkhali & Hare, 2012).  
Although arguments that semantic relations are a type of important structured concept are 
gaining traction, it is also clear that relational information does not spread in semantic networks 
in a way analogous to that seen by object concepts, or other more singular representations. For 
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example, conceptual/semantic priming (e.g. Neely, 1977), the classic finding of facilitated 
processing of one concept following prior exposure to a related concept, unfolds in a ballistic and 
effortless fashion via spreading activation mechanisms. Relational, or analogical priming (e.g. 
presentation of Bear-Cave facilitating subsequent processing of Bird-Nest), on the other hand, 
does not occur in such a way, instead relying on an appropriate strategic set (Spellman, Holyoak, 
& Morrison, 2001). Specifically, participants must note and use the semantic relations in order to 
see any evidence of analogical priming and, as such, is thought to occur due to a mixture of 
controlled and automatic processes/factors. Put simply, priming based on first-order surface 
similarity seems to unfold autonomously, relative to second-order relational priming, which 
seems to require executive engagement of WM systems. Given this, it seems unlikely to me that 
relational connections, of the sort defined as creative within the chosen analogical reasoning 
paradigm, will emerge spontaneously via the autonomous operation of Type 1 processing, as the 
conceptual connection provided by congruence between categories (i.e. within-domain 
analogies) should instead be the information that spreads relatively more automatically, 
relegating relational information to the realm of the overridden.  
Such a picture of the nature of the underlying representations being accessed is easily tied 
to the broader sphere of analogical reasoning research. The processes that underlie analogical 
reasoning are well studied, especially the mapping process thought to occur when reasoners find 
relational correspondences between potentially superficially dissimilar objects (e.g. Gick & 
Holyoak, 1980; Gentner, 1983; Hummel & Holyoak. 1997). It is clear that the process of 
identifying common relational structure is aided by surface similarity of the sort described 
earlier, and exemplified by our within-domain analogy items. A series of clever priming 
experiments has shown that for within-domain analogical reasoning, category information is 
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automatically activated when identifying analogies, despite this information not being integral to 
judgment (i.e. analogical judgment need only consider relational, not surface similarity) but 
relational information is not automatically activated when judging the same stimuli for category 
information (Green, Fugelsang & Dunbar, 2006; Green, Fugelsang, Kraemer & Dunbar, 2008). 
Given that Spellman, Holyoak & Morrison (2001) only observed analogical priming when 
participants noted and made use of the relations between word pairs, it seems reasonable that this 
dissociation reflects the notion that unlike category information, which can spread 
autonomously, conscious attention is needed to activate relational information. In other words, 
Type 1 processing seems more amenable to facilitating the identification of surface similarity 
rather than relational similarity, and accordingly suggests that cross-domain analogies, in which 
there is incongruence in relational and surface similarity, should be more reliant upon Type 2 
processing. One must proactively inhibit or retroactively override the automatic response 
generated as a consequence of superficial similarity in order to arrive at the requisite, relationally 
relevant response.  
A final piece of the puzzle for my predictions herein pertains to DPTs of cognition, and 
the type of processing thought most often engaged. Evans and Stanovich (2013) advocate a 
default-interventionist form of DPTs, in which it is presumed that humans are cognitive misers, 
who tend to only sparingly engage analytic reasoning, and it is this theoretical perspective that I 
adopt here. In their words: “rapid autonomous processes (Type 1) are assumed to yield default 
responses unless intervened on by distinctive higher order reasoning processes (Type 2)” (Evans 
& Stanovich, 2013, p. 223). Such a perspective is supported by decades of reasoning and 
decision-making work focused on the ways in which human reasoners often fall short of 
optimality through their decision to allow Type 1 processing to guide most choices and solve 
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most problems (see Kahneman, 2011). A classic finding is that people tend to substitute easier 
questions in lieu of more difficult ones. In the current context, given that category information 
(i.e. surface similarity) is relatively more easily processed than relational information (i.e. 
relational similarity), it seems that one should predict that a cognitive miser would be more 
inclined to rely on the former, as it would come to mind more easily, leading to lessened 
identification of deeper meaningful relations between the constituent pairs.  
In order to accomplish the stated aim of utilizing a DPT perspective to better understand 
complex creativity, I will describe studies that in turn vary the conditions of the general 
paradigm described above to promote or discourage analytic thinking (Experiments 1 & 2), 
explicitly cue people to think analytically (Experiment 3), explicitly cue people to think both 
analytically or intuitively while measuring long-term individual differences in analytic thinking 
style (Experiment 4), and finally, consider individual differences in analyticity in a broader array 
of tasks thought to index diverse aspects of creativity (Experiment 5). This dissertation is a 
selective sample of studies from a broader program of research. Many of the findings have been 
subject to replication and extension in other work. After reviewing the included studies, I will 
then attempt to analyze and re-combine the evidence pertaining to executive intervention in 
creativity to provide a clearer picture of the cognitive underpinnings of complex creativity and 









In Experiment 1, I aimed to test my central prediction that creative cross-domain 
analogical reasoning would be relatively more dependent upon Type 2 processing than less 
creative within-domain analogical reasoning. To do so, I used a rather heavy-handed 
experimental manipulation designed to limit the ability of participants to engage in WM 
dependent processing while attempting to ascertain whether the presented items did indeed form 
an analogical relation and looked at the relative accuracy of the different stimulus types.  
In previous work using these stimuli (e.g. Green et al., 2012), all 4 components of the 
analogies were presented simultaneously and remained on screen together until response and 
performance was uniformly high (Overall Accuracy = 93.21%; participants were also cued to 
think a certain way on some trials, but that is not of interest yet). Furthermore, norming studies 
obtained 90+% agreement as to the classification of these analogies suggesting that participants 
can extract relational information from these stimuli when presented simultaneously and 
participants were not advised to go as quickly as possible while still being accurate. In the 
current study, the A:B pair appeared for a brief period of time (1000 ms) before it was replaced 
by the C:D pair, which remained on screen until response (i.e. stimulus onset asynchrony of 1000 
ms). Critically, such a manipulation limits participants’ ability to simultaneously view the A:B 
and C:D pairs while assessing whether an analogical relation exists between them. I predict that 
forcing one to hold the A:B pair in WM will limit the ability to identify the cross-domain 
analogies, as under my view, Type 2 processing, which is WM dependent, is critical for correct 
identification of the underlying common relation. In other words, the structures and processes 
that subserve holding the A:B term in WM will be shared with those structures and processes 
that are used to determine whether the A:B and C:D pairs are analogously related. Accordingly, I 
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predict that performance will be markedly worse than in previous experiments (e.g. Green et al., 
2012) and, in conjunction with my speeded instructions, might potentially prove to be very 
disruptive to this process.  
Importantly, if creative analogical reasoning is more dependent upon Type 2 processing, 
this hypothesized decrement to performance as a function of the presentation parameters should 
be more pronounced for cross-domain than within-domain analogies. My logic for this prediction 
is rooted in the fact that the congruent surface and relational similarity in within-domain 
analogies will allow participants to find the common underlying relation between the 
representations in a relatively more intuitive fashion. Conversely, because the relations 
comprising cross-domain analogies do not share surface similarity, more in-depth (and WM 
demanding) processing should be required to correctly identify an analogy. Likewise, I anticipate 
that accuracy in rejecting non-analogies will be lower for the within-domain pairs, as the surface 
similarity should lead participants to more often mistakenly presume an analogical relation in 
such a design. Another way to frame the same prediction is that the further semantic distance on 
cross- relative to within-domain analogies takes more effort to traverse, and requires more WM 
dependent resources. For the non-analogies, the closer proximity in semantic space for within-
domain analogies should make them relatively more difficult to correctly reject than cross-
domain analogies. Put another way, because the constituent pairs of within-domain non-
analogies are more likely to share features and semantic space at the representational level than 
those composing cross-domain non-analogies, a sense of relatedness will be experienced despite 
no underlying analogical relations, which should serve to make correctly ascertaining that no 
analogy exists more difficult. In cases of true analogies, the representational overlap should 
facilitate acceptance and in non-analogies this same shared semantic space should make rejection 
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relatively more difficult. To put these predictions into statistical terms, I anticipate a significant 
interaction between Domain and Validity, such that under these conditions within-domain 
analogies will be easier to identify than cross-domain analogies, but within-domain non-
analogies will be less often correctly rejected than are cross-domain non-analogies. 
A more general prediction, common to all of the speeded analogical reasoning tasks 
employed here, is that within-domain analogies should take less time to identify than cross-
domain analogies, for the same reasons listed above. 
 
Experiment 1 Method 
Participants 
42 undergraduate students (29 females, Mage = 20.4 years, SD = 1.36) participated in this 
experiment in exchange for course credit. One participant was removed for responding ‘yes’ on 
all trials. No special criterion for participation was required beyond normal or corrected to 
normal vision and fluency in English. This study, and all the others reported in this thesis, was 
reviewed and received ethics clearance through the Office of Research Ethics at the University of 
Waterloo.  
Materials/Procedure 
Participants were presented with 120 four-word sets of the form A:B::C:D (40 each of 
within and cross-domain analogies and 20 within and cross-domain non analogy pairs) and were 
asked to judge if an analogical relation existed between the word pairs (see Appendix A for a 
complete list of stimuli). Order of item presentation was randomized. Importantly, examples of 
each stimulus type and the correct response were shown in instructions to ensure that all 
participants understood the nature of the task (i.e. that an analogy is not determined by surface 
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similarity but rather depends on a common underlying relation between the word pairs). 
Participants were told to make their judgments (yes or no), via key-press (‘c’ for yes, ‘n’ for no), 
as quickly as possible while still being accurate. A blank screen appeared for 500 ms (i.e. 500 ms 
inter-trial interval; I.T.I.), followed by a central fixation for 500 ms. The A:B pair was then 
centrally presented for 1000 ms before being replaced by the C:D pair, which remained on screen 
until response. 
Experiment 1 Results 
Any trials that were more than 3 standard deviations above a participant’s mean response 
time (RT) for a given stimulus type, or trials less than 200 ms, were considered an outlier and 
excluded from further analysis, resulting in the removal of less than 1% of trials. Unless 
otherwise stated, RT refers to correct trials only. 
Figure 1 presents the mean accuracy data as a function of Domain and Validity, and 
Figure 2 presents the analogous RT data. A 2 (Domain: Cross-domain, Within-domain) × 2 
(Validity: True, False) Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) on the accuracy data revealed a main 
effect of Domain (F (40) = 36.30, p < .001, ηp² = .48), no main effect of Validity (F < 1), and a 
significant Domain × Validity interaction (F (40) = 80.59, p < .001, ηp² = .67). All ANOVAs are 
reported in full in Appendix B. More specifically, as anticipated, the presentation manipulation 
massively and selectively disrupted performance in identifying cross-domain analogies (Mean 
accuracy = 52.6%, SD = 20.5) relative to within-domain analogies (Mean accuracy = 89.3%, SD 
= 10.0), t (41) = 11.28, SEM = 3.15, p < .001. Also as predicted, ability to reject non-analogies 
was much worse for within-domain items (Mean accuracy = 64.0%, SD = 21.1) than for cross-








Figure 1. Accuracy as a function of Domain and Validity. The error bars for this figure (and for 
all remaining figures) represent the standard error for each condition. In this figure (and for all 
remaining figures) WD = Within-domain, CD = Cross-domain. 
 


















































In an analysis analogous to that conducted on the accuracy data, a 2 (Domain: Cross-
domain, Within-domain) × 2 (Validity: True, False) ANOVA on the RT data revealed a main 
effect of Domain (F (40) = 15.38, p < .001,  ηp² = .28), a main effect of Validity (F (40) = 5.89, p 
< .05,  ηp² = .13), and a significant Domain × Validity interaction (F (40) = 20.10, p < .001,  ηp² = 
.33). RT differences were found in the anticipated direction as a function of domain for valid 
analogies, with within-domain analogies (Mean RT = 1554 ms, SD = 776) being correctly 
identified much faster than cross-domain analogies (Mean RT = 2347 ms, SD = 1228), t (41) = 
8.20, SEM = 94.6, p < .001. Correctly rejecting cross-domain non-analogies took less time 
(Mean RT = 2132 ms, SD = 1343) than correctly rejecting within-domain non-analogies (Mean 
RT = 2347 ms, SD = 1228), though this difference was not statistically significant, t (41) = 1.32, 
SEM = 164.5, p = .19.    
Experiment 1 Discussion 
Experiment 1 has several findings that are novel and inform the nature of the underlying 
processes and representations of interest when discussing complex creativity in analogical 
reasoning. It was found that within-domain analogies were answered much more accurately than 
cross-domain analogies despite faster overall RTs. We take this as preliminary evidence that 
cross-domain analogies require more Type 2 processing to comprehend. Although I anticipated 
this general pattern of results, the impact of the presentation parameters upon creative cross-
domain analogical reasoning was even greater than I would have predicted. Many participants 
were extremely poor at identifying the requisite common relation to understand the cross-domain 
analogies, despite relative preservation of the ability to identify within-domain analogies. 
Interestingly, there were large individual differences in the extent of disruption, in that there was 
a huge range in performance. Some participants were only successful in correctly identifying 
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about one-third of the cross-domain analogies, whereas others were able to identify a majority of 
these items correctly. Although I cannot speak to the reason behind these differences here, this 
point will be discussed further in later portions of this thesis when I directly explore the locus of 
such individual differences in performance. These experimental conditions also led to a large 
number of errors in identifying non-analogies as valid analogies, specifically in cases in which 
the constituent pairs were from the same domain. This effect was more pronounced for within-
domain non-analogies, further suggesting that when analytic thinking is limited, so is the ability 
to correctly infer relational information. 
Together, these results support my assumption that surface similarity is more amenable to 
being understood via autonomous Type 1 processing than is relational similarity, and suggest 
that creative cross-domain analogical reasoning is relatively more contingent upon Type 2 
processing, loading on WM dependent resources to a greater extent than the matched within-
domain stimuli. It seems clear that relations spanning a greater semantic distance require 
relatively more executive engagement to connect in a meaningful way, providing a first hint that 












In Experiment 1, via a manipulation to the presentation parameters that limited the ability 
to engage Type 2 processing, I selectively impeded the ability of participants to generate the 
underlying relational structure, thus limiting their ability to make semantically distant 
connections. In Experiment 2, I modified the presentation parameters again, in order to show that 
the disparity between our reported accuracy and that observed in other published reports (i.e. 
Green et al., 2012) was indeed a result of the inability of participants to only view the constituent 
relations sequentially, and not simultaneously, thus limiting the extent to which Type 2 was 
directed to ascertaining the underlying relation. The aim of this experiment is, as such, quite 
simple. Here, I simply structured the experiment to mirror the presentation parameters of 1, with 
a few exceptions that should increase the extent to which analytic Type 2 processing can be 
engaged toward identifying relational matches. Specifically, I had participants view the A:B pair 
in isolation for the same duration as in Experiment 1, but rather than replace the A:B pair, the 
C:D pair appeared beside, such that participants could now view both of the pairs 
simultaneously. In an additional, again heavy-handed, effort to induce greater analytic thinking, 
participants could not make their judgment until they had viewed the pairs together for at least 
two seconds.   
Although I expect improvements over Experiment 1 in cross-domain analogical 
reasoning, I still expect the general pattern of lowered accuracy and longer RTs for cross-
domain, relative to within-domain analogies, which will be taken as further support for the stated 
predictions. 




42 undergraduate students (26 females, Mage = 20.8 years, SD = 1.18) participated in this 
experiment in exchange for course credit. No special criterion for participation was required 
beyond normal or corrected to normal vision and fluency in English.   
Materials/Procedure 
All aspects of the materials and procedure of Experiment 1 were preserved with the 
following exceptions. After the blank screen (ITI), a red fixation cross appeared and remained on 
screen. The A:B pair appeared to the left of fixation for 1000 ms. After that time elapsed, the 
C:D pair appeared to the right of  fixation, and after 2000 ms of simultaneous presentation, the 
fixation cross changed from red to green. During instructions (which were otherwise identical to 
Experiment 1) participants were told they could respond only after the fixation cross changed to 
green. Reported RTs are the time taken from the onset of the C:D pair until response (i.e. these 
values include the two second period before response was allowed, to better align with the 
measurement of RT in Experiment 1 and better reflect the time spent processing the pairs). 
Experiment 2 Results 
Any trials that were more than 3 standard deviations above a participants mean RT for a 
given stimulus type were deemed an outlier and excluded from further analysis, resulting in the 
removal of less than 1% of trials.  
Figure 3 presents the mean accuracy data as a function of Domain and Validity, and 
Figure 4 presents the analogous RT data. A 2 (Domain: Cross-domain, Within-domain) × 2 
(Validity: True, False) ANOVA on the accuracy data revealed a main effect of Domain (F (41) = 
112.42, p < .001, ηp² = .73), a main effect of Validity (F (41) = 8.3, p < .01,  ηp² = .17), and a 
significant Domain × Validity interaction (F (41) = 96.05, p < .001,  ηp² = .70). As expected, 
performance in identifying cross-domain analogies was again far inferior (Mean accuracy = 
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64.6%, SD = 15.5) to performance in identifying within-domain analogies (Mean accuracy = 
93.3%, SD = 4.6), t (41) = 12.44, SEM = 2.31, p < .001. Also as predicted, accuracy in 
identifying non-analogies was worse for within-domain items (Mean accuracy = 82.2%, SD = 
12.7) than for cross-domain non-analogies (Mean accuracy = 85.9%, SD = 8.9), t (41) = 2.16, 
SEM = 1.71, p < .05.   
In an analysis analogous to that conducted on the accuracy data, a 2 (Domain: Cross-
domain, Within-domain) × 2 (Validity: True, False) ANOVA on the RT data revealed a main 
effect of Domain (F (41) = 56.53, p < .001,  ηp² = .58), a marginal effect of Validity (F (41) =  
 
3.27, p = .08,  ηp² = .07), and a significant Domain × Validity interaction (F (41) = 17.12, p < 
.001,  ηp² = .30). RT differences were found in the anticipated direction again as well, with 
within-domain analogies (Mean RT = 2687 ms, SD = 435) being correctly identified faster than 
cross-domain analogies (Mean RT =3369 ms, SD = 890), t (41) = 7.54, SEM = 90.5, p < .001. 
Correctly rejecting cross-domain non-analogies took significantly less time (Mean RT = 3127 
ms, SD = 1343) than correctly rejecting within-domain non-analogies (Mean RT = 3127 ms, SD 
= 1058), t (41) = 2.16, SEM = 77.1, p < .05.   
Experiment 2 Discussion and Experiment 1 and 2 Comparisons  
As expected, we again saw superior performance as a function of domain, whereby the 
less creative within-domain analogies were more successfully identified, relative to the cross-
domain analogies. There was again an effect of domain for non-analogies as well, with cross-
domain non-analogies being easier to reject than within-domain analogies. We also replicated 
our expected RT results, specifically, the primary prediction that cross-domain analogies will 
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take relatively more time to understand due to the incongruence between surface and relational 
similarity and the greater semantic distance.  
In order to understand the implications of the work described thus far, it is useful to 
contrast performance in Experiments 1 and 2. There was a large difference in accuracy across 
experiments for cross-domain analogies (12%; Experiment 1 mean accuracy = 52.6% vs. 
Experiment 2 mean accuracy = 64.6%), but there was also a difference in performance on 
within-domain analogies across experiments (4.3%; Experiment 1 mean accuracy = 89.0% vs. 
Experiment 2 mean accuracy = 93.3%). The smaller difference in the latter stimulus type 
suggests that the impact of having a lessened capacity for the use of Type 2 processing 
selectively influenced cross-domain analogical reasoning performance. However, in order to 
properly make such a claim, it is important to identify whether the conditions of Experiment 1 
(parameters relatively less conducive to engaging Type 2 processing) selectively hindered cross-
domain analogy identification, relative to within-domain analogy identification (parameters 
relatively more conducive to engaging Type 2 processing) when compared to Experiment 2, or if 
there was simply a global difference in performance between the two experiments as a function 
of the differences in design. Evidence for such a selective influence account would come from 
the presence of an Experiment × Domain interaction. If no such interaction exists, one could 
argue that the differences in parameters generally decreased performance in any sort of 
reasoning. As such, I conducted a 2 (Experiment: Experiment 1, Experiment 2) × 2 (Domain: 
Cross-domain, Within-domain) mixed ANOVA and found main effects of both Experiment (F 
(1, 81) = 11.66, p < .01,  ηp² = .13), and Domain (F (1, 81) = 285.26, p < .001,  ηp² = .78). 
Critically, there was indeed a significant Experiment × Domain interaction (F (41) = 4.01, p < 
.05,  ηp² = .05), supporting the suggestion that parameters meant to reduce Type 2 processing 
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selectively hindered performance on creative cross-domain analogies, relative to within-domain 
analogies. In other words, although the parameters of Experiment 1 reduced performance in 
identifying both types of analogies relative to Experiment 2, this decrement was especially large 
for cross-domain analogies. 
It is important to note, though, that depending on one’s perspective, there are several 
factors that might preclude my analyzing Experiments 1 and 2 in such a way. For one, they were 
not run as such, and were completed in different terms. Secondly, there are large differences in 
the variance between these task variants that would violate some assumptions of the ANOVA. 
However, given the roughly equal sample size and the a priori interest in contrasting 
performance, I made comparisons that converge with the analysis conducted above which should 
quell any concerns of more conservative statisticians. Specifically, I elected to contrast 
performance in each stimulus sub-type as a function of variant, to illuminate the extent to which 
each sub-type was affected by the relative changes in condition. Importantly, these analyses can 
be attuned to address the heterogeneous variance (Levene’s Test for Equality of Variances was 
significant for all four comparisons; performance on Experiment 1 was much more variable) 
through the Welch-Satterwaite method, which increases the conservatism of the test by adjusting 
the degrees of freedom as a function of the relative inequality of variance. Thus, the subsequent 
analyses will feature these adjusted degrees of freedom and should afford some insight into the 
relative differences across tasks while avoiding contention about the suitability of the previously 
reported ANOVA. 
Though there was a difference in cross-domain non-analogy performance as a function of 
task, with accuracy on Experiment 1 (Mean accuracy = 80.2%, SD = 20.9) being lower than that 
seen in Experiment 2 (Mean accuracy = 85.9%, SD = 8.9), t (53.743) = 1.61, SEM = 3.54, p > 
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.05, this difference was statistically not significant.  For within-domain analogies there was a 
significant, but relatively slight difference between performance in Experiment 1 (Mean 
accuracy = 89.0%, SD = 20.9) compared to Experiment 2 (Mean accuracy = 93.3%, SD = 4.6), t 
(56.073) = 2.49, SEM = 1.71, p < .05. For the two stimulus types in which the surface similarity 
conflicted with the relational information (i.e. the semantically distant analogies and the 
semantically near non-analogies), however, a marked difference in accuracy was evident. The 
ability to correctly reject the within-domain non-analogies was significantly hindered in the 
sequential presentation conditions in Experiment 1 (Mean accuracy = 64.0%, SD = 4.6) relative 
to the simultaneous presentation conditions in Experiment 2 (Mean accuracy = 82.2%, SD = 
12.7), t (65.524) = 4.76, SEM = 3.83, p < .01. Similarly, the ability to correctly find the relational 
connection in cross-domain analogies was severely hindered in Experiment 1 (Mean accuracy = 
52.6%, SD = 20.5) relative to Experiment 2 (Mean accuracy = 64.6%, SD = 15.5), t (74.329) = 
3.00, SEM = 4.00, p < .01. Additionally, I ran two one-sample t-tests to determine whether 
performance for cross-domain analogies was greater than chance (i.e. 50%) in these two variants. 
In Experiment 2, participants did perform significantly better than would be expected by chance, 
t (41) = 6.12, p < .001, but performance in Experiment 1 was not different than what would be 
expected if participants were simply guessing, t < 1, strongly supporting my supposition that 
sequential presentation severely limited the WM resources that are required for the cross-domain 
analogies and underscoring the necessity of executive involvement in the extraction of 
underlying relational information. This pattern of results strongly supports a view in which the 
ability to span the semantic distance required to link the constituent pairs is strongly hindered 
when WM resources are dedicated to holding the A:B pair constant, supporting my hypothesis 
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that Type 2 thinking is integral to creative analogical reasoning. It also suggests that closer 
proximity in semantic space can mislead one to identify a non-existent relation. 
If it were the case that the manipulation employed in Experiment 1, which was designed 
to limit the amount of Type 2 processing, simply hindered the ability to do any type of analogical 
reasoning, one would have expected similarly sized decrements in within-domain analogies. The 
notion that the cause of the sharp drop in performance is less Type 2 processing is supported by 
the following pattern. In Experiment 1 there were positive correlations between accuracy in 
identifying cross-domain analogies and RT for correct, r(40) = .34, p < .05, and incorrect trials of 
that type, r(41) = .62, p < .001. Such relations were not significant for Experiment 2, in which all 
participants were forced, for at least several seconds, to view the pairs simultaneously, thus 
reducing variance in individual differences in Type 2 engagement; r(40) = -.23, p = .15 and r(41) 
= .17, p = .28, for the relation between accuracy and correct and incorrect trial RTs respectively. 
I take this to suggest that those who did the best in Experiment 1 were those who were both 
willing and able to maintain the A:B pair and map the relational correspondences. Those who 
went quickly and relied on the autonomous, Type 1 stream of processing for response performed 
relatively poorly. No such correlation existed for the relation between RT and accuracy for 
within-domain analogies and RT on correct and incorrect trials of that type (p’s of .67 and .81 
respectively), again qualifying that the need for Type 2 processing is not general to this sort of 
reasoning, but specific to the semantically distant cross-domain analogical reasoning. 
Comparing my results to Green et al.’s (2012) results is also supportive of my 
interpretation, as the accuracy in cross-domain analogical reasoning was much, much poorer 
(52.6% & 64.6%) than their observed accuracy (90+%), whereas our average accuracy for 
within-domain analogical reasoning was similar (both approximately 90%). The primary 
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difference between our tasks, beyond the presentation manipulations and a cuing procedure used 
by Green et al. (2012) that I will discuss in the next section, is that participants in my sample 
were instructed to go “as quickly as possible while still being accurate” whereas no such 
admonishment was made to their participants. Green et al.’s (2012) participants took, on average, 
approximately 5500 ms to correctly identify cross-domain analogy trials, whereas my 
participants took only 2347 ms in Experiment 1 and 3369 ms in Experiment 2. Presumably, in 
those extra few seconds, participants were analytically mapping the relational correspondences 
via WM dependent processes, leading to the much better accuracy. Recall too, that in norming 
studies, participants nearly unanimously agree as to the validity classification of these stimuli, 
meaning it is not the case that these relations are impossible to understand -- rather, so long as 
you can and do engage Type 2 processing sufficiently, you will find the common underlying 
relation. Taken as a whole, these experiments support the notion that creative cross-domain 
analogies require relatively more Type 2 processing, and show the utility of the general 













In Experiments 1 and 2, I took a classically cognitive psychological approach by 
modulating performance in the task at hand by manipulating the presentation parameters within 
the study. Specifically, I controlled the extent to which participants could engage Type 2 
processing, and analyzed which sub-types of the stimuli used were relatively more adversely 
affected by these manipulations. This investigation was illuminating in regards to the types of 
processing connected to within and cross-domain analogies respectively, with the results clearly 
suggesting that creative connections of the sort of interest here are dependent upon the 
engagement of Type 2 processing, relative to items that have the same relational structure but are 
more semantically near and bound by surface similarity. Although quite helpful in understanding 
the types of underlying processes that subserve such reasoning, it is at best indirect in terms of 
helping us go about cultivating creativity. That is, although the former experiments give us some 
clues as to what processes underlie complex creativity and the sorts of conditions that preclude 
this ability, I have yet to say anything about how best to encourage or enable people to more 
effectively identify such connections. The purpose of Experiment 3 is to explore whether one can 
cue creativity, in a moment-to-moment basis. Such an investigation will both add to the 
conceptual understanding of the cognitive processes that potentiate complex creativity, and 
perhaps begin to allow intervention aimed at enhancing the ability to identify relationally 
complex creative connections. 
The logic of Experiment 3 is quite simple. Under a default-interventionist DPT 
perspective, people tend not to routinely engage such processing unless required and rather rely 
on the output provided by autonomous Type 1 processes. In the context of the speeded analogical 
reasoning task employed here, there are several aspects of the setting which lend themselves to 
39 
 
not engaging Type 2 processing over and above the experimental manipulations, including the 
standard instruction to “go as quickly as possible while still being accurate”, the number of trials, 
and the general testing environment. Given this, as well as the findings of Experiments 1 and 2, 
which suggest that an integral part of identifying cross-domain analogies is the engagement of 
Type 2 processing, it seems that an instructional manipulation might be quite effective. 
Specifically, I am curious as to what the consequence would be of an instruction to think more 
deeply and engage Type 2 processing? Given that the situational and instructional set seem to 
favour autonomous responding, I wondered whether admonishing participants to think more 
analytically about certain items would induce greater ability in identifying cross-domain 
analogies. In other words, I aim to test whether one can be instructed to more often engage Type 
2 processing as a means of improving performance.  
A recent study already cited here (Green et al., 2012), provides a useful template for 
testing this idea. These authors used the precise stimuli used here and directly explored whether 
intra-experimental cues could modulate performance in making creative connections. 
Participants engaged in the analogical identification task used here (all 4 terms presented 
simultaneously), but on half of the trials (randomly inter-mixed, not blocked) a cue indicated that 
they “should think more creatively”. They found that the cue to think more creatively did 
enhance performance on cross-domain analogical reasoning. Importantly, this increase was not 
due to a more liberal response criterion (i.e. the creative cue did not lead to greater endorsement 
of non-analogies as valid) suggesting that participants were indeed seeing connections they 
otherwise would not. Despite demonstrating than an explicit cue could be effective at enhancing 
creativity, these authors said little about why such a cue might have been effective at a cognitive 
processing level. Given the previously discussed experiments and the findings that support a 
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view in which relatively greater Type 2 processing is beneficial to the identification of cross-
domain analogies, I wondered whether inducing participants to more analytically decompose the 
relations (i.e. engage in relatively more Type 2 processing) would improve identification rates. 
Such an interpretation is consistent with Green et al.’s (2012) finding that along with an increase 
in accuracy as a function of the cue, participants had longer RTs on cue trials compared to non-
cue trials. If participants were responding relatively more intuitively or heuristically (i.e. via 
relatively more Type 1 processing) in an effort to be more creative, one might expect faster RTs 
on cue trials.  
Although it is valuable to know that such creativity can be modulated at the state-level, 
especially via a manipulation as simple as advising one to think more creatively, for such 
interventions or instructions to have a broader meaningful impact, it is necessary to understand 
what the mechanisms are that underlie such a benefit. As such, the focus of this experiment is to 
discern whether a cue to think more analytically can enhance performance. If a cue of this sort 
could effectively enhance cross-domain analogical reasoning, this would constitute a possible 
means by which to enhance creativity in a manner that is inspired by low-level mechanistic 
evidence regarding the underlying cognitive processes involved. If the increased involvement of 
Type 2 processing as a function of the cue is of decrement to the processes that subserve the 
understanding of cross-domain analogies, then participants should perform more poorly on cue 
trials, relative to no cue trials. If the relative degree of Type 1 vs. Type 2 processing is 
unimportant, or insensitive to pointed instruction, such a cue should be of no consequence.  




63 undergraduate students (44 females, Mage = 20.4 years, SD = 1.40) participated in this 
experiment in exchange for course credit. No special criterion for participation was required 
beyond normal or corrected to normal vision and fluency in English.   
Materials/Procedure 
The stimuli and general instructions from Experiments 1 and 2 remained the same, 
though the sequence of trial presentation was such that following fixation, the four terms for each 
trial appeared on screen together and remained there until response, rather than a sequential 
presentation as done before. Additionally, on half of the trials, participants were instructed to 
“think more analytically” (this was counterbalanced such that equal numbers of each stimulus 
sub-type received a cue or no cue. The nature/implementation of such a cue was modelled 
directly after the procedure of Green et al. (2012) with color serving as the means by which to 
alert participants as to the manner in which they should engage each trial. Specifically, on half of 
the trials, the four word sets were purple and on the other half were green. Participants were told: 
“When the words appear in green, think more analytically about whether the four-word set 
constitutes a valid analogy.” The only change here in the nature of the cue and the procedure 
from Green et al. (2012) is the substitution of the word “analytically” for the word “creatively”. 
It is also important to recognize that participants were not advised to think in a particular way on 
no cue trials, rather being left to adopt the processing style of their preference. 
Experiment 3 Results 
Any trials that were more than 3 standard deviations above a participant’s mean RT for a 
given stimulus and cue type were deemed an outlier and excluded from further analysis, resulting 
in the removal of less than 1% of trials.  
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Figure 5 presents the mean accuracy data as a function of Domain, Validity, and Cue, and 
Figure 6 presents the analogous RT data. A 2 (Domain: Cross-domain, Within-domain) × 2 
(Validity: True, False) × 2 (Cue: Analytic cue, No cue) ANOVA on the accuracy data revealed a 
main effect of Domain (F (62) = 92.76, p < .001, ηp² = .60), no main effect of Validity (F <1), 
and no main effect of Cue (F <1). There was a significant Domain × Validity interaction (F (62) 
= 70.11, p < .001, ηp² = .53), and a marginal Validity × Cue interaction, (F (62) = 3.12, p = .08,  
ηp² = .05). The Domain × Cue interaction, and the three-way interaction were both not significant 
(F <1 and F =1.87, respectively). Direct comparisons of each stimulus sub-type as a function of 
cue reveal no significant effects, though there was a slight trend toward greater identification of 
cross-domain analogies in the cue condition (Mean = 72.67, SD = 15.8) relative to the no cue 
condition (Mean = 70.87, SD = 19.0), t (62) = 1.15, SEM = 1.55, p = .25, and performance in 
rejecting the cross-domain analogies was marginally worse in the cue condition than in the no 
cue condition t (62) = 1.80, SEM = 2.19, p = .08. 
Again, the same analysis conducted on the accuracy data was performed on the RT data. 
The 2 (Domain: Cross-domain, Within-domain) × 2 (Validity: True, False) × 2 (Cue: Analytic 
cue, No cue) ANOVA yielded a main effect of Domain (F (62) = 56.70, p < .001, ηp² = .48), a 
main effect of Validity (F (62) = 22.15, p < .001, ηp² = .26), and no main effect of Cue (F <1). 
There was a significant Domain × Validity interaction (F (62) = 70.11, p < .001,  ηp² = .53), and 
a Validity × Cue interaction, (F (62) = 70.11,  p < .001,  ηp² = .53). Though the Domain × Cue 
interaction, and the three-way interaction were both not significant (both Fs <1), the Domain × 
Validity interaction,  (F (62) = 41.38, p < .001,  ηp² = .40), and Validity × Cue, (F (62) = 41.38,  
p < .001,  ηp² = .40), interactions were significant. Direct comparisons of each stimulus sub-type 
as a function of cue revealed that for both within- and cross-domain analogies, there was no  
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Figure 5. Accuracy as a function of Domain, Validity, and Cue. 
 
 

























































significant increase in reaction time, t < 1 and t (62) = 1.53, SEM = 133, p = .13, respectively. 
There was a slight trend toward longer RTs on cue trials for both types (mean increases of 46 and 
204 ms respectively) but there was great variability in the size of this RT difference as a function 
of cue (SDs of 687 and 1057 ms respectively). On non-analogy trials, participants did take 
significantly longer to respond on cue trials for both within- and cross-domain non-analogies 
(mean increases of 818 and 644 ms respectively), t (62) = 2.84, SEM = 288, p < .01 and t (62) = 
2.67, SEM = 241, p = .01.  
Experiment 3 Discussion 
My attempt to mimic the effects of Green et al.’s (2012) cue to think more creatively was 
unsuccessful. These results were not in accord with my hypothesis that being told to “think 
creatively” was leading to greater engagement of Type 2 processing in their sample. There was 
no increase in the number of cross-domain analogies correctly identified on cue trials, relative to 
no cue trials, and we also did not see an increase in RT for cue relative to non-cue trials for this 
stimuli type, as observed by Green et al. (2012). Also, unlike Green et al. (2012), we saw a trend 
(though not statistically significant) whereby participants erroneously endorsed more cross-
domain non-analogies as valid when told to think more analytically. The incongruence between 
our hypothesized results and what was found by Green et al. (2012) seem puzzling in the context 
of the previous experiments I report here. Specifically, if it is the case that Type 2 processing is 
critical to identifying cross-domain analogies, as evidenced by the effect of the manipulations we 
made, then why did telling participants to “think more analytically” on some trials not afford 
participants an advantage? Does this mean that I should abandon my predictions and theoretical 
position? I believe not for the following reasons. 
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For one, it is worth considering the relative size of the cuing effect elicited by Green et al. 
(2012). In their experiment, accuracy on cross-domain analogies for no cue trials was 91.66%, 
compared to 94.53% for cue trials, resulting in a benefit of 2.87%. In my experiment, accuracy 
on cross-domain analogies for no cue trials was 70.87%, compared to 72.66% for cue trials, 
resulting in a benefit of 1.79%. Translating these percentage increases into the actual benefit into 
the number of cross-domain analogies identified, participants in Green et al.’s (2012) experiment 
answered, on average, approximately 0.57 more analogies in the cue than in the no cue condition 
(there were 20 cue trials and 20 no cue trials for this stimulus type), and in my experiment, 
participants solved approximately 0.36 more. This means that relative to our data, participants in 
their experiment solved 0.11 more cross-domain analogies in the cue condition. Given the 
lessened variability (compared to performance in Green et al.’s (2012) experiment, my 
experiment had much lower accuracy and more variability), and the slightly larger increase, their 
experiment found a statistically significant cuing effect, whereas mine did not. Thus, although 
Green et al.’s (2012) “data [do] indicate that an explicit cue to think creatively was able to 
effectively augment reasoning for semantically distant analogies” (p. 602), as there was a 
statistically significant effect, it is sufficiently small that in conjunction with our results, I am, at 
this juncture, reticent to believe that explicit cuing of this sort is sufficiently impactful to 
meaningfully facilitate processing in more ecologically valid settings. Green et al. (2012) 
acknowledge that their effect is a small one, pointing to the ceiling effect caused by the use of 
gifted students, and ponder whether other populations that exhibit lower overall performance 
would receive greater benefit from the cue. Our data revealed that this was not the case, at least 
with this sample, as despite our overall accuracy being significantly lower, we did not see a 
relative increase in the size of the cuing effect on the stimuli of primary interest. 
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So, although the results demonstrated that the cue to “think more analytically” was 
statistically ineffective at enhancing performance, this experiment was not a waste as knowing 
this is valuable for understanding the underlying processes that allow such abilities. This data set 
also had another piece that I think consequential for the matters at hand, as further inspection of 
the pattern of results across cue types hints at a factor consequential to cross-domain analogical 
reasoning ability. I analyzed the relation between performance on cue and no cue trials for all 
stimulus types at the individual level and found positive correlations for all cells. In other words, 
I looked to see how strongly related an individual’s performance was on cue trials to no cue 
trials. Strikingly, a correlation of r(61) = .71, p < .001, was observed for performance on cross-
domain analogy cue trials and no cue trials. Given this strong relation, and the relatively minimal 
effect of the cue, it seems reasonable to presume that stable individual differences (i.e. the trait 
level) in the ability to make such connections are of greater consequence than are any benefits 
afforded by explicit cues to think a certain way (i.e. state level). 
Thus, one means of understanding the null results in this experiment, that is strongly 
grounded in reasoning research and DPTs, is that long-term dispositions in the extent to which 
participants engage in Type 2 processing is driving much of the difference in performance, and is 
sufficiently influential so as to hinder our ability to directly modify processing style on demand 
via an explicit cue. Given that we know meaningful individual differences exist in the relative 
proclivity to engage in Type 2 processing (e.g. Stanovich, 2009), and that there was great 
variability in the effect of the cue, it stands to reason that these individual differences should 
interact with explicit cues to engage in a particular sort of processing. Another potential source 
of variability is the manner in which people of varying cognitive styles respond to instructions to 
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think a certain way. This is especially true given the previous design, as the baseline no cue 
condition contained no hint as to how one should respond on those trials. 
Given the known individual differences in the extent to which one thinks analytically, the 
null results of Experiment 2, the strong correlation between individual performance on cue and 
no cue trials, and the myriad possibilities for how such individual differences will interact with 
cuing instructions, an important part of understanding how to cue creative thinking comes from 
qualifying this relation. As such, Experiment 4 will again have participants receive a cue to think 
a certain way, and I will collect information pertaining to participants’ long term dispositions to 
engage in relatively more or less Type 1 and Type 2 thinking. 

















Stanovich (1999; 2004) and other dual-process theorists, distinguish between the 
willingness (i.e. thinking disposition; cognitive style) and ability (i.e. intelligence; cognitive 
ability) to engage Type 2 processes. Importantly, individual differences in the dispositional use 
of Type 2 processing predict rational performance over and above individual differences in 
cognitive ability (Stanovich & West, 2000; Toplak, West, & Stanovich, 2011), and it is such 
differences that are of focus in the remaining experiments. Recall that Type 1 processing is 
considered autonomous and, as a consequence, the default mode of processing (Evans & 
Stanovich, 2013). Thus, individual differences in the dispositional use of Type 2 processing (i.e. 
cognitive style) are thought to exist on a spectrum such that those more willing to engage Type 2 
reasoning are therefore less likely to be influenced by Type 1 processes whereas those who are 
less willing to engage Type 2 reasoning are therefore more likely to be influenced by Type 1 
processes. 
In the context of the current experiment, we were interested in indexing this individual 
difference and exploring its effects upon explicit cues to think certain ways. Several possibilities 
exist. For example, it might be the case that cuing a relatively non-analytic thinker to think 
analytically could be detrimental to reasoning as they might waste valuable WM dependent 
resources, integral to Type 2 processing, in conscious attempts to alter their cognitive style, or 
meta-monitoring of their ability to follow the admonishment to think analytically. Conversely, 
less analytic thinkers might experience relatively greater benefit than others who tend to already 
engage in relatively more analytic thought, as these participants might already be at ceiling. 
Little work in the reasoning tradition has employed such direct cues to think a certain way in a 
speeded task of the sort employed here, and as such, the current experiment is important not only 
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for understanding the creative analogical reasoning of primary interest, but generally informs 
research on thinking styles and their ability to be modified in an explicit way on a trial-to-trial 
basis. 
Experiment 4 Method 
Participants 
76 undergraduate students (59 females, Mage = 20.3 years, SD = 3.19) participated in this 
experiment in exchange for course credit. No special criterion for participation was required 
beyond normal or corrected to normal vision and fluency in English.   
Materials/Procedure 
The cued analogical reasoning task was nearly identical to that used in Experiment 2, 
with the exception that rather than only have a cue on half of the trials, all trials were cued; 
however, the nature of the cue changed. Now, participants were told: “When the words appear in 
green, think more analytically about whether the four-word set constitutes a valid analogy. When 
the words appear in purple, think more intuitively about whether the four-word set constitutes a 
valid analogy.” By introducing such an instructional set, I improve upon both Green et al.’s 
(2012) and my own previous (Experiment 3) attempts to cue creativity in several ways. For one, 
rather than leave it to the participants to decide what it means to “think more creatively”, I 
instead cue them to think particular ways on every trial in hopes of more specifically being able 
to bind the effects of the cue to underlying cognitive processing mechanisms or styles. It might 
be the case that some participants think more analytically (i.e. more frequently engaging Type 2 
processing) when prompted to think more creatively, whereas others might try thinking more 
intuitively (i.e. less frequently engaging Type 2 processing), making the locus of any 
improvements difficult to ascertain. As such, having contrasting cues used on every trial 
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provides a more clear demarcation between trial types than that afforded by a cue vs. no cue 
comparison, and hopefully will provide slightly more uniformity in the manner in which 
participants respond to the cue.  
In order to glean insight into individual differences in cognitive style, upon completing 
the analogical reasoning task, participants completed the Rational Experiential Inventory (REI; 
Pacini & Epstein, 1999). The REI is a self-report index that is comprised of two sub-scales each 
comprised of 20 questions. The Need for Cognition scale (NFC) indexes the extent to which an 
individual enjoys and engages in effortful or analytic thinking. The Faith in Intuition scale (FI), 
indexes the extent to which one is prone to trust one’s first impulses (see Appendix C for the full 
scale). Although such a scale has a slightly different decomposition (i.e. distinctions amongst the 
analytic and experiential systems) than that of the DPTs discussed, it, in essence, is thought to 
index the same types of dispositions. 
Experiment 4 Results 
Again, any trials that were more than 3 standard deviations above a participant’s mean 
RT for a given stimulus and cue type were deemed an outlier and excluded from further analysis, 
resulting in the removal of less than 1% of trials.  
Before considering the effects of the cue as a consequence of individual differences, I 
will analyze the cued analogical reasoning task in isolation. Figure 7 presents the mean accuracy 
data as a function of Domain, Validity, and Cue, and Figure 8 presents the analogous RT data. A 
2 (Domain: Cross-domain, Within-domain) × 2 (Validity: True, False) × 2 (Cue: Analytic cue, 
Intuitive cue) ANOVA on the accuracy data revealed a main effect of Domain (F (75) = 123.98, 








Figure 7. Accuracy as a function of Domain, Validity, and Cue. 
 
 













































main effect of Cue (F (75) = 3.18, p = .08, ηp² = .04). The Validity × Cue interaction was not 
significant (F<1).  The Domain × Validity, (F (62) = 119.62, p < .001, ηp² = .62), and Domain × 
Cue, (F (62) = 26.27, p < .001, ηp² = .26), interactions were significant, as was the three-way 
interaction (F (62) = 8.78, p < .01,  ηp² = .11). Direct comparisons of each stimulus sub-type as a 
function of cue reveal the pattern underlying these effects. For within-domain analogies 
performance was lower on intuitive cue trials (Mean = 91.1%, SD = 8.3) than analytic cue trials 
(Mean = 93.6%, SD = 7.3), t (75) = 2.69, SEM = .93, p < .01. A similar advantage was found for 
within-domain non-analogies, with performance again lower on intuitive cue trials (Mean = 
69.9%, SD = 21.1) than analytic cue trials (Mean = 78.3%, SD = 8.3), t (75) = 3.60, SEM = 2.3, p 
< .01. For cross-domain non-analogy trials, the inverse pattern was found, with performance on 
intuitive cue trials (Mean = 78.9%, SD = 22.0) being significantly worse than on analytic cue 
trials (Mean = 73.8%, SD = 15.1), t (75) = -2.63, SEM = 1.94, p < .01. Interestingly, the stimulus 
sub-type of most interest to the current investigation (i.e. true cross domain analogies) was the 
only one not to show any difference, with mean accuracy for analytic (Mean = 69.9%, SD = 
16.6) and intuitive cue trials (Mean = 69.0%, SD = 15.1) being almost identical (t<1). I shall 
return to explore this finding in more detail later in this section. 
Before diving further into these results, and qualifying them in the context of our 
individual differences measure, I will report the analogous analysis conducted on the RT data. A 
2 (Domain: Cross-domain, Within-domain) × 2 (Validity: True, False) × 2 (Cue: Analytic cue, 
Intuitive cue) ANOVA revealed significant main effects of Domain (F (75) = 124.33, p < .001, 
ηp² = .62), Validity (F (75) = 26.2, p < .001, ηp² = .26), and Cue (F (75) = 45.06, p < .001, ηp² = 
.38). All possible interactions were also significant: Domain × Validity, (F (75) = 24.29, p < 
.001, ηp² = .25); Domain × Cue, (F (75) = 9.68, p < .01, ηp² = .11); Validity × Cue, (F (75) = 
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5.13, p < .05, ηp² = .06); and Domain × Validity × Cue, (F (75) = 4.74, p < .05, ηp² = .06). 
Although such a pattern seems complicated, the essential facts can be quite succinctly summated 
as follows. For all stimulus types, analytic cue trials had longer RTs than intuitive cue trials (as 
evidenced by the main effect of cue). Cross-domain analogies and both non-analogy types had 
relatively similar increases (all three between 1500-1700 ms) with within-domain analogies, 
which also had the lowest overall RT, unsurprisingly having a smaller increase on analytic 
relative to intuitive cue trials (828 ms). Importantly, cross-domain analogies took longer to 
identify than within-domain analogies at both cue types, consistent with earlier findings.  
In terms of individual differences measures, I correlated performance on all trial types 
and found that FI was not correlated with accuracy for any type. NFC was positively related to 
accuracy in rejecting, for both cue types, within-domain non-analogies, r (75) = .30, p < .01 for 
intuitive cues and r (75) =.33, p < .01 for analytic cues, and in rejecting cross-domain non-
analogies, r (75) = .39, p < .01 for intuitive cues and r = .22, p =.06 for analytic cues. NFC was 
unrelated to success in identification of analogies for either stimulus under either cuing 
instruction. 
I was surprised by two main results, given my theoretical predictions, and some of the 
data I had collected earlier. Firstly, I had made an a priori prediction that performance in the 
identification of cross-domain analogies would be superior for the analytic cue trials, relative to 
the intuitive cue trials. Secondly, I had also predicted that performance on cross-domain 
analogies would be predicted by the REI. Specifically, I had reasoned that those who are more 
willing to think analytically (i.e. greater disposition to engage Type 2 processing) and less likely 
to rely on intuitions (i.e. less reliance on Type 1 processing) would be more likely to correctly 
identify cross-domain analogies. Given these failures in supporting my hypothesis, I conducted 
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several follow-up analyses to explore whether there was any evidence that would speak to the 
broader questions at hand. 
Importantly, inspired by Cognitive-Experiential Self-Theory (CEST; Epstein, 1973), the 
two subscales that together comprise the REI are purported to index subtly distinct dimensions 
pertaining to the issues at hand, through asking questions thought to relate to rational and 
experiential systems. The NFC is thought to capture variation in thinking style in regards to the 
extent to which one has rational ability (e.g. “ability to think logically and analytically) and the 
extent to which they engage that ability (e.g. “reliance on and enjoyment of thinking in an 
analytical, logical manner”). The FI indexes variation in the extent to which one has ability in 
inferring experiential states (e.g. “ability with respect to one's intuitive impressions and 
feelings") and the extent to which such an experiential system is engaged (e.g. “reliance on and 
enjoyment of feelings and intuitions in making decisions”). Such a distinction suggests that more 
nuanced characterizations of our reasoners might illuminate more interesting relations between 
thinking style and the ability to solve analogies. These subscales are theoretically intended to be 
independent, and this is borne out by the lack of a correlation, or even trend, in our sample (r = 
.005, p = .96). As such, I decided to conduct a median split on participants as a function of both 
subscales and explored the effects of a cue at this more nuanced level. For NFC, a split results in 
a distinction between reflective and non-reflective participants, and for FI, a split results in a 
distinction between intuitive and non-intuitive. The combinations afforded by this provide an 
interesting means of describing 4 subtypes of reasoners in our sample: those that are non-
reflective and intuitive, those that are non-reflective and non-intuitive, those that are reflective 
and intuitive, and those that are reflective and non-intuitive.  
55 
 
To explore whether such groupings provide further insight into the processes of interest 
for the identification of true analogies, I conducted a 2 (Domain: Cross-domain, Within-domain) 
× 2 (Cue: Analytic cue, Intuitive cue) × 2 (Reflectiveness: Non-reflective, Reflective) × 2 
(Intuitiveness: Non-intuitive, Intuitive) ANOVA. The presence of a massive main effect of 
domain (F (1, 72) = 274.16, p < .001, ηp² = .79) and a four-way interaction (F (72) = 11.33, p < 
.01, ηp² = .14) provided impetus to de-compose and run two three-way ANOVAs for each 
domain. For within-domain analogies, there was a main effect of the cue (F (1, 72) = 4.74, p < 
.05, ηp² = .06), with the analytic cue yielding slightly better performance than the intuitive cue 
but no significant interactions (all Fs < 1). For cross-domain analogies, however, there was no 
main effect of cue (F < 1), but a significant three-way interaction (F (1, 72) = 9.72, p < .01, ηp² = 
.12). To further understand the pattern responsible for this interaction, I then split the file as a 
function of Reflectiveness and ran two separate 2 (Cue: Analytic cue, Intuitive cue) × 2 
(Intuitiveness: Non-intuitive, Intuitive) ANOVAs, which were quite illuminating. For non-
reflective participants there was no main effect of Cue, no main effect of Intuitiveness, and no 
interaction (all Fs < 1). For reflective participants, however, there was no main effect of cue (F < 
1) but a significant interaction (F (1, 36) = 11.76, p < .01, ηp² = .25). This interaction suggests 
that the effect of reflectiveness was modulated by whether or not one was intuitive. To quantify 
these patterns in actual performance and to understand this last interaction, I conducted paired 
sample t-tests between intuitive and analytic cue instructions for each of the 4 sub-groups 
discussed above. As is obvious from the ANOVA above, there was no significant difference in 
accuracy for cross-domain analogies as a function of cue for non-reflective intuitive or non-
intuitive participants (both t’s< 1). For reflective participants, a very interesting pattern emerged 
as a function of intuitiveness that explains the aforementioned interaction. Intuitive reflective 
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participants performed better on cross-domain analogy trials when they were cued to think 
intuitively (Mean accuracy = 67.9%, SD = 18.6) than when they were cued to think analytically 
(Mean accuracy = 61.7%, SD = 16.7), t (17) = 2.29, SEM = 2.74, p < .05. Conversely, non-
intuitive reflective participants performed better on cross-domain analogy trials when they were 
cued to think analytically (Mean accuracy = 79.0%, SD = 15.1) than when they were cued to 
think intuitively (Mean accuracy = 68.9%, SD = 13.5), t (41) = 2.66, SEM = 3.79, p < .05. See 
Figure 9 for a graphical depiction of these results. 
 
 
Experiment 4 Accuracy by group 
 
 
Figure 9. Accuracy as a function of Cue for each of the four sub-groups created by splitting file 


























Experiment 4 Discussion 
There are several findings of theoretical interest, varying in complexity. Most simply, we 
replicate the very robust result that cross-domain analogies take longer to identify than within-
domain analogies. The main effect of cue revealed that the additional instructions to think 
intuitively, rather than no cue at all (as in Experiment 3), cleaned up the variability in response to 
the cue to think analytically, as in this experiment all cells showed a mean increase in RT for the 
analytic relative to intuitive cue. This suggests we likely were effective in inducing the two 
different types of processing styles that we had hoped to at the outset, strengthening confidence 
that our cue instructions did induce the desired mindset and making this study amenable to 
understanding the pertinent questions. Such a result is suggestive that similar cues in future 
experiments should provide directives for all trials, rather than only cuing half the trials, as it is 
difficult to know what sort of processing a baseline no cue trial is reflecting, making 
interpretation of results more difficult. 
This study also supported the view that experimental manipulations should be 
accompanied by individual differences measures whenever possible. Here, if I had not included a 
questionnaire gauging thinking dispositions, I would not have illuminated some nuanced and 
informative results. The decomposition of the impact of the cue as a function of reflectiveness 
and intuitiveness showed that the cues to think analytically and intuitively had divergent effects 
for certain sub-sets of the sample. One take-away from such a result is that interventions to 
enhance creativity should take into account individual differences in thinking style, as it seems 
that what is effective for one may not be for another. Some (e.g. Howard-Jones, 2002) have 
suggested that interventions aimed at enhancing creativity should focus on encouraging people to 
think a way that is not their typical ‘style’. Specifically, it was suggested that getting more 
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analytic thinkers to think more associatively might be helpful, and encouraging more associative 
thinkers to think more analytically might be helpful. My results show this was not the case, and 
that cues that were congruent with one’s thinking style were effective.  Although there was 
congruence between the benefit of moment-to-moment cues and longer term dispositions (i.e. 
non-intuitive reflective thinkers did better when told to think analytically, and intuitive reflective 
thinkers did better when told to think intuitively). It is important to emphasize, though, that the 
highest performance on cross-domain analogies came from non-intuitive reflective individuals 
on the analytic cue, with this group having the highest overall (i.e. irrespective of cue) accuracy 
as well. It would seem that on these types of trials, these participants are engaging the most Type 
2 processing we have seen, and this is resulting in the highest performance yet. This is entirely 
consistent with the view articulated here and suggestive that cultivation of complex creativity 
might benefit from longer term efforts to instill analytic cognitive styles. 
More generally, the finding that intuitive reflective participants had lowered performance 
makes sense, as the information that would come intuitively to mind would be lack of surface 
similarity (i.e. these pairs are semantically distant), which would cue the participant to assume 
there is no common underlying relation and incorrectly respond no. Non-intuitive reflective 
participants are presumably less influenced by the autonomous stream of information that 
automatically activates the idea that the two things at hand are not related and are accordingly 
more successful at finding relational connections. Recent work has related such thinking 
dispositions to conflict detection, with more analytic participants being more sensitive to conflict 
(Pennycook, Koehler & Fugelsang, 2012). It might be the case that although the non-intuitive 
non-reflective participants are less influenced by the relatively smaller semantic distance, they 
might not be any less sensitive to this incongruence. In other words, they might experience the 
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same activation, but actively be inhibiting the response based on similarity in order to respond 
relationally, a point to which I will return in the discussion. As for the finding that intuitive 
reflective thinkers actually experienced a decrement in performance when told to think 
analytically, it might be the case that the meta-level cognitive monitoring required to shift one’s 
thinking style actually in effect served as a dual-task manipulation. That is, the effort required to 
consciously be more analytic might require the very resources required for the analogical 
mapping process.  
It seems clear from the basis of the results of Experiment 4 that individual differences in 
disposition to engage Type 2 processing are consequential in determining one’s ability to 
generate the mappings required to identify cross-domain analogical reasoning. It also seems clear 
that these differences interact with cues to think a particular way. As with any good study 
though, the results raise more questions than they provide answers, and in Experiment 5, I will 














  Experiment 5 sought to expand the extent to which I could understand the relation 
between the individual differences factors that predict performance in the context of complex 
creativity. To do so, there were several changes to the procedure used in Experiment 4, as well as 
several expansions to the scope and breadth of my investigation. These modifications 
importantly afford novel insights above and beyond that offered by my previous experimental 
explorations and serve as the culmination of my goal to understand complex creativity (or a 
small part of it at least). I will review the nature of these changes and expansions next, and relate 
them to the broader question of what allows us to make creative connections. 
For one, I wanted to explore the role of thinking dispositions, such as that measured by 
the REI in Experiment 4, in the absence of trial-by-trial cues. Given that thinking dispositions are 
by their very definition reflective of a tendency to approach problems in a certain way, it seems 
important to allow participants freedom in how to respond to better understand the question I aim 
to address. By removing the cue, we should see relatively more ‘natural’ responding that is more 
reflective of the manner in which they might organically approach a problem, which in turn 
might illuminate inter-relations otherwise hidden by the imposition of the cue. A critic might say 
that this is still an artificial speeded task, but it is important to recall that these same stimuli are 
identified correctly with a high degree of uniformity but in the context of my experiments there 
was a large amount of individual differences, specifically within the cross-domain analogies, 
which are of primary interest. As such, I would argue that preservation of this element is 
important for illuminating individual differences of the sort I am interested in.  
Also, although self-report measures have utility, they bring certain problems (e.g. see 
Paulhus & Vazire, 2007).  People are generally notoriously bad at assessing the nature of their 
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own abilities, traits, and behaviours, and even misrepresent that which they could accurately 
report. For example, some participants will aim to respond in a socially desirable way, or engage 
in other strategic efforts to present themselves in a particular way. More specifically, it has been 
argued that indexing the extent to which one is prone to engage analytic processing is more 
effectively done through the use of performance measures that require the engagement of Type 2 
thinking to solve (Toplak, West, & Stanovich, 2011). In this paper, the authors advocate the use 
of the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT; Frederick, 2005) as a means of indexing thinking styles. 
The CRT consists of three items with open ended responses and is a widely used task thought to 
index analytic thinking (Toplak, West, & Stanovich, 2011). The questions are quasi-
mathematical in form and designed so as to engender a strong intuitive response. To answer 
correctly, one is thought to need to question and override the Type 1 response in favour of more 
analytic, Type 2 processing. Consider the following example: 
A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs $1.00 more than the ball. How much 
does the ball cost? 
The response of $.10 comes to mind quickly, presumably due to the segmentation of the given 
values into even units, but further reflection reveals this to be erroneous. As the math involved is 
quite basic, incorrect responses are thought to be primarily a consequence of a failure to engage 
analytic processing, rather than a deficiency in ability to actually do the requisite operation. 
Toplak, West and Stanovich (2011, p. 1284) identify the CRT as a 
 
particularly potent measure of miserly tendencies because of its logic of construction: It 
is a performance measure rather than a self-report measure. That is, it is not a 
questionnaire measure on which people indicate their preferences for engagement—for 
example, as the need-for-cognition scale does (Cacioppo, Petty, Feinstein,& Jarvis, 
1996). Instead, the tendency to accept heuristically triggered responses is measured in a 
real performance context where participants are searching for an accurate solution. The 
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CRT measures miserliness in action, so to speak. It is a direct measure of miserly 
processing rather than an indirect self-report indicator. 
 
  
Given the arguments of these authors, and the demonstrated utility in the use of the same and 
similar measures in other contexts (e.g. Pennycook, Cheyne, Seli, Koehler, & Fugelsang, 2012; 
Pennycook, Cheyne, Barr, Koehler, & Fugelsang, 2014a; Pennycook, Cheyne, Barr, Koehler, & 
Fugelsang, 2014b), Experiment 5, in addition to the REI, incorporated performance based 
measures (including the CRT) that are thought to also index individual differences in the relative 
degree of Type 2 engagement. The addition of performance based measures allows both a more 
objective means of assessing the relative engagement of Type 2 processing as well as providing 
an opportunity to determine whether the self-report and performance based measures cohere in 
predicting creative performance, allowing a chance for convergent validity. 
As a means of expanding the scope of the study further, I also included two brief 
cognitive ability indices (i.e. vocabulary/numeracy tasks) to measure individual differences in 
knowledge. Stanovich (2009) distinguishes between the willingness and ability to engage Type 2 
processing, and these measures are thought to relate more to the ability, than the willingness that 
is of primary focus. Their inclusion is motivated by several things. For one, by including 
measures thought to index more general cognitive ability, we can explore whether our cognitive 
style measures are independent contributors. As cognitive ability and a more analytic cognitive 
style are correlated, it is important to ascertain whether the disposition to engage more Type 2 
processing is indeed required. These questions, although having normatively correct answers, do 
not feature a misleading intuitive response such as that in the cognitive style tasks used here. 
Furthermore, it seems that a larger base of knowledge is important for tasks in which one must 
bring together elements represented in distal semantic space. Given that semantic memory is akin 
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to a network of connections, having more concepts and richer inter-connections might prove 
critical to understanding more complex creative relations amongst sets of relations.   
A final addition here was that of additional creativity tasks. Semantic distance of the sort 
studied here is only one sub-type of creative thought that is of interest to psychologists. 
Accordingly, it is important to both explore the relation between individual differences regarding 
thinking style and other types of creativity and to understand whether the analogical reasoning 
task reported here relates to other tasks thought to index the same over-arching construct. In 
addition to tasks that index very distinct aspects of creativity (i.e. cognitive flexibility, fluency, 
originality), I also incorporated another task thought to require the integration of disparate 
concepts as a means of understanding whether our results are an idiosyncratic consequence of the 
analogy task, or if they inform a more general cognitive ability to connect semantically distant 
concepts. Given the consensus regarding the extant confusion characterizing the field of 
creativity research (see Hennessey & Amabile, 2010), it is important to more fully qualify the 
commonalities and differences between the processes and traits that afford success in diverse 
facets of creativity. 
As discussed in the introduction, creativity researchers are divided as to the relative 
utility of engaging executive processing in the creative process and it is this question that is of 
primary importance here. Importantly, those championing the view that relatively less controlled 
processing is helpful do not deny its role altogether. As such, the question is not whether creative 
thought involves some degree of controlled processing. The question, rather, is whether 
relatively more or less intervention of such processing is beneficial to creativity. For example, 
Wiley & Jarosz (2012) assert that creative problem solving requires a mixture of “non-goal-
directed processes and more controlled, attention-demanding processes” (p. 260). Moreover, they 
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state that individual differences in the ability to shift between these two modes of thought may be 
useful in understanding creativity, but that “there is not yet a definitive paradigm that allows for 
the measurement of individual differences along these lines” and overtly state that there is a 
“need for a dual-process model of problem solving that incorporates both analytic and 
nonanalytic processes” (p. 261).  
We agree with Wiley & Jarosz (2012) that such individual differences hold promise, but 
disagree that there exists no suitable paradigm for measuring such differences, as DPTs 
incorporate individual differences in analytic thinking disposition. Under this formulation, Type 
2 processing relates directly to the relative reliance on intuitive “non-goal directed processes” as 
they are necessarily modulated by the explicit engagement of “controlled, attention demanding 
processes” (using Wiley et al.’s terminology).  
In Experiment 5, we use individual differences measures indexing cognitive ability and 
cognitive style to predict creative performance, as indexed by a number of diverse tasks that 
reflect the multi-faceted nature of the construct of creativity. Our aim is to illuminate whether 
relatively more or less analytic thinking is beneficial to the creative process and attempt to 
understand the interplay between distinct types of thinking in creativity, formalizing previous 
suggestions that the study of creativity could benefit from a DPT perspective (see Allen & 
Thomas, 2011) and more strongly situating my state level results with evidence regarding the 
traits that afford success in such tasks. If higher cognitive ability and a more analytic cognitive 
style are associated with increased creativity, it would suggest a greater benefit of executive 
processing than would be predicted by some accounts of creativity (e.g. Wiley & Jarosz, 2012). 
In contrast, if lower cognitive ability and a less analytic cognitive style is associated with 
increased creativity, it would suggest a greater benefit of non-goal directed, potentially 
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unconscious processing than would be predicted by some accounts of creativity (e.g. Beaty & 
Silvia, 2012). Given the logic outlined in the introduction, and the findings discussed thus far, I 
would predict that complex creativity tasks, such as that exemplified by the cross-domain 
analogies will be positively related to a dispositional tendency to more often engage Type 2 
processing. Given the results of the previous experiments in this study, as well as the logic 
outlined in the introduction regarding the nature of knowledge representation and the default-
interventionist DPT framework, I hypothesize that tasks indexing the ability to make remote 
connections will benefit from relatively more Type 2 processing, but am less certain about what 
to expect with the other tasks. 
Experiment 5 Method 
Participants 
One-hundred two University of Waterloo undergraduates (66 females, Mage = 20.01 
years, SD = 3.11) participated in a two-part study for course credit. No special criterion for 
participation was required beyond normal or corrected to normal vision and fluency in English.   
Design 
The experiment consisted of several tasks and one questionnaire. The individual 
difference cognitive measures were included as part of a larger online study. Participants who 
completed these measures online were eligible to come into the lab and complete the creativity 
tasks, as well as a self-report questionnaire on thinking dispositions. All in-lab tasks were 
computerized and implemented via E-prime. Task order was randomized with the exception of 




Cognitive Tasks/Questionnaires. See Appendix D for ACS and CA measures. To index 
the extent to which participants varied in analytic cognitive style (ACS), that is, the 
willingness/tendency to think analytically, participants completed the Cognitive Reflection Test 
(CRT; Frederick, 2005) and a Base-rate conflict task (Pennycook et al., 2012).  
The CRT is discussed above and as such is not described further here, though all three 
items can be found. The base-rate task employed here is similar in logic and makes use of the 
idea that successful judgments often necessitate consideration of several different, and often 
competing, sources of information. By intentionally creating incongruence in these sources, we 
can make inferences about the types of processing that relate to the given choice. Specifically, 
we asked participants to decide category membership in situations in which the base-rate 
information and personality description were in conflict.  In other words, we presented the 
relative chance that an individual in our sample would be from either of two given categories 
alongside a description of their personality that fits better with the less likely of those two 
choices. Consider the following example (from De Neys & Glumicic, 2008): 
 
In a study 1000 people were tested. Among the participants there were 995 nurses and 5 
doctors. Paul is a randomly chosen participant of this study. Paul is 34 years old. He lives 
in a beautiful home in a posh suburb. He is well spoken and very interested in politics. He 
invests a lot of time in his career.  
 
Is Paul more likely to be a nurse or a doctor? 
 
People often ‘neglect’ or underweight the fact that there is an extremely high chance that Paul, or 
any other person from this sample, is a nurse (i.e. base-rate probability = 99.5%) in the face of 
the more intuitive personality description that it conflicts with. As such, the relative distribution 
of base-rate versus personality-based choices on this task is considered a means of indexing the 
extent to which an individual is willing to engage analytic processing. There were 18 items in 
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total: six neutral (no personality descriptions, six congruent (base-rate and personality match), 
and six incongruent problems such as that outlined above. Our primary dependent measure for 
this task was the proportion of incongruent problems correctly solved. 
Importantly, in both tasks, an intuitive (Type 1) response is cued that requires Type 2 
processing to override. Overall performance reflects the relative reliance on both Type 1 and 
Type 2 processes such that those who are more analytic are necessarily less intuitive, and vice 
versa. Thus, variations in performance on such tasks that cue misleading intuitive responses 
reflect individual differences in deployment of both analytic and nonanalytic processes. In order 
to create a composite ACS score, the percentage correct for the CRT and incongruent base-rate 
problems were averaged. 
An important issue to address is that although the CRT and Base-rate task are primarily 
thought to be indexing ACS, recent investigations have confirmed that performance on both 
tasks is predicted by measures of cognitive ability as well (Base-rate problems: Pennycook, 
Cheyne, Barr, Koehler, & Fugelsang, 2014a; CRT: Toplak, West & Stanovich, 2011). As such, 
these tasks are not “pure” measures of the willingness to think analytically but also, to some 
degree, are reflective of an individual’s analytic ability. However, as noted above, that 
performance on these problems is relatively low, despite the simple computations required, 
indicates a stronger relative role for cognitive style than cognitive ability (see Pennycook, 
Cheyne, Barr, Koehler, & Fugelsang, 2014b for a similar discussion).  
The Rational Experiential Inventory (Pacini & Epstein, 1999) was again used as a self-
report index, as it is related to our performance-based ACS tasks. Fourteen participants did not 
complete the REI.  
68 
 
To measure cognitive ability (CA), participants completed a widely used Numeracy task 
(Schwartz et al., 1998) and the Wordsum (see Huang & Hauser, 2010), a verbal intelligence 
measure shown to correlate well with full scale intelligence measures (Malhorta, Krosnick, & 
Haertwl, 2007). The Numeracy task consists of three questions thought to index basic 
understanding of concepts pertaining to probability and basic numerical knowledge.  The 
Wordsum is a 12 item vocabulary test in which participants are shown a target word, and given 
five other words, one of which is close in meaning to the given word. Participants are simply 
asked to identify the word that is closest in meaning to the target word or to indicate that they do 
not know the meaning of the word. Together, these short tasks comprise an index of broad 
cognitive abilities and have demonstrated predictive validity in previous work (e.g. Pennycook et 
al., 2012; Pennycook et al., 2014a).  In order to create a composite CA score, the percentage 
correct from the Numeracy task and the Wordsum were averaged. 
Creativity Tasks. See Appendix E for creativity measure items. Four tasks were employed 
to index different facets of creativity. To measure cognitive flexibility, participants completed 
the Category-Inclusiveness Task (CIT; Isen & Duabman, 1984). In this task, participants are 
presented with exemplars and asked to indicate the extent to which the given item belongs in the 
category to which it belonged. Here, participants were presented with a total of 36 exemplars 
from four categories (furniture, vehicle, vegetable, and clothing), with each category consisting 
of three weak, moderate, and strong exemplars. The presentation of words in each category was 
blocked and the order of blocks was randomized, as were the exemplars within the block, with 
the caveat that a strong exemplar was always first (as in Isen & Daubman, 1984 and Slepian & 
Ambady, 2012). The primary dependent variable is the ratings of belonging for weak exemplars 
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of a given category. Those who, on average, assign higher ratings to weak exemplars are 
purported to be more flexible and are thought to conceive of entities in an atypical manner. 
To measure fluency and originality, participants completed the Alternate Uses Task 
(AUT; Guilford, 1967). The dependent measures for our study were fluency (i.e. the number of 
items generated) and originality (i.e. the extent to which the provided use is deemed divergent 
from the intended uses of that object, as assessed by three independent raters on a scale from 1 
(not at all) to 7 (very). In our study, participants were asked to generate as many possible 
creative uses for a newspaper as they could within one minute (Guilford, 1967; Slepian & 
Ambady, 2012) 
To assess the ability to make remote connections, two tasks were used. The first, the 
Remote Associates Test (RAT; Mednick, 1962), presents three words that are ostensibly 
unrelated (e.g. SORE, SHOULDER, SWEAT) and participants are asked to generate a common 
associate that forms a compound with all three of the given words (e.g. COLD). No time limit 
was imposed, contrary to what has been done in some investigations (see Dorfman, Shames, & 
Kihlstrom, 1996; Slepian, Weisbuch, Rutchick, Newman, & Ambady, 2010; Slepian & Ambady, 
2012) as allowing participants to decide how long to think about the problems should allow 
greater variance in the extent of Type 2 processing, an issue central to our investigation. The 15 
three-word triads, originally drawn from Bowden and Jung-Beeman (2003) and more recently 
used by Slepian and Ambady, (2012), were rated in previous investigations as being moderately 
difficult and were presented in random order on screen. Participants typed their responses, but if 
they could not generate the answer, they were asked to type “no” to move on to the next trial.  
The final creativity measure was the same speeded analogical reasoning task used 
throughout this thesis. Presentation parameters were such that a blank screen appeared for 500 
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ms, followed by a fixation cross for 500 ms in isolation before being joined by the two word 
pairs, to the left and right of fixation. This procedure is nearly identical to that used in 
Experiments 2 and 3, without the explicit cue.  
Experiment 5 Results 
Cognitive tasks. Performance on the cognitive tasks was as follows: CRT, Mean accuracy 
= 41.2%, SD = 37.9; Base rate Incongruent problems, Mean accuracy = 30.2%, SD = 32.5; 
Wordsum, Mean accuracy = 58.2%, SD = 20.6; Numeracy, Mean accuracy = 74.5%, SD = 29.7. 
Remote connections. Embedded within the broader correlation design, the analogy task 
features the same experimental component (i.e. the distinction between within and cross-domain 
analogies) as earlier experiments. Figure 10 presents the mean accuracy data as a function of 
Domain, Validity, and Cue, and Figure 11 presents the analogous RT data. A 2 (Domain: Cross-
domain, Within-domain) × 2 (Validity: True, False) ANOVA on the accuracy data revealed a 
main effect of Domain, F (1, 101) = 203.58, p < .001, ηp² = .67, a main effect of Validity F (1, 
101) = 13.44, p < .001, ηp² = .12, and a significant Domain × Validity interaction F (1, 101) = 
162.04, p < .001, ηp² = .67.  Specifically, performance for within domain analogies (Mean 
accuracy = 93.8%, SD = 6.3) was far superior (and less variable) than that for cross-domain 
analogies (Mean accuracy = 63.7%, SD = 18.8), t = 17.47, SEM = 1.72, p < .0001. Again, 
performance for cross-domain non-analogies (Mean accuracy = 87.75%, SD = 13.0) was 
superior to that for within-domain non-analogies (Mean accuracy = 81.0%, SD = 17.5), t = 4.22, 
SEM = 1.60, p < .001.   
An analogous 2 (Domain: Cross-domain, Within-domain) × 2 (Validity: True, False) 
ANOVA on the RT data revealed a main effect of Domain, F (1, 101) = 195.03, p < .001, ηp² = 
.66, a main effect of Validity F (1, 101) = 8.12, p < .01, ηp² = .07, and a significant Domain ×  
71 
 




Figure 10. Accuracy as a function of Domain and Validity. 
 
 





















































Validity interaction F (1, 101) = 78.5, p < .001, ηp² = .44. For non-analogies, participants took 
slightly longer to respond correctly to cross-domain items (Mean RT = 4336 ms, SD = 1852) 
than within-domain items (Mean RT = 4181 ms, SD = 1563), but this difference was not 
significant, t = 1.56, SEM = 99.42, p = .12. Again, a significant RT difference was found as a 
function of domain for true analogies, with within-domain analogies (Mean RT = 3230 ms, SD = 
891) being correctly identified much faster than cross-domain analogies (Mean RT = 4659 ms, 
SD = 1495), t = 17.23, SEM = 82.92, p < .0001. As within-domain analogies were yet again 
answered more accurately despite faster overall RTs, it seems clear that cross-domain analogies 
require more analytic thinking to solve. We take the robustness of this result as further support 
that Type 2 thinking is relatively more strongly involved in the ability to identify creative, cross-
domain analogies than in within-domain analogies. 
Consistent with the intra-experimental results are positive relations between performance 
in cross-domain analogical reasoning and ACS, CA, and NFC, but not FI (see Table 1 for 
correlation table and Appendix F for more complete table). Importantly, correct rejection of non-
analogies was not negatively related to ACS and CA, suggesting that the benefit in identifying 
cross-domain analogies was due to a heightened ability to see a connection and not a result of a 
more liberal response criterion (i.e. a general tendency to say yes).   
Performance on the RAT (Mean accuracy = 37.6%, SD = 21.4) was also positively 
associated with ACS, CA, and NFC, but not FI, further supporting a view in which the ability to 
make remote connections is aided by relatively more engagement of Type 2 processing. Those 
higher in CA presumably have greater ability to generate a solution to these problems as a 









Table 1. Pearson product-moment correlations among cognitive variables and creativity tasks. 
Coefficients in bold are significant, p < .05.   
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Fluency and Originality. Fluency (Mean number of items generated = 8.2, SD = 3.4) did 
not differ as a function of any of the cognitive tasks. Originality ratings (Mean rating = 2.4, SD = 
.73) were related to CA, however. Given this, it seems that those with greater CA more 
efficiently retrieved creative uses from semantic space. The lack of strong relation between 
Originality and ACS (p = .16) suggests that individual differences in thinking style may be less 
likely to emerge in constrained time periods with clear instructions to generate ideas. 
Cognitive flexibility. There was no relation between cognitive flexibility (Mean rating for weak 
exemplars = 4.4, SD = 1.3) and the ACS or CA measures. Presumably, given the lack of a 
correct answer in such a rating task, engagement of Type 2 processing is unlikely to yield an 
answer divergent from the default response produced by Type 1 processing in any systematic 
way (i.e. further analysis could lead one to either view an item as more or less representative of a 
category). In other words, tasks such as the CIT that rely on an affective judgment (Isen & 
Daubman, 1984), but do not have a correct answer, may not be systematically related to 
reasoning ability or style.  
Complex creativity. An important ancillary issue is the extent to which the creativity 
measures cohere.  Based on the inter-correlations between our tasks, a nuanced look at the over-
arching construct of creativity is warranted.  Analogical reasoning and RAT performance most 
strongly related to our reasoning measures (see Table 2 for summary of these key correlations), 
and to each other, r(101) = .48, p < .001, suggesting they together represent a type of complex 
creativity. A common element between analogical reasoning and the RAT is that of unification 
of concepts spanning large semantic distance in a coherent manner -- a reasoned connection. In 
both the RAT and creative analogical reasoning, one must be able to maintain and manipulate 
relations between activated concepts to assess the connection between disparate elements. We 
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created a complex creativity composite score by averaging percentage accuracy for RAT and 
cross-domain analogy problems. This score was positively related to ACS and CA, r(101) = .44, 
p < .001 and  r(101) = .50, p < .001 respectively, as well as NFC , r(87) = .34, p = .001, but not 
FI, r(87) = .02, p = .88. Regression analyses revealed that ACS and CA together accounted for 
approximately 29% of the variance in complex creativity scores, with both emerging as 
independent predictors B = .14, t = 2.39, SE = .06, p = .019 and B = .33, t = 3.76, SE = .09, p < 
.001, respectively (see Table 3 for regression table).  
 
Experiment 5 Key correlations 
 
Creativity Index CA ACS NFC 
CD analogies   0.49**   0.44**   0.36** 
RAT   0.38**   0.32**  0.22* 
 
Table 2. Pearson product-moment correlations amongst ACS, CA, CD analogy accuracy, and 
RAT accuracy. Coefficients with ** are significant, p < .01, Coefficients with * are significant, p 
< .05.   
 
 







t        Sig. B Std. Error β 
 ACS .140 .059 .239 2.388 .019 
CA .333 .089 .376 3.760 .000 
 
Table 3. Regression table for analysis of relation between ACS, CA (predictors) and Complex 







Experiment 5 Discussion 
Creative performance on only some of the tasks employed here was related to the 
willingness and ability to engage Type 2 processing, a finding that speaks both to the relation of 
these tasks to ACS and CA as well as the diversity of the tasks thought to index the same over-
arching construct of creativity. The most relationally complex of the creativity tasks, in 
particular, were strongly positively correlated with ACS and CA, suggesting that the process of 
connecting remotely associated items in semantic space is related to more efficient and frequent 
engagement of an analytic reasoning system. 
Although the primary research question revolved around the relation between thinking 
dispositions and creativity, an interesting ancillary source of information here is the correlations, 
or lack thereof in some cases, amongst the diverse creativity tasks in Experiment 5. There was 
relatively little connection between some of the tasks. For example, not only were cognitive 
flexibility and fluency unrelated to our reasoning measures, they were both also unrelated to any 
of the other creativity tasks. Interestingly, originality ratings related to both cross-domain 
analogical reasoning and RAT performance. One way to conceptualize the commonality is that 
generating original uses requires spanning of larger semantic space, with less original uses being 
closer in semantic space to the given object’s typical use. Although this connection exists, there 
was no relation between originality and ACS measures (as there was with the tasks comprising 
our complex creativity composite). One reason for this dissociation might be that there is not the 
same type of underlying relational complexity. Such an interpretation predicts that first order 
semantically distant connections likely do not require as much Type 2 processing as do more 
relationally complex ones.  
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Another interesting result is that NFC did not predict performance in identifying cross-
domain analogies in the previous experiment in which participants were cued on each trial to 
think a certain way; here, though, we did see a significant correlation between NFC and the 
measures meant to index complex creativity. Such a result suggests that attempts to relate 
thinking style and performance on creative tasks might be best undertaken in more open-ended 
formats. It is quite possible that if the speeded instructions were removed from the analogical 
reasoning tasks that the effects here might be even larger. 
As a whole, the correlational and experimental results of this study together support the 
predictions I established at the outset of this thesis, and have made the findings more specific by 
distinguishing complex creativity from other indices. Given that I have now explicated all of the 
results of my experiments and have a more full idea of the processes at play, rather than continue 
my discussion here only about Experiment 5, I will move to the General Discussion to more fully 
characterize what I believe to be the cognitive underpinnings of complex creativity at multiple 
levels of analysis, yielding a relatively complete model of such creativity and some suggestions 












The creativity literature has been described by experts as “both daunting and exciting” 
(Hennessy & Amabile, 2010, p. 570). I agree with this characterization: it is daunting because 
there are many unconnected results that together comprise a vast literature, and it is exciting 
because this lack of cohesion means the field is ripe for a perspective that can tie together these 
disparate threads into a more cohesive inter-woven fabric of findings. In the aim of providing 
such a perspective, I have argued that the application of a DPT model of reasoning (Stanovich & 
Evans, 2013) could help resolve some of the extant issues in this area, and conducted several 
studies to explore the utility of such an approach in accounting for variance in the ability to make 
creative connections at both the state and trait levels.  
Highlighted Findings 
In the context of state-level factors, I explored whether inducing (i.e. via experimental 
manipulation) or cuing (i.e. via instructional manipulation) relatively more or less 
intuitive/analytic thinking enhances or reduces creative performance (see Experiments 1, 2, 3 and 
4). I found that making it more difficult to engage Type 2 processing selectively impaired the 
ability to identify cross-domain analogies. Especially strong evidence for this came from 
Experiment 1, when the parameters were most challenging, as participants’ performance was no 
different than that expected by random responding on the creative cross-domain analogies. In 
Experiment 2, participants performed better when they could view all four items simultaneously, 
but there was still marked differences in performance between cross and within-domain 
analogies such that cross-domain accuracy was lower despite longer RTs. This general pattern 
was preserved across the studies and is a robust demonstration of the strong role that semantic 
distance plays in analogical reasoning, and underscores that the manipulations used in these 
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experiments did not indiscriminately deter reasoning in general, but rather, quite specifically, the 
ability to identify the cross-domain analogies. The instruction to respond as quickly and 
accurately as possible hindered performance, further underscoring the important role of semantic 
distance in finding common underlying relations. In Experiment 3, counter to expectation, I 
found that a cue to think analytically did little to improve performance on cross-domain 
analogies, which, coupled with consistently large variance across individuals in performance, led 
me to consider longer term disposition (i.e. individual differences) in the context of cuing. 
Accordingly, in Experiment 4 I measured thinking styles and cued participants to think 
analytically or intuitively on each trial and found that although there was no main effect of the 
cue for cross-domain analogies, short term instructions to think a certain way interacted with 
longer term dispositions in processing style. Most interestingly, on cross-domain analogies, 
reflective thinkers who were relatively more intuitive performed better when told to think 
intuitively than when told to think analytically, whereas those who were reflective but less 
intuitive performed better when told to think analytically than when told to think intuitively. This 
suggested that one must consider longer term disposition when attempting to augment creativity 
in the short term. The highest accuracy for the creative items were on analytic cue trials for the 
non-intuitive reflective participants, again underscoring the importance of Type 2 processing for 
understanding such analogies. In Experiment 5, I explored the roles of individual differences in 
cognitive ability and analytic cognitive style (as in Stanovich, 2009) and included other indices 
of creative ability to broaden the scope of my investigation. I found that those more willing 
and/or able to engage Type 2 processing were more likely to successfully make creative 
connections in tasks requiring the unification of disparate elements and the novelty of generated 
items, but not in some other indices of creativity, namely, cognitive flexibility and fluency. 
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Taken together, these results support and qualify my supposition that one must engage executive, 
WM demanding Type 2 processing to engage in complex creativity. In what follows, I more 
fully explore these results in the context of the broader reasoning and creativity literatures, and 
formulate a more complete account of the manner in which humans make complex creative 
connections.  
More or Less Executive Engagement 
Taken together, the studies in this thesis strongly suggest that more frequent engagement 
of Type 2 processing is helpful in making creative connections, shedding light on a disputed 
issue in the creativity literature. The extent to which Type 2 processing is engaged varies as a 
function of contextual and situational determinants as well as longer term dispositions. As such, 
a consideration of this interplay can be used to both describe differences in the way an individual 
engages WM dependent resources under different conditions and individual differences in ACS. 
In all of the studies conducted here, complex creativity seemed to benefit from relatively more 
involvement of Type 2 processing at both the state and trait levels. In other words, both 
situations that more often prompt one to engage in Type 2 processing and having a general 
disposition to do so more often converge from the state and trait levels to support the idea that 
more, not less, intervention is helpful for complex creativity. Interestingly, these results were 
qualified further by the lack of a relation between certain other creativity tasks. 
The results regarding complex creativity here are highly consistent with an array of 
evidence implicating executive processes in creativity (Nussbaum & Silvia, 2011; Beaty & 
Silvia, 2012; Atchley, Strayer & Atchley, 2012; Benedek, Franz, Heene & Neubauer, 2012). For 
example, recent experimental work finds a role for analytic processing in the solving of 
compound remote associates. In one such study, it was found that articulatory suppression (i.e. 
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repeating digits) impeded insight problem solving on difficult problems, whereas talking aloud 
(i.e. verbalizing one’s thoughts about the task and inner-thoughts) facilitated performance (Ball 
& Stevens, 2009). In related research, Chein and Weisberg (2014) found that individual 
differences in attention and verbal WM at the state level aided the solving of such problems. 
These, and our own, findings support the view that the same cognitive mechanisms that subserve 
other types of non-creative problem solving underlie creative problem solving (i.e. business-as-
usual theory) rather than one in which creativity and insight are a result of spreading activation 
mechanisms that operate below the level of awareness (i.e. special-process theory). 
My work is also consistent with findings relating to the temporal course of creative 
generation.  The serial order effect, a well replicated and relatively old finding in creativity 
research (Christensen, Guilford, & Wilson, 1957), refers to the fact that in generative tasks more 
creative responses typically come later in the response period. In other words, people generate 
more creative responses as time goes on, or, even more simply, ideas grow better with the 
passage of time. Traditional accounts attributed this result to spreading activation, whereby more 
proximal associates (i.e. closer in semantic distance) come to mind first, but with increased time 
on task, activation spreads to more distal associates, resulting in more creative responses. Such 
an account considers the primary determinant of creativity to be non-controlled associative 
thinking.  Recent research, however, has eschewed the associative explanation and forwarded an 
executive based account in which top down thinking and guided search can afford creative ideas 
(Beaty & Silvia, 2012). These researchers showed that as intelligence increased, the serial order 
effect diminished. Amongst the most intelligent of their sample, order was inconsequential, and 
their earliest ideas were as creative as their later ones. Such a result suggests that one need not 
rely on the passive spread of activation to find relations amongst items in memory. Rather, one 
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can strategically intervene via top down control and executive processes to find one’s way to 
more creative ideas. Although less relationally complex than the analogies and RAT, work in this 
vein provides a useful way to think about what it is that is accomplished through executive 
intervention in creative thinking and suggests that controlled processes can systematically 
explore semantic space in novel ways. 
In integrating some of these notions Beaty, Silvia, Nusbaum, Jauk, and Benedek (2014) 
describe their controlled attention theory of creativity and cite more work relating fluid 
intelligence (Gf; Beaty & Silvia, 2012, 2013; Benedek, Franz, Heene, & Neubauer, 2012; Jauk, 
Benedek, & Neubauer, 2014; Silvia & Beaty,  2012) and working memory capacity (de Dreu, 
Nijstad, Bass, Wolsink, & Roskes, 2012; Lee & Therriault, 2013; Süß, Oberauer, Wittmann, 
Wilhelm, & Schulze, 2002) to creativity. In this paper, the authors looked to reconcile the 
discussed divide between those that think creativity is associative or executive. They related 
verbal fluency task performance (meant to index associative processes) and measures of 
executive attention and found support for both as predictors of the creative quality of divergent 
thinking responses in the AUT. Future work would be well served to explore whether associative 
factors of the sort used there hold any predictive value in complex creativity. Given my results 
and interpretation, I would predict executive factors to be relatively more influential and 
associative factors relatively less important in complex creativity than in other creativity tasks. 
In relevant theoretical work, Nijstad, de Dreu, Rietzschel, and Baas (2010) describe the 
dual-pathway model of creativity which presumes that two distinct routes can lead one to 
creative thoughts. The persistence pathway entails in-depth analysis of a relatively constrained 
semantic space, which can lead one to find fruitful avenues by which to connect disparate 
elements. The flexibility pathway entails sampling from diverse categories, with frequent 
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vacillation of focus between them, in hopes of fostering a creative connection. Nijstad et al. 
(2010) presume that both modes entail executive control, in that the search through semantic 
space is controlled and strategic. This description is befitting of the general tendency found here 
for those who most frequently intervene upon the autonomous stream of processing with analytic 
thought, are the most likely to forge creative connections. Although both pathways are tied to 
Type 2 processing, with the authors even stating that their theory does not apply to cases of 
spontaneously generated creative output, they differ in the nature of the role of such processing. 
The flexibility pathway entails sampling from intentionally diverse categories and styles of 
problem solving, trying many novel approaches in hopes of making remote connections.  The 
persistence pathway involves a greater degree of executive control as it involves a more strategic 
approach in which people engage in a much more focused search through a relatively smaller 
semantic space. A systematic search for semantic connections is another way of putting this. It 
seems the former relates to relatively more time spent allowing autonomous Type 1 processing to 
unfold before engaging Type 2 processing, whereas the latter entails more maintenance of Type 
2 processing over time. Interestingly, these authors posit that one can move back and forth 
between these modes, in effect describing variability in the sampling of the autonomous stream 
in WM. Sowden, Pringle and Gabora (2014) describe the flexibility pathway as being more 
strongly related to originality but identify ambiguity about how the persistence pathway leads to 
such originality as a shortcoming of their model. I would argue, on the basis of the results here, 
that a fruitful means of further understanding the nature of the persistence pathway would be to 
explore it in the context of complex creativity of the sort used here. A role for a focused search 
through semantic space seems to converge with the notion that people need to analytically 
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identify common relations with Type 2 thinking, as the autonomous Type 1 stream is unable to 
pass such information automatically.  
Another theoretical model that speaks to the extent of executive engagement in creative 
thinking comes from Finke, Ward and Smith (1992). Their Geneplore model draws a distinction 
between generation and exploration. This model is supportive of the work found here, as it 
presumes that reasoners take the path of least resistance (see also Ward & Kolomyts, 2010). By 
this, the authors mean that people, when generating ideas, draw on similar domains to constrain 
the process. The example used to explicate this idea by Sowden, Pringle and Gabora (2014), 
drawn from Ward (1994), is that of people ascribing aliens similar appendages as that found 
amongst creatures on Earth, rather than developing completely novel anatomy. Such a 
conceptualization is conducive with our broad theoretical framework and data. Theoretically, this 
account fits a default-interventionist DPT view, as it seems that people tend to naturally traverse 
relatively smaller semantic distances, thus limiting the use of the more demanding processes 
needed to draw from more distal domains. Empirically, my finding that participants tend to 
intuitively extract surface similarity, rather than relational information, is congruent with their 
general view and I would predict that instances of more open-ended analogy generation (i.e. 
given A:B, must produce C:D) might provide even stronger evidence for my claims, as less 
reflective participants would presumably be much less likely to spontaneously come up with 
cross-domain analogies given their cognitive miserliness. 
Mechanisms and Models 
Although the relative utility of frequent engagement of such processing for complex 
creativity seems clear from my investigation, I have yet to fully unpack the sorts of sub-
processes that are likely to be involved when such Type 2 processing is engaged and more fully 
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explicate what is likely occurring at a mechanistic level. What exactly is occurring during this 
interjection of Type 2 processing that is affording insight into the relational connections between 
semantically distant relations? One can view the relatively infrequent decoupling from the 
autonomous stream via Type 2 processing as a selective sampling and fusion of the internal and 
external information that is being continuingly processed autonomously. Such a view in which 
autonomous processes are responsible for activating collections of concepts which are then 
scrutinized in a more analytic fashion is reminiscent of other models of creativity that describe 
various stages.  
As noted in the introduction, I am by no means the first to characterize creativity as 
benefitting from the interplay between distinct cognitive modes, processes or stages. Wallas’ 
(1926) description of the creative process as being composed of stages was massively influential, 
with many similar models appearing over the intervening decades of research. Recently, Allen 
and Thomas (2011) systematically explored each stage of the creative process in terms of 
whether it seemed to be more related to Type 1 or Type 2 processing. Most simply, their 
conceptualization seems to capitalize on a distinction between the generative and evaluative 
components of the creative process, with Type 1 processes presumed to underlie the generation 
of ideas, which are then subject to conscious scrutiny via Type 2 thinking though they do 
recognize that both types of processes likely are active in all stages. However, these authors did 
not collect empirical evidence to support their suppositions, and as such, have little to say about 
the precise nature of this interactive relation beyond that both are active, relatively more or less, 
at all stages. Allen and Thomas (2011) warn that one should be careful mapping large stages (i.e. 
longer temporal windows) of the creative process to one or the other type of processing in such a 
way as to imply that generation is solely dependent on Type 1 and evaluation is solely dependent 
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on Type 2. Doing so is likely too simplistic as humans assuredly vacillate between types of 
processing frequently and in short time frames, meaning that a conceptualization of quick 
vacillations between processing types could be helpful in describing sub-stages to the more 
traditional stages associated with the creative process. The fact that we were able to find 
differences as a function of ACS in speeded tasks such as those employed here is suggestive that 
such qualitative shifts between Type 1 and 2 processing are amenable to exploration within each 
of the stages discussed in stage models such as that put forth by Wallas (1926).      
Similar notions to that put forth by Allen and Thomas (2011) were posited by Basadaur, 
Graen, and Green (1982), through their description of the stages of problem finding, problem 
solving, and solution implementation when explicating their idea of ideation-evaluation cycles. 
In their theory, depending on the stage one is in during the creative process, one might engage in 
relatively more or less ideation or evaluation -- that is, more or less time can be spent generating 
ideas or assessing their utility, depending on the current task demands. This theory is not geared 
toward understanding the mechanistic underpinnings of such shifts or the ways in which 
individuals might differ in the relative contributions of each type of process, though it is useful to 
map more basic processing mechanisms to higher level observations such as these. 
An older view, one that is more grounded in the types of low-level cognitive processes of 
the sort of interest here, is the famous “Blind-Variation-and-Selective-Retention” model 
(Campbell, 1960), which eventually was evolved by Simonton (1999, 2010, 2013) into the 
Darwinian theory of creativity. Such models analogize the evolution of ideas as being akin to 
that accomplished by species. They describe the generative aspects of the creative process as 
reflecting random (i.e. blind) combinations of ideas which then are assessed for utility, with the 
best (or most fit, in Darwinian terms) being kept for use (i.e. selectively retained). Such models, 
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though having intuitive appeal, have been criticized on both theoretical grounds, and for not 
matching emergent empirical evidence.  
Reasoned Connections: Relational Complexity and Creativity  
My view differs from these existing models or accounts in an important way. My work 
addresses and more fully incorporates work on the nature of relational representation in semantic 
memory and in so doing accounts for the notion that some creative ideas are more complex than 
others, which could potentially explain the deep division on whether executive engagement is 
beneficial or not. To illustrate the utility in making such a distinction, I will contrast what I will 
call first-order creative connections and complex creativity. First-order creative connections refer 
to two concepts being connected across a relatively large semantic space and are typical of what 
is commonly indexed in some divergent thinking tasks. For example, in coming up with a less 
frequent category exemplar, one is making a relatively more remote connection between the 
over-arching category (e.g. bird) and a given item (e.g. emu) than when generating a more 
frequent exemplar (e.g. robin). Although creative, there is little in the way of relational 
complexity. Contrast this example with the complex cross-domain analogical reasoning of 
interest here. One must find a connection between two relations through identification of a 
common underlying relation. Here, it is not the case that one must reach a concept on the edges 
of the defining features of a category, but rather, one must find the common relational path 
connecting two sets of elements in relatively very distant semantic space. In such a case I would 
suggest the complex creative ideas are not generated autonomously and subsequently assessed in 
a controlled fashion as one might see in a first-order creative connection. To illustrate the subtle 
distinction between these types of creative connections, I will explain and expand upon an 
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existing model of the way in which remote concepts are activated in memory by focusing on 
what could be occurring in complex creative connections.  
Gabora (2010) has explicated a detailed model of the way that more creative ideas 
become active that relies on the concept of contextual focus. Contextual focus refers to the 
ability to shift between two modes of thought, associative and analytic, through the focusing/de-
focusing of attention. Such an interpretation is amenable to understanding through the old 
analogy of attention as a spotlight. Although an imperfect representation of the precise 
manifestation of memory in such reasoning (the spotlight analogy is more often and more 
accurately linked to visual and spatial attention, rather than an internal search through semantic 
space), such an analogy is useful as a thinking tool, so long as one does not take it too far (see 
Harrison & Treagust, 2006 for more on the use of analogies in teaching and learning). When 
engaged in focused thought, the spotlight of attention is narrow and intensely centered upon a 
relatively smaller neural region (i.e. a relatively smaller region of neurons is activated), resulting 
in relatively mundane and uncreative thought. When engaging in the less focused associative 
thinking, the spotlight of attention becomes more diffuse, illuminating otherwise unseen 
representational features (i.e. a relatively larger region of neurons is activated). Her 
conceptualization is entirely congruent with the manner in which the neurobiological 
investigations discussed earlier presume that our knowledge is represented (e.g. Binder & Desai, 
2011). Specifically, Gabora (2010) discusses memory as content addressable; “there is a 
systematic relationship between the state of an input and the place it gets encoded” (p. 5), which 
directly relates to the notion that representations are coded in terms of the emotional, sensory, 
and motor regions that are active when these representations are experienced, and that these 
regions become re-activated when one recalls such a representation (e.g. Schachter et al., 2012; 
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Skinner, Manios, Fugelsang, & Fernandes, in press). Such a view presumes that things closer in 
semantic (and thus neural) space rely on similar and overlapping neural signatures. Most simply, 
given this overlap, a defocused state of attention affords recruitment of otherwise inactive 
representations that correspond to atypical or abstract features of the problem or task, and a 
return to focused attention allows one to hone in on the relevant information within these 
representations for the idea.  
I believe such a conceptualization to likely be effective for characterizing cognitive 
flexibility and other divergent thinking. To use the example above, allowing a relaxation of the 
spotlight of attention could allow the more semantically distant exemplar of emu to become 
active when trying to think of a bird, when a more focused search might only yield the relatively 
common robin. However, such a model seems incomplete in its ability to explain very distantly 
related concepts only bridged by relational information, as the spotlight of attention cannot 
become wide enough to encompass such semantically distant relations.  
Consider the following example of a cross-domain analogy drawn from the stimuli I used 
here: Star is to Constellation as Goose is to Flock. Given the organization of semantic memory, it 
seems unlikely that a relaxation of focus could activate a broad enough neural space to capture 
the requisite representational concepts and elements simultaneously given their extremely 
distinct underlying features and the accordingly vast semantic distance between the pairs. To 
again invoke the spotlight analogy: the spotlight cannot be broadened sufficiently to illuminate 
such distant areas. Also, as discussed earlier, we know from analogical priming studies that the 
activation of relational information required for understanding such analogies is not analogous to 
the spread of activation associated with the ballistic activation of related concepts (Spellman, 
Holyoak & Morrison, 2001) and this is suggestive that controlled processes are required for such 
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a process. Accordingly, unlike first-order creative connections in which ideas are automatically 
generated and then analytically assessed, I argue that the idea truly becomes formed only when 
one selectively co-activates several concepts and their relations simultaneously or perhaps in 
rapid succession, such that the requisite elements are held active via WM demanding resources 
and Type 2 processing. Only when this otherwise diffuse activation distributed throughout the 
semantic system is held in focus via Type 2 processing is the idea truly ‘generated’.  As such, in 
cases of complex creativity, I would argue that such a model would require incorporation of a 
mechanism dedicated to allowing multiple spotlights to be active simultaneously or in quick 
enough succession for decomposition rather than a simple broadening of a singular metaphorical 
spotlight. As I will discuss soon, there is evidence that frontal regions of the brain may play an 
important role in such a process. 
The Role of WM 
I have argued that it is not the case, at least with complex creativity, that one generates 
connections between distally related elements via Type 1 processing, and then proceeds 
afterwards to assess the veracity of this relation, but rather, that the comparison of features and 
relations in consciousness via Type 2 processing yields novel ways of viewing the relational 
structure between elements. As you will recall, the defining feature of Type 2 processing is the 
engagement of WM processes, and given the central role of such processing systems in my 
arguments, understanding the nature of working memory is critical to understanding the relation 
between creativity and analyticity. Modern models of WM are not considered as being 
comprised of a single store or conceived as a unitary construct (see, e.g. Unsworth & Engle, 
2007; Shipstead, Lindsey, Marshall & Engle, 2014). Rather, WM is divided between Primary 
and Secondary WM components. Primary WM relates to an ability to store/maintain entities in 
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consciousness for subsequent use and is most often what one thinks of when the term WM is 
used. Secondary WM, on the other in contrast, refers to one's ability to retrieve information from 
long-term memory and bring it to conscious awareness. One plausible means by which complex 
creative connections could arise, then, would be the maintenance of one set of relations in 
primary WM, followed by the access of the relations from a distinct domain via secondary WM.  
The underlying relational content would then be forged in the fires of focus to arrive at a new 
conception. Less hyperbolically, once the elements of the candidate analogy are simultaneously 
held in WM, one can assess common relations. It seems that some sort of psychological 
processes must be at play which allows this less well travelled path to be walked and that WM 
processes are most certainly at play. Such a view is quite reminiscent of Hofstadter’s (2001) 
characterization of the mechanisms underlying analogical reasoning, which he sees as the 
“lifeblood” of human thinking, though it is more strongly grounded in modern advances in 
cognitive psychology. According to him, thinking and analogy depend upon “the transfer of 
tightly packed mental chunks from the dormant area of long-term memory into the active area of 
short-term memory, and on their being unpacked on arrival, and then scrutinized” (p. 142).  
It seems likely that secondary WM might be the especially crucial cog in the wheel of 
complex creativity, as the ability to hold active items from long-term memory to relate with 
environmental stimuli, or other recently activated long term memories, seems an absolutely 
essential component of forging complexly related new ideas. Perhaps one reason for mixed 
results in many creativity experiments is the use of Primary WM dependent measures that don't 
actually index the more crucial Secondary WM. This seems a likely possibility as WM theorists 
use a very intensive array of tasks, and subsequently employ advanced statistical analysis to 
generate indices of such subtle components of the WM system (see Redick, Broadway, Meier, 
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Kuriakose, Unsworth, Kane, & Engle, 2012). Such an approach, although more amenable to 
understanding sub-components of the WM system, is much more time consuming to use relative 
to more traditional span tasks. Given that much of contemporary creativity research is more 
strongly rooted in social than cognitive psychological frameworks, I believe it important that 
cognitive psychologists advocate the fusion between more mechanistically based models of basic 
cognitive systems and higher order cognition to ensure accurate understanding of the role of WM 
in complex creativity. 
The paths to new connections 
In creative problem solving, “dominant solutions or most obvious solution paths will lead 
to initial failure” (Wiley & Jarosz., 2012, p. 259) and as such, associative connections that were 
forged due to frequent pairings are unlikely to be divergent, leaving the question of how one 
arrives at the correct concepts to be compared. I would suggest that this is facilitated by two 
primary processes that relate to what information enters/remains in WM: inhibition and 
overriding. Creativity has long been connected to inhibition (e.g. see Beaty & Silvia, 2012) such 
that more obvious answers must be inhibited in order to ascertain a novel one. For example, in 
the case of cross-domain analogies, one must inhibit the intuition that such semantically distant 
pairs are unrelated in order to find the creative connection. The other process, overriding, has 
strong roots in both the reasoning and creativity literatures. In reasoning, the response provided 
via Type 1 processing comes to mind quickly and often must be overridden in order to arrive at a 
normatively correct response. This is precisely the sort of process thought to be indexed in 
problems such as those within the CRT. A strong intuitive response in situations that could 
afford a more creative and meaningful relation connection would be first order relational 
information, such as that exemplified by domain information in assessing analogical relations. 
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The intuitive sense that pairs drawn from disparate domains are not related, if not initially 
inhibited, must be assessed and overridden to assess the second order relational information. In 
creativity research, the oft-described evaluative process (e.g. Wallas, 1926) seems to mirror the 
type of reflection often described in reasoning research. In both, one assesses the contents of 
autonomously generated input in a deliberative manner via WM dependent Type 2 processing.  
Importantly, my characterization of creativity is not incompatible with evidence that 
relinquishment of such Type 2 processing can still yield creative output (e.g. Aiello et al., 2012; 
Jarosz et al., 2012) if creativity is conceptualized as a destination (i.e. output) that can be reached 
via multiple paths (i.e. types of processing), with some paths being more fruitful than others. To 
illustrate this point, I return to Mednick’s (1962) classic paper. In articulating the different means 
by which one could achieve a creative solution, Mednick described creativity by serendipity: 
“The requisite associative elements may be evoked contiguously by the contiguous 
environmental appearance (usually an accidental contiguity) of stimuli which elicit these 
associative elements” (p. 221). Though he was referring to the presence of associative elements 
in the external world, I believe that internal semantic space can be conceptualized in a similar 
way. Given that relational, or analogical, priming does not occur in the ballistic, automatic 
fashion that concept priming does (with conscious attention to the relations a requisite for 
facilitation; Spellman, Holyoak & Morrison, 2001), it seems unlikely that relationally complex 
creative ideas will frequently emerge spontaneously. Rather, executive intervention potentiates 
new connections amongst distal concepts that would otherwise remain unearthed. So, despite 
insight and moments of sudden illumination being real and interesting phenomena, our results 
would suggest that identifying connections across great semantic distance more often comes via 
intervening upon autonomous processes with more analytic reasoning.  
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Neuroscientific and Neurocomputational Models/Evidence  
Neuroscientific evidence dedicated to exploring the neural regions that subserve the 
identification and generation of semantically distant analogies provides plausible ways that 
complex creativity occurs at the neural level, and is convergent with the theories and evidence 
discussed to this point. Specifically, much evidence supports the view that creative analogical 
reasoning relies heavily on frontal regions of the brain, specifically the frontopolar cortex (Bunge 
et al., 2005; Green, Fugelsang, Kraemer, Shamosh & Dunbar, 2006; Green et al., 2010; Green, 
Kraemer, Fugelsang, Gray & Dunbar, 2012). As semantic distance between the constituent pairs 
of the analogy parametrically increased, so does activation of this region. This well-replicated 
finding is presumed to occur as a function of the role of these regions in the relational integration 
required for understanding the complex creative connections, with more activation required for 
more semantically distant elements. More generally, Ramnani and Owen (2004) proposed a 
model of the cognitive-anatomical architecture of prefrontal function and organization, which 
identifies the frontopolar cortex as being crucial for the integration of items represented in distal 
cortical space, suggesting these results may well extend to other instances of complex creativity, 
such as the RAT, suggesting a future avenue for empirical inquiry. In addition, 
neuropsychological work with frontotemporal dementia patients has shown that creative ability 
is contingent upon involvement of frontopolar cortex (de Souza et al., 2010), providing 
convergent support for the conclusions of such neuroimaging results. Green et al. (2006, p. 134), 
in summarizing the key role of such regions in creative thinking, eloquently argue that:   
 
highly developed frontal lobes–frontopolar cortex in particular–make the human brain 
unique in terms of its structure. It is perhaps not coincidental that the most advanced 
reaches of the evolved human brain should mediate function at the most advanced 





Recent work has also illuminated a complex and widespread neural network thought to 
comprise the mental workspace which subserves the maintenance and manipulation of concepts 
and images thought integral for creative thinking (Shlegel et al., 2013). In describing the regions 
responsible for manipulation and combination of visual images, four core regions were identified 
that vary in activation as a function of whether one is maintaining or manipulating concepts: 
dorsolateral pre-frontal cortex, posterior parietal cortex, posterior precuneus, and occipital 
cortex. Further exploration into the commonalities between these regions and those that underlie 
the ability to combine verbal concepts should further illuminate the sorts of networks that 
support advanced creative cognition. In this vein, Schelegel et al. (2013) state that although they 
only looked at visual representations, they presume “that this network is part of a more general 
workspace in the human brain in which core conscious processes in frontal and parietal areas 
recruit specialized sub-domains for specific mental operations” (p. 5) and this issue awaits 
empirical investigation. Future work should also explore the relative temporal onset of regions in 
the mental workspace (Schlegel et al., 2013) in different types of creative thinking, as advocated 
by Kounios and Beaman (2014) while varying the relational complexity of the creative 
connections forged. Dietrich (2004) has taken important steps in articulating such a view, by 
describing different types of creative insight and the neural underpinnings of such processes. It 
seems likely that the frontal cortex could be actively engaged to systematically search through 
memory in cases where a person is actively seeking a creative solution (such as that described by 
Nijstad et al. in the persistence pathway). In moments of insight or less consciously sought after 
creative connections, it could be that a threshold of shared activation between disparate elements 
in distributed semantic space is reached, forcing online the frontal networks responsible for the 
maintenance and manipulation of such concepts. A recent meta-analysis of the neuroscientific 
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data pertaining to analogy and metaphor strongly suggests that there is no singular region of the 
brain that constitutes a creativity module and it is concluded that in order to glean the cortical 
underpinnings of creative thought, a nuanced approach that considers component processes, task 
demands, and diverse types of creativity tasks is necessary (see Vartanian, 2012). 
An important direction for future research in this area will be the neuroscientific 
exploration of the manner in which frontal regions interact with relatively ancient structures 
related to affective reactivity and emotion. An interesting and understudied parallel exists in the 
reasoning and creativity literatures that could help guide this process. In problem solving of the 
sort often used in creativity research, a moment of insight or illumination is often described, 
wherein one experiences the sudden appearance of a solution in consciousness. It is as if the 
activation pattern associated with the solution induces an affective “feeling of rightness” such 
that currently active representations that were, until that moment, below the threshold of 
awareness, are cast into the spotlight of WM and Type 2 processing is engaged. In reasoning 
research, it has been shown that an affective “Feeling of Rightness” (FOR) determines whether 
one engages Type 2 processing, such that a higher FOR when trying to answer a question leads 
to less engagement of Type 2 processing (Thompson, Prowse Turner, Pennycook, 2011). 
Generally, such work points to the role of affective information guiding analytic processes but 
little can be said more specifically until further exploration has ensued. As such, an important 
question, one that I am currently developing behavioural experiments to answer, regards the 
extent to which a relation exists between feelings of insight and FOR. One quite interesting 
possibility is that such feelings are highly correlated such that individual differences in one 
predict differences in the other, with both in turn having an influence on reasoning, creative or 
not. Neuroscientific study of connectivity between frontal and affective regions should help 
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further understand any such relation. In general, a stronger unification between DPT and 
creativity should more fully account for the role of such affective responses in cognition, and 
help specify their role in diverse scenarios.  
Another interesting avenue for future research is further fusing of such neuroscientific 
work with neurocomputational simulations of such biological processes. This approach has 
proven effective and become more influential in recent years as advances in computing power 
have enabled computational modelling of hither-to too complex phenomena (e.g. Eliasmith, 
2013). Thagard (in press) identifies the key to creative insights to be the competition between 
and binding of semantic pointers, which he describes as high-level neural representations that are 
a function of the combination of lower-level neural representations (see Eliasmith, 2013 for more 
in-depth treatment of semantic pointers). Such a conceptualization maps well to the neural 
account described by Gabora (2010) and is consistent with the notion that distributed semantic 
memory representations are combined to arrive at new and creative ideas. Future work should 
formally fuse Thagard’s (in press) work on creativity with DPT views on creativity and 
reasoning.  
Similarly, Holyoak and Thagard’s (1989) notion of parallel constraint satisfaction seems 
to be an important idea for understanding how complex creative connections can be made. In 
models of thinking that utilize this framework, thinkers must engage in the simultaneous 
satisfaction of numerous constraints. In first-order creative connections, one is merely 
constrained such that a generated item is novel but sufficiently related to the original item to still 
be task-appropriate. In complex creativity, however, more constraints must be made. Holyoak 
and Thagard (1989) described constraint satisfaction as being an integral component of 
analogical mapping, and implemented a computational model (Analogical Constraint Mapping 
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Engine; ACME), that took into account structural, semantic, and pragmatic constraints and these 
authors have connected such processes to meaningful instances of real world creativity (Holyoak 
& Thagard, 1995). This model was eventually supplanted by the LISA model (Learning and 
Inference with Schemas and Analogies; see Hummel & Holyoak, 1997), which has been useful 
in understanding the role of the frontal lobes in analogical reasoning, for example (Morrison, 
Krawczyk, Holyoak, Hummel, Chow, Miller, & Knowlton, 2004). Other complex creativity, 
such as that seen in the RAT can be considered in similar ways, as one must satisfy constraints 
regarding the relative relations amongst more than a single pair of elements and likely could be 
modelled in a similar way. 
Development of Creativity: Across the Lifespan and Within our Species 
Our finding that creative analogical reasoning performance is reliant upon Type 2 
processing is consistent with research centered on a developmental milestone dubbed the 
relational shift (see Gentner, 1988). It has been shown that when faced with conflicting object 
(surface similarity) and relational congruency (relational similarity), younger children are 
strongly biased to base judgments on the more basic surface similarity level. With age, however, 
children undergo a shift in which they transition from this more superficial reasoning into a 
mode more intensively concerned with relations. Several accounts of this shift have been offered. 
Gentner and colleagues credit this shift to a growth in the base of relational knowledge from 
which children can draw to base their decisions (see Gentner & Smith, 2012). In other words, the 
increased repertoire of relations affords new means of understanding connections. Halford 
(1993) believes the source of this shift is a maturational increase in processing capacity. This 
view is predicated on the supposition that relational processing is more resource demanding than 
matching items on the basis of surface or object level features, and as students develop greater 
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informational processing capacity, they less often rely on the less taxing of the two tactics. 
Richland, Morrison, and Holyoak (2006), in addition to these factors, identify inhibitory control 
as another critical component in the shift. Under this view, the ability to suppress or inhibit the 
lower level similarity information comes with age, accounting for the transition. I believe that all 
three of these accounts are consistent with the findings herein, as they generally all relate to the 
dimensions of cognitive ability and cognitive style discussed extensively above. In all cases, the 
ability or willingness to engage Type 2 thinking (my terminology, not that of the authors) seems 
critical. Richland and Gentner’s positions can be conceptualized as reflecting growth in 
knowledge and skill, and Halford’s view is reminiscent of the type of suppression and overriding 
that characterizes the intervention of Type 2 processing in favour of relying on the autonomous 
stream of processing, which is often insufficient for the comprehension of relational information. 
Interesting and important future research could relate this shift to the ability to solve complex 
creativity problems such as the RAT. My account would predict that the onset of the relational 
shift would coincide with advances in the ability to generate solutions to such problems. My 
view would also predict this shift to correlate with advances in more general reasoning ability 
and increases in the tendency to engage in the cognitive decoupling characteristic of an analytic 
cognitive style. Developmental research could modify the CRT and other similar measures to 
gauge such advances in analytic thinking and relate this to other intellectual achievements across 
developmental time. 
Moving beyond the lifespan of any individual, there is research linking the onset of 
creative output in our species and cognition. Specifically, the outpouring of creative output in the 
Paleolithic period has been linked to the development of reasoning abilities largely synonymous 
with those associated with Type 2 processing (Gabora & Kaufman, 2010). This change is argued 
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to involve: “the onset of symbolic thinking, cognitive fluidity, and the capacity to shift between 
convergent and divergent or explicit and implicit modes of thought. Also, the emergence of 
meta-cognition enabled our ancestors to reflect on and even override their own nature” (Gabora 
& Kaufman, 2010, p. 293). Interestingly, this behavioural shift did not coincide with anatomical 
changes, suggesting, as we do at a more micro-level, that creativity is related to not just ability, 
but willingness to engage in particular types of processing. Put another way, it was not a change 
in the structure of our brains that afforded the massive advances in the way we solved problems 
in the world, but rather the way we used that brain. Such a characterization is clearly congruent 
with the conceptualization of the types of cognitive processes involved in complex creativity and 
conjures a view that compels us to capitalize upon these cognitive gifts bestowed over 
evolutionary time. One interesting possibility is that enhancement of Secondary WM abilities 
helped bring on a new era of creativity. Although difficult to understand the mechanistic nature 
of such ancient advances, the fact that such theory converges with the developmental, 
experimental, correlational, and neuroscientific evidence allows greater confidence in the nature 
of such claims and evidence. 
Enhancing Creativity 
An important issue addressed in this dissertation is the extent to which we can augment 
creativity. I attempted, via several cues, to enhance the ability to make creative connections but 
was largely unsuccessful. Green et al. (2012) did find significant effects of cuing participants to 
think more creatively but as discussed earlier, the impact of their intervention was sufficiently 
small that it is far from obvious that such strategies will yield creative solutions in more 
ecologically valid settings. Given the pattern of results here, I would argue that the most 
effective means of enhancing ability in complex creativity will come from interventions aimed at 
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longer term thinking dispositions. It seems clear from the results here that telling people to “think 
more analytically” is relatively ineffective, and as such, we must instead focus on instilling 
analytic approaches to thinking over the longer term.  
In terms of our finding that instruction type and longer term disposition interacted, it is 
worthwhile to consider Howard-Jones’ (2002) Dual State Model. This model describes shifting 
between associative and analytic modes of thought as integral to creative thought. It is interesting 
to note that although this model is very similar to the ideas I put forth here, Howard-Jones (2002) 
seems to focus on the opposite emphasis when it comes to promoting creative output. In 
particular, this author, similar to Wiley and Jarosz (2012), focuses on fixation as being a primary 
obstacle to creative generation. That is to say, people need help disengaging from the analytic 
stream to allow the associative stream to engage its generative powers, and even prescribes 
means by which to encourage this shift. Such a notion that one must relinquish analyticity in 
favour of associative processing is very much at odds with the specific data here and generally 
with default-interventionist forms of DPTs. Given that most of our waking lives are spent 
processing information primarily via autonomous Type 1 processing, it seems counter-
productive to admonish the relinquishment of Type 2 thinking as decades of reasoning research 
show that such processing is already used quite sparingly. As discussed, many existing models of 
creativity have identified that two types of thinking are implicated in the creative process, but 
little has been said about the optimal distribution of engagement of either type of processing. 
Here, I not only argue that creative thinking is dependent upon two types of processing, but find 




Gabora (2010) similarly seems to focus more strongly on the manner in which a de-
focusing of attention results in creativity. For example, she describes the way that de-focusing 
attention recruits neuronal activation of cliques that would be unavailable: “if one were in an 
everyday relatively convergent mode of thought, but would be included if one were in an 
associative mode of thought” (p. 8). My work, on the other hand, suggests that the focusing of 
attention (specifically, the assessment of relational information in WM) is critical in complex 
creativity and questions the idea that analytic modes of thought are “everyday”. Given that 
default-interventionist DPTs presume that most people are cognitive misers, who only as 
sparingly as needed engage Type 2 processing, it seems to me that imploring one to more often 
disengage focus is less likely to be the key to creativity as this is the most frequently engaged 
sort of process. A way of reconciling this issue is recognizing that although my focus is upon the 
need for engaging Type 2 processing, this does not mean that Type 1 processing is not integral to 
the process, but simply that this is actually the natural “everyday” mode of processing. Another 
way of synthesizing this work would be to qualify whether the creativity at hand is relationally 
constrained as it must be in complex creativity. Gabora’s (2010) view might require qualification 
to accommodate second, rather than first-order relational information, given the already 
discussed nature of relational priming (Spellman, Holyoak, & Morrison, 2001). 
Further to this point, under the DPT discussed earlier, relaxed, associative, Type 1 
processing constitutes the normal mode of operation for humans and working memory dependent 
analytic thinking is engaged much more infrequently. Given the ubiquity of Type 1 processing in 
cognition, evidence that such thinking is related to creativity at the state level should not be 
surprising, as it is implicated in all thought. In other words, I do not posit that Type 1 processing 
is unrelated to creative thinking, but simply that it bears no special relation to creative thinking. I 
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argue that although Type 1 processing is necessarily implicated in advanced thought, Type 2 
processing is the catalytic factor. Importantly, as already noted, an interpretation of the sort laid 
out in this dissertation still accommodates the notion, as evidenced by a large number of studies 
(e.g. Wiley & Jarosz, 2012), that too much interjection of Type 2 processing can hinder the 
creative process, though I do not think it important for measures to promote innovation and 
creative thought. Again, under a default-interventionist DPT framework, it is presumed that 
humans use Type 2 processing relatively sparingly, so in most instances, the use of executive 
processes would not be harmful in more ecological settings as the natural rate of interjection is 
lower than that required to disrupt the spread of activation to the point of decrement. Of all the 
scenarios where such a situation might emerge, one of the most likely seems, to me, a 
psychological experiment where one is presented a quite obviously difficult problem, as is often 
used in insight and creativity studies. One is motivated to consider and solve the problem in a 
short temporal window. One is likely to remain in an intensely focused state for that brief 
interval, and as such show evidence of a narrowed search through semantic space. Such focused 
processing is sufficiently costly in time and energy that it is unlikely to persist in the long term, 
thus precluding a harmful effect in the larger scale. Indeed our evidence that across many trials, 
the ability to interject more frequently was positively related to performance, though this 
supposition would benefit from evidence from longer term studies of real world creativity. 
That said, one particularly interesting area for future directions is individual differences 
in contextual focus, the relaxation of attention, cognitive dishibition and other factors related to 
the relinquishment of Type 2 processing (Eysenk, 1995; Martindale, 1999; Vartanian, 2009). Not 
only would further consideration of such factors more fully situate my work with the broader 
creativity literature, it provides interesting impetus for refinement of DPTs of cognition. 
104 
 
Specifically, Stanovich (2009), a leading proponent of DPTs has argued that few meaningful, 
continuous differences exist in the way that Type 1 processing operates across individuals but 
there is emerging evidence that this may not be entirely true. As already noted, Beaty, Silvia, 
Nusbaum, Jauk, and Benedek (2014) found support for the notion that differences in both 
executive and associative tendencies can account for variation in creative ability. Kaufman, 
DeYoung, Gray, Jiménez, Brown, and Mackintosh (2010) showed that implicit learning can be 
conceived as an ability that is independent of explicit learning, suggesting there may be utility in 
questioning strong claims that autonomous processing is largely uniform across individuals. As 
already suggested, I would predict executive factors to be relatively more influential and 
associative factors relatively less important in complex creativity than in other creativity tasks, 
but more empirical exploration is necessary. Further integration of creativity and reasoning 
research can be mutually informative, and could further qualify the nature of the interaction 
between Type 1 and 2 processing at both basic and specific levels. 
Climate of creativity 
The fact that executive processing seems critical for complex creativity is important for 
the way we consider the allocation of attention when reasoning. As noted, task level meta-
cognitive monitoring of success on the problem at hand might deter these resources from being 
dedicated to actually focusing on the relevant task. The current concerns theory (Klinger, 1977) 
describes how mind wandering often leads one to think of things that are currently of concern to 
people in terms of their goals. In the case of creativity problems, it is quite conceivable for 
people to reflect on their progress, which hinders success through occupation of crucial cognitive 
resources required to actually solve the problem. In more ecological settings such a state of 
affairs seems to resemble the fixation plaguing some innovators. Poincaré (1913), for example, 
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described futile attempts to solve a certain problem he intensely worked on, only to solve it when 
he left to take a vacation. Mozart was quoted as saying: “When I am traveling in a carriage, or 
walking after a good meal, or during the night when I cannot sleep, it is on such occasions that 
ideas flow best and most abundantly.” Explanations of such anecdotes have often pointed to the 
unconscious or associative implicit processing as the driving force for such ideas. However, an 
alternative means of interpreting such a trend is to assume that the reprieve afforded greater 
access to the executive resources formerly wasted on worrying about the problem, better 
preparing the mind to seize the otherwise unearthed common elements of a hitherto unsolved  
problem in WM (see Thagard in press, for a similar argument about incubation and semantic 
pointers). 
An interesting convergence comes from the role of nature in cognition. Berman, Jonides, 
and Kaplan’s (2008) attention restoration theory posits that urban environments capture attention 
relatively more dramatically than natural environments. As such, time spent in nature allows 
restoration of directed-attention abilities, leading to cognitive benefits. Atchley, Strayer, and 
Atchley (2012) explored whether such executive restoration led to enhanced creativity by 
comparing RAT performance amongst a group about to embark on a nature hike, versus those 
who had already spent several days in the wilderness. They found a dramatic improvement in 
creative performance, suggesting that such restful periods in which one’s attentional reserves are 
replenished might be critical for creativity, and supporting my view regarding complex 
creativity. 
The notion that recuperation/freeing of WM dependent executive resources enhance 
creativity has implications for the climate in which scientists and other innovators operate. It is 
commonly accepted that modern academicians are under intense pressure to produce at all costs. 
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For example, Peter Higgs, the physicist behind the Higgs boson particle stated that he would not 
get an academic job today and has a hard time imagining that he would have had enough peace 
and quiet in the present sort of climate to make the groundbreaking advances for which he 
became famous (Aitkenhead, 2013). With this kind of pressure, it seems that the concern of 
creating an idea could consume valuable cognitive resources that could otherwise be used to try 
and solve the problems they seek to study. In a similar vein, Wenger, Schneider, Carter, and 
White (1987) described the “paradoxical effects of thought suppression”, suggesting that trying 
to not think of something actually has the opposite effect whereby that which is attempted to be 
suppressed permeates one’s thoughts. Similarly, I wonder if the intense pressure to produce in 
science and innovation has a similar effect whereby a great desire to produce an innovation 
actually precludes creative thinking due to counter-productive meta-level monitoring of one’s 
progress, which comes at the cost of concerted creative thinking. 
 Research focused on cultivating creativity notes that one must not only have domain 
general abilities in problem solving but domain specific knowledge of the topics at hand (Mayer, 
1983). Such a characterization is highly congruent with our findings that both ACS and CA 
predicted performance on complex creativity tasks. People had to have sufficient knowledge in 
order to have the requisite relational structure to connect in semantic memory, as well as the 
disposition to engage the necessary Type 2 processing to ensure one becomes conscious of this 
underlying connectivity. Such a conceptualization is also congruent with much more recent 
reviews of the efficacy of creativity training. Scott, Leritz and Mumford (2004) examined the 
factors that contribute to the effectiveness of creativity training programs and identified the 
relatively more successful programs as being those that focus on honing general cognitive skills 
in the context of domain appropriate problems. Interestingly, it has been suggested that 
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neuroscientific work regarding the regions underlying creative thought can been used to suggest 
means by which to foster creativity (Vartanian, 2013). This author has argued that there are two 
particularly interesting ways that creativity can be enhanced. One is through heightening neural 
efficiency and fluid intelligence. Higher fluid intelligence is thought to entail greater efficiency 
in the deployment of cortical regions, and it is has been shown that behavioural interventions can 
enhance such efficiency, suggesting a means by which to be more creative. The other possibility 
is enhancing creativity through WM training. The notion that such training could lead to 
improvement is supported by both the evidence and theoretical orientation offered here, and 
future work would be well served to qualify the efficacy of such training regimens with pre-
existing individual differences in not just WMC, but ACS and CA. It truly is an exciting time for 
such interventions, as creativity can now be understood from many distinct and complementary 
levels of analysis, including the neural. 
“Giving away” creativity research 
Mayer (1981) in The Promise of Cognitive Psychology, claimed that “as we learn more 
about the use of strategies in solving complex problems, we will be able to do a better job of 
teaching people to solve complex problems” (p. 104). Similarly, Scott, Leritz and Mumford 
(2004) state that “creativity training should be subject to revision and extension as we develop a 
better understanding of creative thought and better understanding of the approaches that might be 
used to enhance creative thought” (p. 383). In this thesis, I hope to have provided more solid 
footing by which to characterize the types of processing that allow one to make creative 
connections, and in turn, a stronger ability to enhance creativity throughout society. Mayer 
(1983) expressed dismay that most creativity training studies yielded little in the way of global 
skills that enhance creativity and can be learned independently of the actual content area. 
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However, my finding that greater engagement of Type 2 processing leads to greater ability in 
connecting semantically distant relations suggests a promising avenue in this end and converges 
with the work of Vartanian (2013). Furthermore, knowing that this disposition is correlated, but 
independent from more general fluid intelligence suggests that such a trait might well be able to 
be cultivated in the longer term.  
An emerging trend in reasoning research, which relates to my admonishment to 
encourage analytic thinking to promote creativity, is the effort to share results and theory 
regarding the way our minds typically operate in order to help people become more effective 
information processors. For example, Lilienfield (2011) discusses “giving de-biasing away”. In 
this paper, he admonishes that reasoning researchers share the pertinent results which show how 
heuristics and the general disinclination to engage Type 2 processing damage our decision 
making ability in hopes of showing citizens means by which to avoid falling prey to the perils of 
such paltry use of our advanced cognition.  
In terms of complex creativity, knowing that measures predicting reliance on such 
heuristics are negatively related to creative ability provides a framework by which to center 
educational programs on overriding initial autonomous intuitions to arrive at novel solutions. 
Recent work finds that explicit instruction on how to think more analytically coupled with 
practice doing so is effective in improving critical thinking (Heijltjes, Van Gog & Pass, 2014), 
suggesting that such longer term training and intervention could be fruitful. Such a combination 
of factors thought to enhance creativity leads one to question the relative value of work that 
focuses on more ephemeral inductions or admonishments to enhance creativity, as it seems 
society would benefit from longer term educational and cognitive training interventions. In 
general, a stronger unification of reasoning and creativity interventions and training will likely 
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prove efficacious as my work suggests that long term cultivation of creative thinking will be 
more fruitful than efforts at short term induction of such thinking.  
In sum, I would contend that the detrimental impact of executive thought in the creative 
process is overstated. We, as a society, should be weary of intentional attempts to shut the doors 
of analyticity in hopes of opening the window of creativity, for the biggest of ideas, those that 
are complex, comprised of deeply meaningfully inter-connected relations, and that are most 
crucial to the continued success of our species might not fit through that window when swept 
along by the wind of spreading activation. Instead, such multifarious combinations of concepts 
must be carefully carried in a controlled fashion through the door of analyticity. 
Limitations and Future Directions 
Throughout this thesis I have largely focused on what my investigation allows us to 
understand but have said less about what it cannot tell us. In what follows, I describe several 
limitations and constraints that are of interest in critically assessing this work (though I 
admittedly maintain an optimistic tenor in evaluating the implications of this work) and suggest 
areas of study for future research that would quell current concerns.  
One obvious point of contention with my work methodologically is the choice of 
individual difference measures. I improved upon this from Experiment 4 to Experiment 5 by 
including performance-based measures in addition to a self-report questionnaire. However, this 
work was still limited in that the measures used were by no means exhaustive and often were 
quite simple, mostly due to practical constraints. It is quite impressive that such limited indices 
of processing types were able to so effectively account for variance and demonstrate the power 
of the DPT perspective. However, in an ideal world, such an investigation would have used full 
scale intelligence measures and more complete assessments of cognitive style, and even 
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personality variables. Future work could systematically expand the scope of individual 
differences measures (and as such, also broaden the theoretical scope). To this end, I have 
collected data from around 100 participants in follow-up work (not included in this dissertation) 
while measuring more complete ACS and CA measures in an online task, the analogical 
reasoning task used here, the RAT, the Raven’s Progressive Matrices, an automated WM span 
from Engle, and a questionnaire indexing visual imagery ability. This follow-up work should 
provide deeper insights into the complex pattern of inter-relations unearthed in my investigations 
within this dissertation. In addition, by measuring WM ability using a variety of measures, this 
follow-up work will provide a more direct test of the role of WM in complex creativity. Future 
work could use more precise cognitive indices of WM capacity, inhibition and other factors to 
more precisely understand the creative process, and even better understand what exactly leads 
one to more often and/or more effectively engage Type 2 processing. 
Perhaps a more fundamental limitation of the current work is the very nature of the 
primary task used. The analogy task used here took an approach in which experimental control 
was prized over ecological validity. Such an approach has proven extremely useful throughout 
the history of psychological science; however, such control does come at a cost. Aspects of the 
over-arching processes at play when such reasoning operates outside of the confines of the 
experimental setting are unable to be understood due to the design. Here, through the use of a 
constrained task that isolated the factor of semantic distance while holding the structure of the 
analogies constant, I was able to shield my investigation from certain noisy processes, and was 
accordingly able to hone more specifically upon sub-processes of interest. To my disadvantage 
though, elimination of such variance precludes a broader view.  
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To address this limitation, future work could begin to expand the logic of this work to 
progressively more noisy settings. For example, other investigations have had participants 
generate the C:D terms rather than identify whether given items are analogies. I would be 
extremely interested to see future work that utilizes similar manipulations and individual 
difference measures to explore the attempted generation of within and cross-domain analogies. I 
predict an analogous set of results to my work would emerge. For example, under dual-task 
conditions one should have a harder time generating a cross-domain than within-domain 
analogy. A chronometric approach could reveal that it takes longer to generate cross than within-
domain analogies. I would also predict that those higher in ACS could more effectively retrieve 
cross-domain analogies than those lower in ACS, given the mechanisms I discuss.  
Although having participants generate the C:D terms incorporates other processes, one 
might still argue that this is too artificial to understand how analogy of the sort studied here 
operates ‘in the wild’. Future research could, however, explore such issues by investigating 
individual differences in analogy use in real world problem solving situations as a function of 
certain cognitive variables. Dunbar and Blanchette (2001) have employed a naturalistic approach 
to studying analogy, what they called in vivo methods, whereby they tracked the use of analogies 
in leading scientific laboratories. Such a method affords insight into the preponderance and 
utility of analogies in a real world dynamic environment. I would be very curious to know how 
differences in ACS and CA relate to how analogy is used both within and across individuals.  
Even more ecological validity could come from expanding beyond observational methods 
in finite time periods, as in a laboratory method. Future research should more often engage in 
studies on problem solving over longer periods of time as a function of individual differences. 
An important avenue for such exploration could come from Smartphone technology's role in 
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psychological research in that round the clock data can be collected (Miller, 2012). Billions of 
people worldwide now carry devices that could be used to index problem solving strategies. I 
would be very curious to understand how individual differences in ACS and CA relate to real 
world innovation. An especially interesting question in that vein regards the relation between 
dispositions to think analytically when reasoning and longer term perseverance and effort toward 
goals, and how these factors contribute to creativity. Galton (1892) long ago discussed the role of 
perseverance in attaining the heights of achievement and Duckworth, Peterson, Matthews, and 
Kelly (2007) have found grit, long term passion and perseverance toward a goal, to be influential 
in determining long term success and these factors are likely key to achieving an eminently 
important creative contribution to humanity. If we wish to reach our full creative and intellectual 
potential, as a society and as individuals, future work will be very well-served to make use of 
emerging technology that will afford us the chance to peer upon the characteristics of creative 
achievers in a manner unavailable to previous generations. Such potential for big data and long 
term tracking of outcomes, accompanied by advances in understanding the mechanistic 
underpinning of complex creativity will afford future researchers unprecedented insight into a 
systems view of creativity that incorporates the neurological, cognitive, personality, group, social 
environment, and cultural/societal correlates of creative thinking (see Hennessy & Amabile, 
2010). In particular, I think that universities, research centres, innovation-oriented corporations 
and institutions, think tanks and other hubs of innovation should be the focus of efforts to track 
creativity amongst real world innovators through a systematic look at what potentiates creative 




Although more research is focused upon creativity now than ever before, the field 
remains fragmented and lacks cohesion. When one does adopt a broader perspective, it becomes 
apparent that communication may not be the sole problem as the anecdotal, correlational, and 
experimental evidence regarding creativity presents a disjointed, and even seemingly 
contradictory, collection of findings. In this thesis I delineate complex creativity from other 
measures of creative thinking, providing a more qualified look at a complicated construct. By 
linking complex creative thinking to meta-theoretical frameworks in reasoning research that 
accommodate both notions of ability, as well as dispositional factors related to thinking style, I 
meld vestiges of classic work tying intellectual capacity and creativity (e.g. Galton, 1892) with 
that following Guilford’s (1950) admonishments to study the aspects of the creative process that 
can be seen in isolation from intelligence.  
Such a view synthesizes diverse findings and perspectives within creativity research 
under a broad and influential class of models. A major contribution of the current work is the 
emphasis placed on a mechanistic approach in which the cognitive and neural processes that 
underlie thinking and reasoning are applied to understanding the means by which a creative 
connection is forged. Such an approach grounds creativity in the broader cognitive and 
neuroscientific literature, allows the process to be characterized at a fine temporal resolution, and 
affords greater integration across domains of creativity research. Such a conceptualization is 
compatible with extant theoretical frameworks focused on the types of thinking in various stages 
of the creative process (Allen & Thomas, 2011), the interplay between associative and analytic 
thinking at the neural level (Gabora, 2010), the role of intelligence in creativity (Silvia & Beaty, 
2012), theories that describe different paths to creativity (de Dreu, Nijstad, Baas, Wolsink & 
Roskes, 2012), the emergence of creative thinking in the human species (Gabora & Kaufman, 
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2010), eminent and real-world creativity (Holyoak & Thagard, 1995; Dunbar & Blanchette, 
2001) and situates complex creativity alongside other types of cognition thought to be uniquely 
human (Penn, Holyoak, & Povinelli, 2008). Our capacity to hold, manipulate, and understand the 
complex inter-relations amongst distantly connected concepts sets us apart from other creatures 
and has allowed us to reason our way to new and useful means of understanding and changing 
the world around us (Ouspensky, 1950; Stanovich, 2004; Byrne, 2005).  
Ouspensky (1950) observed that, “Man is a machine, but a very peculiar machine. He is a 
machine which, in right circumstances, and with right treatment, can know that he is a machine, 
and, having realized this, he may find the ways to cease to be a machine.” It is important to 
understand the means by which we can intervene upon the way we think in a melioristic fashion 
to avoid only relying on automatic and associative thinking to produce powerful innovations. I 
have high hopes for humanity’s capacity to do so, for “…what is really singular about humans [is 
that [we] gain control of [our] lives in a way unique among lifeforms on Earth—by rational self-
determination” (Stanovich, 2004). It is my sincere hope that future work on creative cognition 
can continue to develop stronger understanding of the processes at play in such thought so as to 
allow our species to face the great challenges that await solution, but cannot be left too long, not 
merely by awaiting the emergence of a solution spontaneously in consciousness, but rather in a 
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Analogy Stimuli (used in all Experiments) 
 
Note: CD = Cross-domain, WD = Within-domain; For each A:B pair for any given A:B pair, 
there were three C:D pairs: A cross-domain valid analogy, a within-domain valid analogy, and a 
non-analogy, half of which were cross- domain and half of which were within-domain.  
 
A B C D Domain 
answer riddle key lock Analogy (CD) 
answer riddle solution problem Analogy (WD) 
answer riddle jersey number Non-Analogy (CD) 
ash fireplace lint pocket Analogy (CD) 
ash fireplace soot chimney Analogy (WD) 
ash fireplace harness climber Non-Analogy (CD) 
aspirin pain muffler noise Analogy (CD) 
aspirin pain antacid heartburn Analogy (WD) 
aspirin pain foot sock Non-Analogy (CD) 
baker cake scientist discovery Analogy (CD) 
baker cake chef meal Analogy (WD) 
baker cake muffin blueberry Non-Analogy (WD) 
basket picnic holster gun Analogy (CD) 
basket picnic lunchbox lunch Analogy (WD) 
basket picnic knife napkin Non-Analogy (WD) 
basketball hoop traveler destination Analogy (CD) 
basketball hoop soccerball goal Analogy (WD) 
basketball hoop serve volley Non-Analogy (WD) 
blindness sight poverty money Analogy (CD) 
blindness sight deafness hearing Analogy (WD) 
blindness sight wall paint Non-Analogy (CD) 
blizzard snowflake army soldier Analogy (CD) 
blizzard snowflake monsoon raindrop Analogy (WD) 
blizzard snowflake tornado cloud Non-Analogy (WD) 
bracelet wrist moat castle Analogy (CD) 
bracelet wrist ring finger Analogy (WD) 
bracelet wrist skill practice Non-Analogy (CD) 
burger bun book  cover Analogy (CD) 
burger bun sub roll Analogy (WD) 
135 
 
burger bun onion lettuce Non-Analogy (WD) 
cleanser face absolution sinner Analogy (CD) 
cleanser face soap body Analogy (WD) 
cleanser face curtain shower Non-Analogy (WD) 
eraser pencil amnesia memory Analogy (CD) 
eraser pencil whiteout pen Analogy (WD) 
eraser pencil glue paper Non-Analogy (WD) 
father son inventor invention Analogy (CD) 
father son mother daughter Analogy (WD) 
father son nephew cousin Non-Analogy (WD) 
flock goose constellation star Analogy (CD) 
flock goose wolfpack wolf Analogy (WD) 
flock goose pond turtle Non-Analogy (WD) 
foresight future x-ray bone Analogy (CD) 
foresight future hindsight past Analogy (WD) 
foresight future letter mailman Non-Analogy (CD) 
foundation house premise argument Analogy (CD) 
foundation house base structure Analogy (WD) 
foundation house duplex renter Non-Analogy (WD) 
furnace coal stomach food Analogy (CD) 
furnace coal woodstove wood Analogy (WD) 
furnace coal beach ocean Non-Analogy (CD) 
hoof hoofprint introduction impression Analogy (CD) 
hoof hoofprint paw pawprint Analogy (WD) 
hoof hoofprint battery toy Non-Analogy (CD) 
immunization disease forewarning surprise Analogy (CD) 
immunization disease vaccination infection Analogy (WD) 
immunization disease hotel innkeeper Non-Analogy (CD) 
jacket zipper wound suture Analogy (CD) 
jacket zipper overcoat button Analogy (WD) 
jacket zipper actor film Non-Analogy (CD) 
ketchup tomato fuel petroleum Analogy (CD) 
ketchup tomato guacamole avocado Analogy (WD) 
ketchup tomato shoelace skate Non-Analogy (CD) 
kitten cat spark fire Analogy (CD) 
kitten cat puppy dog Analogy (WD) 
kitten cat hamster wheel Non-Analogy (WD) 
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knee kneepad snail shell Analogy (CD) 
knee kneepad elbow elbowpad Analogy (WD) 
knee kneepad flag flagpole Non-Analogy (CD) 
lambchop lamb chapter book Analogy (CD) 
lambchop lamb porkchop pig Analogy (WD) 
lambchop lamb fillet skillet Non-Analogy (WD) 
landscaper lawn stylist hair Analogy (CD) 
landscaper lawn gardener garden Analogy (WD) 
landscaper lawn fence field Non-Analogy (WD) 
launchpad helicopter divingboard diver Analogy (CD) 
launchpad helicopter runway airplane Analogy (WD) 
launchpad helicopter thorn rose Non-Analogy (CD) 
lawschool lawyer vineyard wine Analogy (CD) 
lawschool lawyer medschool doctor Analogy (WD) 
lawschool lawyer beard razor Non-Analogy (CD) 
movie screen lightning sky Analogy (CD) 
movie screen gameshow television Analogy (WD) 
movie screen metal rust Non-Analogy (CD) 
multiplication product brewing beer Analogy (CD) 
multiplication product addition sum Analogy (WD) 
multiplication product sleep pajamas Non-Analogy (CD) 
nose scent antenna signal Analogy (CD) 
nose scent tongue taste Analogy (WD) 
nose scent eyelash mascara Non-Analogy (WD) 
orchard apple neighbourhood apartment Analogy (CD) 
orchard apple grove orange Analogy (WD) 
orchard apple cantaloupe farmstand Non-Analogy (WD) 
painting canvas birthmark skin Analogy (CD) 
painting canvas drawing paper Analogy (WD) 
painting canvas mistake regret Non-Analogy (CD) 
pen  pig reservoir water Analogy (CD) 
pen  pig coop chicken Analogy (WD) 
pen  pig hay  horse Non-Analogy (WD) 
rectangle perimeter nation border Analogy (CD) 
rectangle perimeter circle circumference Analogy (WD) 
rectangle perimeter octagon angle Non-Analogy (WD) 
revising manuscript evolving species Analogy (CD) 
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revising manuscript editing story Analogy (WD) 
revising manuscript price sale Non-Analogy (CD) 
saxophone jazz typewriter poetry Analogy (CD) 
saxophone jazz harmonica blues Analogy (WD) 
saxophone jazz document copier Non-Analogy (CD) 
sugar coffee incentive deal Analogy (CD) 
sugar coffee honey tea Analogy (WD) 
sugar coffee grinder bean Non-Analogy (WD) 
thermometer temperature polygraph honesty Analogy (CD) 
thermometer temperature barometer pressure Analogy (WD) 
thermometer temperature table leg Non-Analogy (CD) 
train track signal wire Analogy (CD) 
train track trolley rail Analogy (WD) 
train track conductor  whistle Non-Analogy (WD) 
watermelon rind cigarette butt Analogy (CD) 
watermelon rind orange peel Analogy (WD) 






























ANOVA Tables for Experiments 1-5 
 
Experiment 1 Accuracy:  
2 (Domain: Cross-domain, Within-domain) × 2 (Validity: True, False) 
 
 
Tests of Within-Subjects Effects 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df 
Mean 





4189.948 1 4189.948 36.301 .000 .476 
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
4189.948 1.000 4189.948 36.301 .000 .476 
Huynh-Feldt 4189.948 1.000 4189.948 36.301 .000 .476 
Lower-bound 4189.948 1.000 4189.948 36.301 .000 .476 
Error(Domain) Sphericity 
Assumed 
4616.854 40 115.421 
   
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
4616.854 40.000 115.421 
   
Huynh-Feldt 4616.854 40.000 115.421    
Lower-bound 4616.854 40.000 115.421    
Validity Sphericity 
Assumed 
66.360 1 66.360 .170 .683 .004 
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
66.360 1.000 66.360 .170 .683 .004 
Huynh-Feldt 66.360 1.000 66.360 .170 .683 .004 
Lower-bound 66.360 1.000 66.360 .170 .683 .004 
Error(Validity) Sphericity 
Assumed 
15653.106 40 391.328 
   
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
15653.106 40.000 391.328 
   
Huynh-Feldt 15653.106 40.000 391.328    
Lower-bound 15653.106 40.000 391.328    
Domain * Validity Sphericity 
Assumed 





28396.883 1.000 28396.883 80.593 .000 .668 
Huynh-Feldt 28396.883 1.000 28396.883 80.593 .000 .668 
Lower-bound 28396.883 1.000 28396.883 80.593 .000 .668 
Error(Domain*Validity) Sphericity 
Assumed 
14093.968 40 352.349 
   
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
14093.968 40.000 352.349 
   
Huynh-Feldt 14093.968 40.000 352.349    
Lower-bound 14093.968 40.000 352.349    
 
 
Experiment 1 RT:  
2 (Domain: Cross-domain, Within-domain) × 2 (Validity: True, False) 
 
 
Tests of Within-Subjects Effects 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Source 
Type III Sum 





3394507.100 1 3394507.100 15.380 .000 .278 
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
3394507.100 1.000 3394507.100 15.380 .000 .278 
Huynh-Feldt 3394507.100 1.000 3394507.100 15.380 .000 .278 
Lower-bound 3394507.100 1.000 3394507.100 15.380 .000 .278 
Error(Domain) Sphericity 
Assumed 
8828519.141 40 220712.979 
   
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
8828519.141 40.000 220712.979 
   
Huynh-Feldt 8828519.141 40.000 220712.979    
Lower-bound 8828519.141 40.000 220712.979    
Validity Sphericity 
Assumed 
3461240.074 1 3461240.074 5.890 .020 .128 
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
3461240.074 1.000 3461240.074 5.890 .020 .128 
Huynh-Feldt 3461240.074 1.000 3461240.074 5.890 .020 .128 





23507651.100 40 587691.277 
   
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
23507651.100 40.000 587691.277 
   
Huynh-Feldt 23507651.100 40.000 587691.277    
Lower-bound 23507651.100 40.000 587691.277    
Domain * Validity Sphericity 
Assumed 
10459346.159 1 10459346.159 20.103 .000 .334 
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
10459346.159 1.000 10459346.159 20.103 .000 .334 
Huynh-Feldt 10459346.159 1.000 10459346.159 20.103 .000 .334 
Lower-bound 10459346.159 1.000 10459346.159 20.103 .000 .334 
Error(Domain*Validity) Sphericity 
Assumed 
20811486.063 40 520287.152 
   
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
20811486.063 40.000 520287.152 
   
Huynh-Feldt 20811486.063 40.000 520287.152    
Lower-bound 20811486.063 40.000 520287.152    
 
Experiment 2 Accuracy:  
2 (Domain: Cross-domain, Within-domain) × 2 (Validity: True, False) 
 
Tests of Within-Subjects Effects 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df 
Mean 





6569.127 1 6569.127 112.418 .000 .733 
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
6569.127 1.000 6569.127 112.418 .000 .733 
Huynh-Feldt 6569.127 1.000 6569.127 112.418 .000 .733 
Lower-bound 6569.127 1.000 6569.127 112.418 .000 .733 
Error(Domain) Sphericity 
Assumed 
2395.834 41 58.435 
   
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
2395.834 41.000 58.435 
   
Huynh-Feldt 2395.834 41.000 58.435    





1104.540 1 1104.540 8.301 .006 .168 
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
1104.540 1.000 1104.540 8.301 .006 .168 
Huynh-Feldt 1104.540 1.000 1104.540 8.301 .006 .168 
Lower-bound 1104.540 1.000 1104.540 8.301 .006 .168 
Error(Validity) Sphericity 
Assumed 
5455.619 41 133.064 
   
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
5455.619 41.000 133.064 
   
Huynh-Feldt 5455.619 41.000 133.064    
Lower-bound 5455.619 41.000 133.064    
Domain * Validity Sphericity 
Assumed 
11019.078 1 11019.078 96.048 .000 .701 
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
11019.078 1.000 11019.078 96.048 .000 .701 
Huynh-Feldt 11019.078 1.000 11019.078 96.048 .000 .701 
Lower-bound 11019.078 1.000 11019.078 96.048 .000 .701 
Error(Domain*Validity) Sphericity 
Assumed 
4703.726 41 114.725 
   
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
4703.726 41.000 114.725 
   
Huynh-Feldt 4703.726 41.000 114.725    
Lower-bound 4703.726 41.000 114.725    
 
Experiment 2 RT:  
2 (Domain: Cross-domain, Within-domain) × 2 (Validity: True, False) 
 
Tests of Within-Subjects Effects 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df 
Mean 





7557801.720 1 7557801.720 56.528 .000 .580 
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
7557801.720 1.000 7557801.720 56.528 .000 .580 
Huynh-Feldt 7557801.720 1.000 7557801.720 56.528 .000 .580 





5481685.530 41 133699.647 
   
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
5481685.530 41.000 133699.647 
   
Huynh-Feldt 5481685.530 41.000 133699.647    
Lower-bound 5481685.530 41.000 133699.647    
Validity Sphericity 
Assumed 
1394303.720 1 1394303.720 3.278 .078 .074 
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
1394303.720 1.000 1394303.720 3.278 .078 .074 
Huynh-Feldt 1394303.720 1.000 1394303.720 3.278 .078 .074 
Lower-bound 1394303.720 1.000 1394303.720 3.278 .078 .074 
Error(Validity) Sphericity 
Assumed 
17441230.530 41 425395.867 
   
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
17441230.530 41.000 425395.867 
   
Huynh-Feldt 17441230.530 41.000 425395.867    
Lower-bound 17441230.530 41.000 425395.867    
Domain * Validity Sphericity 
Assumed 
2792850.720 1 2792850.720 17.121 .000 .295 
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
2792850.720 1.000 2792850.720 17.121 .000 .295 
Huynh-Feldt 2792850.720 1.000 2792850.720 17.121 .000 .295 
Lower-bound 2792850.720 1.000 2792850.720 17.121 .000 .295 
Error(Domain*Validity) Sphericity 
Assumed 
6688053.530 41 163123.257 
   
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
6688053.530 41.000 163123.257 
   
Huynh-Feldt 6688053.530 41.000 163123.257    
Lower-bound 6688053.530 41.000 163123.257    
 
Experiment 1 & 2 CD analogy accuracy:  




Tests of Within-Subjects Effects 




Type III Sum 
of Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Domain Sphericity Assumed 44003.949 1 44003.949 285.257 .000 .779 
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
44003.949 1.000 44003.949 285.257 .000 .779 
Huynh-Feldt 44003.949 1.000 44003.949 285.257 .000 .779 
Lower-bound 44003.949 1.000 44003.949 285.257 .000 .779 
Domain * Task Sphericity Assumed 618.678 1 618.678 4.011 .049 .047 
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
618.678 1.000 618.678 4.011 .049 .047 
Huynh-Feldt 618.678 1.000 618.678 4.011 .049 .047 
Lower-bound 618.678 1.000 618.678 4.011 .049 .047 
Error(Domain) Sphericity Assumed 12495.131 81 154.261    
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
12495.131 81.000 154.261 
   
Huynh-Feldt 12495.131 81.000 154.261    
Lower-bound 12495.131 81.000 154.261    
 
 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Transformed Variable:   Average   
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Intercept 931006.928 1 931006.928 3958.070 .000 .980 
Task 2742.686 1 2742.686 11.660 .001 .126 
Error 19052.610 81 235.217    
 
Experiment 3 accuracy:  




Tests of Within-Subjects Effects 













13179.038 1 13179.038 92.756 .000 .599 
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
13179.038 1.000 13179.038 92.756 .000 .599 
Huynh-Feldt 13179.038 1.000 13179.038 92.756 .000 .599 
Lower-bound 13179.038 1.000 13179.038 92.756 .000 .599 
Error(Domain) Sphericity 
Assumed 
8809.103 62 142.082 
   
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
8809.103 62.000 142.082 
   
Huynh-Feldt 8809.103 62.000 142.082    
Lower-bound 8809.103 62.000 142.082    
Validity Sphericity 
Assumed 
416.330 1 416.330 .947 .334 .015 
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
416.330 1.000 416.330 .947 .334 .015 
Huynh-Feldt 416.330 1.000 416.330 .947 .334 .015 
Lower-bound 416.330 1.000 416.330 .947 .334 .015 
Error(Validity) Sphericity 
Assumed 
27256.485 62 439.621 
   
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
27256.485 62.000 439.621 
   
Huynh-Feldt 27256.485 62.000 439.621    
Lower-bound 27256.485 62.000 439.621    
Cue Sphericity 
Assumed 
40.655 1 40.655 .376 .542 .006 
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
40.655 1.000 40.655 .376 .542 .006 
Huynh-Feldt 40.655 1.000 40.655 .376 .542 .006 
Lower-bound 40.655 1.000 40.655 .376 .542 .006 
Error(Cue) Sphericity 
Assumed 
6703.276 62 108.117 
   
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
6703.276 62.000 108.117 
   
Huynh-Feldt 6703.276 62.000 108.117    
Lower-bound 6703.276 62.000 108.117    
Domain * Validity Sphericity 
Assumed 





20637.853 1.000 20637.853 70.113 .000 .531 
Huynh-Feldt 20637.853 1.000 20637.853 70.113 .000 .531 
Lower-bound 20637.853 1.000 20637.853 70.113 .000 .531 
Error(Domain*Validity) Sphericity 
Assumed 
18249.803 62 294.352 
   
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
18249.803 62.000 294.352 
   
Huynh-Feldt 18249.803 62.000 294.352    
Lower-bound 18249.803 62.000 294.352    
Domain * Cue Sphericity 
Assumed 
32.691 1 32.691 .218 .642 .004 
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
32.691 1.000 32.691 .218 .642 .004 
Huynh-Feldt 32.691 1.000 32.691 .218 .642 .004 
Lower-bound 32.691 1.000 32.691 .218 .642 .004 
Error(Domain*Cue) Sphericity 
Assumed 
9290.173 62 149.841 
   
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
9290.173 62.000 149.841 
   
Huynh-Feldt 9290.173 62.000 149.841    
Lower-bound 9290.173 62.000 149.841    
Validity * Cue Sphericity 
Assumed 
380.761 1 380.761 3.120 .082 .048 
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
380.761 1.000 380.761 3.120 .082 .048 
Huynh-Feldt 380.761 1.000 380.761 3.120 .082 .048 
Lower-bound 380.761 1.000 380.761 3.120 .082 .048 
Error(Validity*Cue) Sphericity 
Assumed 
7567.434 62 122.055 
   
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
7567.434 62.000 122.055 
   
Huynh-Feldt 7567.434 62.000 122.055    
Lower-bound 7567.434 62.000 122.055    
Domain * Validity * Cue Sphericity 
Assumed 
159.990 1 159.990 1.867 .177 .029 
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
159.990 1.000 159.990 1.867 .177 .029 
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Huynh-Feldt 159.990 1.000 159.990 1.867 .177 .029 
Lower-bound 159.990 1.000 159.990 1.867 .177 .029 
Error(Domain*Validity*Cue) Sphericity 
Assumed 
5311.797 62 85.674 
   
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
5311.797 62.000 85.674 
   
Huynh-Feldt 5311.797 62.000 85.674    
Lower-bound 5311.797 62.000 85.674    
 
Experiment 3 RT:  




Tests of Within-Subjects Effects 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Source 
Type III Sum of 





95802238.613 1 95802238.613 56.700 .000 .478 
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
95802238.613 1.000 95802238.613 56.700 .000 .478 
Huynh-Feldt 95802238.613 1.000 95802238.613 56.700 .000 .478 
Lower-bound 95802238.613 1.000 95802238.613 56.700 .000 .478 
Error(Domain) Sphericity 
Assumed 
104757236.063 62 1689632.840 
   
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
104757236.063 62.000 1689632.840 
   
Huynh-Feldt 104757236.063 62.000 1689632.840    
Lower-bound 104757236.063 62.000 1689632.840    
Validity Sphericity 
Assumed 
108287177.041 1 108287177.041 22.150 .000 .263 
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
108287177.041 1.000 108287177.041 22.150 .000 .263 
Huynh-Feldt 108287177.041 1.000 108287177.041 22.150 .000 .263 
Lower-bound 108287177.041 1.000 108287177.041 22.150 .000 .263 
Error(Validity) Sphericity 
Assumed 
303109319.508 62 4888859.992 





303109319.508 62.000 4888859.992 
   
Huynh-Feldt 303109319.508 62.000 4888859.992    
Lower-bound 303109319.508 62.000 4888859.992    
Cue Sphericity 
Assumed 
23100706.436 1 23100706.436 15.663 .000 .202 
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
23100706.436 1.000 23100706.436 15.663 .000 .202 
Huynh-Feldt 23100706.436 1.000 23100706.436 15.663 .000 .202 
Lower-bound 23100706.436 1.000 23100706.436 15.663 .000 .202 
Error(Cue) Sphericity 
Assumed 
91442022.376 62 1474871.329 
   
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
91442022.376 62.000 1474871.329 
   
Huynh-Feldt 91442022.376 62.000 1474871.329    
Lower-bound 91442022.376 62.000 1474871.329    
Domain * Validity Sphericity 
Assumed 
66005232.082 1 66005232.082 41.379 .000 .400 
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
66005232.082 1.000 66005232.082 41.379 .000 .400 
Huynh-Feldt 66005232.082 1.000 66005232.082 41.379 .000 .400 
Lower-bound 66005232.082 1.000 66005232.082 41.379 .000 .400 
Error(Domain*Validity) Sphericity 
Assumed 
98898950.747 62 1595144.367 
   
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
98898950.747 62.000 1595144.367 
   
Huynh-Feldt 98898950.747 62.000 1595144.367    
Lower-bound 98898950.747 62.000 1595144.367    
Domain * Cue Sphericity 
Assumed 
2293.290 1 2293.290 .002 .968 .000 
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
2293.290 1.000 2293.290 .002 .968 .000 
Huynh-Feldt 2293.290 1.000 2293.290 .002 .968 .000 
Lower-bound 2293.290 1.000 2293.290 .002 .968 .000 
Error(Domain*Cue) Sphericity 
Assumed 
86095147.879 62 1388631.417 
   
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
86095147.879 62.000 1388631.417 
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Huynh-Feldt 86095147.879 62.000 1388631.417    
Lower-bound 86095147.879 62.000 1388631.417    
Validity * Cue Sphericity 
Assumed 
11593517.593 1 11593517.593 11.018 .002 .151 
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
11593517.593 1.000 11593517.593 11.018 .002 .151 
Huynh-Feldt 11593517.593 1.000 11593517.593 11.018 .002 .151 
Lower-bound 11593517.593 1.000 11593517.593 11.018 .002 .151 
Error(Validity*Cue) Sphericity 
Assumed 
65236789.277 62 1052206.279 
   
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
65236789.277 62.000 1052206.279 
   
Huynh-Feldt 65236789.277 62.000 1052206.279    
Lower-bound 65236789.277 62.000 1052206.279    
Domain * Validity * Cue Sphericity 
Assumed 
871584.541 1 871584.541 .654 .422 .010 
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
871584.541 1.000 871584.541 .654 .422 .010 
Huynh-Feldt 871584.541 1.000 871584.541 .654 .422 .010 
Lower-bound 871584.541 1.000 871584.541 .654 .422 .010 
Error(Domain*Validity*Cue) Sphericity 
Assumed 
82604976.058 62 1332338.324 
   
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
82604976.058 62.000 1332338.324 
   
Huynh-Feldt 82604976.058 62.000 1332338.324    
Lower-bound 82604976.058 62.000 1332338.324    
 
 
Experiment 4 Accuracy: 




Tests of Within-Subjects Effects 













16042.352 1 16042.352 123.981 .000 .623 
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
16042.352 1.000 16042.352 123.981 .000 .623 
Huynh-Feldt 16042.352 1.000 16042.352 123.981 .000 .623 
Lower-bound 16042.352 1.000 16042.352 123.981 .000 .623 
Error(Domain) Sphericity 
Assumed 
9704.487 75 129.393 
   
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
9704.487 75.000 129.393 
   
Huynh-Feldt 9704.487 75.000 129.393    
Lower-bound 9704.487 75.000 129.393    
Validity Sphericity 
Assumed 
4886.325 1 4886.325 6.297 .014 .077 
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
4886.325 1.000 4886.325 6.297 .014 .077 
Huynh-Feldt 4886.325 1.000 4886.325 6.297 .014 .077 
Lower-bound 4886.325 1.000 4886.325 6.297 .014 .077 
Error(Validity) Sphericity 
Assumed 
58194.422 75 775.926 
   
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
58194.422 75.000 775.926 
   
Huynh-Feldt 58194.422 75.000 775.926    
Lower-bound 58194.422 75.000 775.926    
Cue Sphericity 
Assumed 
431.434 1 431.434 3.177 .079 .041 
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
431.434 1.000 431.434 3.177 .079 .041 
Huynh-Feldt 431.434 1.000 431.434 3.177 .079 .041 
Lower-bound 431.434 1.000 431.434 3.177 .079 .041 
Error(Cue) Sphericity 
Assumed 
10184.896 75 135.799 
   
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
10184.896 75.000 135.799 
   
Huynh-Feldt 10184.896 75.000 135.799    
Lower-bound 10184.896 75.000 135.799    
Domain * Validity Sphericity 
Assumed 





24067.575 1.000 24067.575 119.624 .000 .615 
Huynh-Feldt 24067.575 1.000 24067.575 119.624 .000 .615 
Lower-bound 24067.575 1.000 24067.575 119.624 .000 .615 
Error(Domain*Validity) Sphericity 
Assumed 
15089.578 75 201.194 
   
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
15089.578 75.000 201.194 
   
Huynh-Feldt 15089.578 75.000 201.194    
Lower-bound 15089.578 75.000 201.194    
Domain * Cue Sphericity 
Assumed 
2168.975 1 2168.975 26.721 .000 .263 
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
2168.975 1.000 2168.975 26.721 .000 .263 
Huynh-Feldt 2168.975 1.000 2168.975 26.721 .000 .263 
Lower-bound 2168.975 1.000 2168.975 26.721 .000 .263 
Error(Domain*Cue) Sphericity 
Assumed 
6087.775 75 81.170 
   
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
6087.775 75.000 81.170 
   
Huynh-Feldt 6087.775 75.000 81.170    
Lower-bound 6087.775 75.000 81.170    
Validity * Cue Sphericity 
Assumed 
.163 1 .163 .001 .973 .000 
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
.163 1.000 .163 .001 .973 .000 
Huynh-Feldt .163 1.000 .163 .001 .973 .000 
Lower-bound .163 1.000 .163 .001 .973 .000 
Error(Validity*Cue) Sphericity 
Assumed 
10357.688 75 138.103 
   
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
10357.688 75.000 138.103 
   
Huynh-Feldt 10357.688 75.000 138.103    
Lower-bound 10357.688 75.000 138.103    
Domain * Validity * Cue Sphericity 
Assumed 
1360.257 1 1360.257 8.784 .004 .105 
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
1360.257 1.000 1360.257 8.784 .004 .105 
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Huynh-Feldt 1360.257 1.000 1360.257 8.784 .004 .105 
Lower-bound 1360.257 1.000 1360.257 8.784 .004 .105 
Error(Domain*Validity*Cue) Sphericity 
Assumed 
11614.356 75 154.858 
   
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
11614.356 75.000 154.858 
   
Huynh-Feldt 11614.356 75.000 154.858    
Lower-bound 11614.356 75.000 154.858    
 
 
Experiment 4 RT: 




Tests of Within-Subjects Effects 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Source 
Type III Sum of 






117634925.880 1 117634925.880 124.328 .000 .624 
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
117634925.880 1.000 117634925.880 124.328 .000 .624 
Huynh-Feldt 117634925.880 1.000 117634925.880 124.328 .000 .624 
Lower-bound 117634925.880 1.000 117634925.880 124.328 .000 .624 
Error(Domain) Sphericity 
Assumed 
70962181.253 75 946162.417 
   
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
70962181.253 75.000 946162.417 
   
Huynh-Feldt 70962181.253 75.000 946162.417    
Lower-bound 70962181.253 75.000 946162.417    
Validity Sphericity 
Assumed 
55138469.232 1 55138469.232 26.293 .000 .260 
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
55138469.232 1.000 55138469.232 26.293 .000 .260 
Huynh-Feldt 55138469.232 1.000 55138469.232 26.293 .000 .260 





157282624.794 75 2097101.664 
   
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
157282624.794 75.000 2097101.664 
   
Huynh-Feldt 157282624.794 75.000 2097101.664    
Lower-bound 157282624.794 75.000 2097101.664    
Cue Sphericity 
Assumed 
313630664.200 1 313630664.200 45.058 .000 .375 
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
313630664.200 1.000 313630664.200 45.058 .000 .375 
Huynh-Feldt 313630664.200 1.000 313630664.200 45.058 .000 .375 
Lower-bound 313630664.200 1.000 313630664.200 45.058 .000 .375 
Error(Cue) Sphericity 
Assumed 
522049732.448 75 6960663.099 
   
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
522049732.448 75.000 6960663.099 
   
Huynh-Feldt 522049732.448 75.000 6960663.099    
Lower-bound 522049732.448 75.000 6960663.099    
Domain * Validity Sphericity 
Assumed 
25664752.943 1 25664752.943 24.285 .000 .245 
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
25664752.943 1.000 25664752.943 24.285 .000 .245 
Huynh-Feldt 25664752.943 1.000 25664752.943 24.285 .000 .245 
Lower-bound 25664752.943 1.000 25664752.943 24.285 .000 .245 
Error(Domain*Validity) Sphericity 
Assumed 
79262576.610 75 1056834.355 
   
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
79262576.610 75.000 1056834.355 
   
Huynh-Feldt 79262576.610 75.000 1056834.355    
Lower-bound 79262576.610 75.000 1056834.355    
Domain * Cue Sphericity 
Assumed 
10098582.677 1 10098582.677 9.681 .003 .114 
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
10098582.677 1.000 10098582.677 9.681 .003 .114 
Huynh-Feldt 10098582.677 1.000 10098582.677 9.681 .003 .114 
Lower-bound 10098582.677 1.000 10098582.677 9.681 .003 .114 
Error(Domain*Cue) Sphericity 
Assumed 
78235837.483 75 1043144.500 





78235837.483 75.000 1043144.500 
   
Huynh-Feldt 78235837.483 75.000 1043144.500    
Lower-bound 78235837.483 75.000 1043144.500    
Validity * Cue Sphericity 
Assumed 
4727200.329 1 4727200.329 5.134 .026 .064 
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
4727200.329 1.000 4727200.329 5.134 .026 .064 
Huynh-Feldt 4727200.329 1.000 4727200.329 5.134 .026 .064 
Lower-bound 4727200.329 1.000 4727200.329 5.134 .026 .064 
Error(Validity*Cue) Sphericity 
Assumed 
69055548.421 75 920740.646 
   
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
69055548.421 75.000 920740.646 
   
Huynh-Feldt 69055548.421 75.000 920740.646    
Lower-bound 69055548.421 75.000 920740.646    
Domain * Validity * Cue Sphericity 
Assumed 
4631374.453 1 4631374.453 4.743 .033 .059 
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
4631374.453 1.000 4631374.453 4.743 .033 .059 
Huynh-Feldt 4631374.453 1.000 4631374.453 4.743 .033 .059 
Lower-bound 4631374.453 1.000 4631374.453 4.743 .033 .059 
Error(Domain*Validity*Cue) Sphericity 
Assumed 
73234796.760 75 976463.957 
   
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
73234796.760 75.000 976463.957 
   
Huynh-Feldt 73234796.760 75.000 976463.957    
Lower-bound 73234796.760 75.000 976463.957    
 
Experiment 4 accuracy by group: 
2 (Domain: Cross-domain, Within-domain) × 2 (Cue: Analytic cue, Intuitive cue) × 2 
(Reflectiveness: Non-reflective, Reflective) × 2 (Intuitiveness: Non-intuitive, Intuitive) 
 
Tests of Within-Subjects Effects 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df 
Mean 







40157.507 1 40157.507 274.164 .000 .792 
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
40157.507 1.000 40157.507 274.164 .000 .792 
Huynh-Feldt 40157.507 1.000 40157.507 274.164 .000 .792 
Lower-bound 40157.507 1.000 40157.507 274.164 .000 .792 
Domain * NFC_split Sphericity 
Assumed 
9.252 1 9.252 .063 .802 .001 
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
9.252 1.000 9.252 .063 .802 .001 
Huynh-Feldt 9.252 1.000 9.252 .063 .802 .001 
Lower-bound 9.252 1.000 9.252 .063 .802 .001 
Domain * FI_split Sphericity 
Assumed 
585.525 1 585.525 3.998 .049 .053 
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
585.525 1.000 585.525 3.998 .049 .053 
Huynh-Feldt 585.525 1.000 585.525 3.998 .049 .053 
Lower-bound 585.525 1.000 585.525 3.998 .049 .053 




582.609 1 582.609 3.978 .050 .052 
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
582.609 1.000 582.609 3.978 .050 .052 
Huynh-Feldt 582.609 1.000 582.609 3.978 .050 .052 
Lower-bound 582.609 1.000 582.609 3.978 .050 .052 
Error(Domain) Sphericity 
Assumed 
10546.042 72 146.473 
   
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
10546.042 72.000 146.473 
   
Huynh-Feldt 10546.042 72.000 146.473    
Lower-bound 10546.042 72.000 146.473    
Cue Sphericity 
Assumed 
200.927 1 200.927 2.546 .115 .034 
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
200.927 1.000 200.927 2.546 .115 .034 
Huynh-Feldt 200.927 1.000 200.927 2.546 .115 .034 
Lower-bound 200.927 1.000 200.927 2.546 .115 .034 
Cue * NFC_split Sphericity 
Assumed 





30.776 1.000 30.776 .390 .534 .005 
Huynh-Feldt 30.776 1.000 30.776 .390 .534 .005 
Lower-bound 30.776 1.000 30.776 .390 .534 .005 
Cue * FI_split Sphericity 
Assumed 
116.489 1 116.489 1.476 .228 .020 
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
116.489 1.000 116.489 1.476 .228 .020 
Huynh-Feldt 116.489 1.000 116.489 1.476 .228 .020 
Lower-bound 116.489 1.000 116.489 1.476 .228 .020 




365.522 1 365.522 4.631 .035 .060 
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
365.522 1.000 365.522 4.631 .035 .060 
Huynh-Feldt 365.522 1.000 365.522 4.631 .035 .060 
Lower-bound 365.522 1.000 365.522 4.631 .035 .060 
Error(Cue) Sphericity 
Assumed 
5683.221 72 78.934 
   
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
5683.221 72.000 78.934 
   
Huynh-Feldt 5683.221 72.000 78.934    
Lower-bound 5683.221 72.000 78.934    
Domain * Cue Sphericity 
Assumed 
62.983 1 62.983 .976 .327 .013 
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
62.983 1.000 62.983 .976 .327 .013 
Huynh-Feldt 62.983 1.000 62.983 .976 .327 .013 
Lower-bound 62.983 1.000 62.983 .976 .327 .013 




23.561 1 23.561 .365 .548 .005 
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
23.561 1.000 23.561 .365 .548 .005 
Huynh-Feldt 23.561 1.000 23.561 .365 .548 .005 
Lower-bound 23.561 1.000 23.561 .365 .548 .005 




205.038 1 205.038 3.176 .079 .042 
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
205.038 1.000 205.038 3.176 .079 .042 
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Huynh-Feldt 205.038 1.000 205.038 3.176 .079 .042 
Lower-bound 205.038 1.000 205.038 3.176 .079 .042 
Domain * Cue * 
NFC_split  *  FI_split 
Sphericity 
Assumed 
731.644 1 731.644 11.333 .001 .136 
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
731.644 1.000 731.644 11.333 .001 .136 
Huynh-Feldt 731.644 1.000 731.644 11.333 .001 .136 
Lower-bound 731.644 1.000 731.644 11.333 .001 .136 
Error(Domain*Cue) Sphericity 
Assumed 
4648.070 72 64.557 
   
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
4648.070 72.000 64.557 
   
Huynh-Feldt 4648.070 72.000 64.557    
Lower-bound 4648.070 72.000 64.557    
 
 
Experiment 4 WD analogy accuracy by group: 
2 (Cue: Analytic cue, Intuitive cue) × 2 (Reflectiveness: Non-reflective, Reflective) × 2 
(Intuitiveness: Non-intuitive, Intuitive) 
 
 
Tests of Within-Subjects Effects 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 





244.449 1 244.449 7.233 .009 .091 
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
244.449 1.000 244.449 7.233 .009 .091 
Huynh-Feldt 244.449 1.000 244.449 7.233 .009 .091 
Lower-bound 244.449 1.000 244.449 7.233 .009 .091 
Cue * NFC_split Sphericity 
Assumed 
.241 1 .241 .007 .933 .000 
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
.241 1.000 .241 .007 .933 .000 
Huynh-Feldt .241 1.000 .241 .007 .933 .000 
Lower-bound .241 1.000 .241 .007 .933 .000 
Cue * FI_split Sphericity 
Assumed 





6.217 1.000 6.217 .184 .669 .003 
Huynh-Feldt 6.217 1.000 6.217 .184 .669 .003 
Lower-bound 6.217 1.000 6.217 .184 .669 .003 




31.445 1 31.445 .930 .338 .013 
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
31.445 1.000 31.445 .930 .338 .013 
Huynh-Feldt 31.445 1.000 31.445 .930 .338 .013 
Lower-bound 31.445 1.000 31.445 .930 .338 .013 
Error(Cue) Sphericity 
Assumed 
2433.248 72 33.795 
   
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
2433.248 72.000 33.795 
   
Huynh-Feldt 2433.248 72.000 33.795    
Lower-bound 2433.248 72.000 33.795    
 
 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Transformed Variable:   Average   
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Intercept 1294742.451 1 1294742.451 14155.550 .000 .995 
NFC_split 14.809 1 14.809 .162 .689 .002 
FI_split 55.126 1 55.126 .603 .440 .008 
NFC_split * FI_split 19.323 1 19.323 .211 .647 .003 
Error 6585.506 72 91.465    
 
 
Experiment 4 CD analogy accuracy by group: 
2 (Cue: Analytic cue, Intuitive cue) × 2 (Reflectiveness: Non-reflective, Reflective) × 2 
(Intuitiveness: Non-intuitive, Intuitive) 
 
 
Tests of Within-Subjects Effects 




Type III Sum 
of Squares df 
Mean 





19.461 1 19.461 .177 .675 .002 
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
19.461 1.000 19.461 .177 .675 .002 
Huynh-Feldt 19.461 1.000 19.461 .177 .675 .002 
Lower-bound 19.461 1.000 19.461 .177 .675 .002 
Cue * NFC_split Sphericity 
Assumed 
54.096 1 54.096 .493 .485 .007 
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
54.096 1.000 54.096 .493 .485 .007 
Huynh-Feldt 54.096 1.000 54.096 .493 .485 .007 
Lower-bound 54.096 1.000 54.096 .493 .485 .007 
Cue * FI_split Sphericity 
Assumed 
315.310 1 315.310 2.874 .094 .038 
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
315.310 1.000 315.310 2.874 .094 .038 
Huynh-Feldt 315.310 1.000 315.310 2.874 .094 .038 
Lower-bound 315.310 1.000 315.310 2.874 .094 .038 




1065.721 1 1065.721 9.715 .003 .119 
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
1065.721 1.000 1065.721 9.715 .003 .119 
Huynh-Feldt 1065.721 1.000 1065.721 9.715 .003 .119 
Lower-bound 1065.721 1.000 1065.721 9.715 .003 .119 
Error(Cue) Sphericity 
Assumed 
7898.043 72 109.695 
   
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
7898.043 72.000 109.695 
   
Huynh-Feldt 7898.043 72.000 109.695    
Lower-bound 7898.043 72.000 109.695    
 
 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   




Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Intercept 730116.358 1 730116.358 1952.263 .000 .964 
NFC_split .205 1 .205 .001 .981 .000 
FI_split 718.023 1 718.023 1.920 .170 .026 
NFC_split * FI_split 884.439 1 884.439 2.365 .128 .032 
Error 26926.893 72 373.985    
 
 
Experiment 4 CD analogy accuracy for Reflective and Non-reflective groups: 
2 (Cue: Analytic cue, Intuitive cue) × 2 (Intuitiveness: Non-intuitive, Intuitive) for each group 
 
 
Tests of Within-Subjects Effects 













4.338 1 4.338 .039 .845 .001 
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
4.338 1.000 4.338 .039 .845 .001 
Huynh-Feldt 4.338 1.000 4.338 .039 .845 .001 





110.986 1 110.986 .995 .325 .027 
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
110.986 1.000 110.986 .995 .325 .027 
Huynh-Feldt 110.986 1.000 110.986 .995 .325 .027 
Lower-bound 110.986 1.000 110.986 .995 .325 .027 
Error(Cue) Sphericity 
Assumed 
4014.003 36 111.500 
   
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
4014.003 36.000 111.500 
   
Huynh-Feldt 4014.003 36.000 111.500    
Lower-bound 4014.003 36.000 111.500    
Reflective Cue Sphericity 
Assumed 





69.128 1.000 69.128 .641 .429 .017 
Huynh-Feldt 69.128 1.000 69.128 .641 .429 .017 





1268.439 1 1268.439 11.757 .002 .246 
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
1268.439 1.000 1268.439 11.757 .002 .246 
Huynh-Feldt 1268.439 1.000 1268.439 11.757 .002 .246 
Lower-bound 1268.439 1.000 1268.439 11.757 .002 .246 
Error(Cue) Sphericity 
Assumed 
3884.039 36 107.890 
   
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
3884.039 36.000 107.890 
   
Huynh-Feldt 3884.039 36.000 107.890    
Lower-bound 3884.039 36.000 107.890    
 
 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Transformed Variable:   Average   
NFC_split Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Non Reflective Intercept 365177.468 1 365177.468 1064.245 .000 .967 
FI_split 4.338 1 4.338 .013 .911 .000 
Error 12352.785 36 343.133    
Reflective Intercept 364939.425 1 364939.425 901.449 .000 .962 
FI_split 1595.916 1 1595.916 3.942 .055 .099 
Error 14574.108 36 404.836    
 
Experiment 5 accuracy:  
2 (Domain: Cross-domain, Within-domain) × 2 (Validity: True, False) 
 
Tests of Within-Subjects Effects 




Type III Sum 
of Squares df 
Mean 





13844.045 1 13844.045 203.583 .000 .668 
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
13844.045 1.000 13844.045 203.583 .000 .668 
Huynh-Feldt 13844.045 1.000 13844.045 203.583 .000 .668 
Lower-bound 13844.045 1.000 13844.045 203.583 .000 .668 
Error(Domain) Sphericity 
Assumed 
6868.185 101 68.002 
   
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
6868.185 101.000 68.002 
   
Huynh-Feldt 6868.185 101.000 68.002    
Lower-bound 6868.185 101.000 68.002    
Validity Sphericity 
Assumed 
3219.642 1 3219.642 13.437 .000 .117 
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
3219.642 1.000 3219.642 13.437 .000 .117 
Huynh-Feldt 3219.642 1.000 3219.642 13.437 .000 .117 
Lower-bound 3219.642 1.000 3219.642 13.437 .000 .117 
Error(Validity) Sphericity 
Assumed 
24201.172 101 239.616 
   
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
24201.172 101.000 239.616 
   
Huynh-Feldt 24201.172 101.000 239.616    
Lower-bound 24201.172 101.000 239.616    
Domain * Validity Sphericity 
Assumed 
34485.113 1 34485.113 162.042 .000 .616 
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
34485.113 1.000 34485.113 162.042 .000 .616 
Huynh-Feldt 34485.113 1.000 34485.113 162.042 .000 .616 
Lower-bound 34485.113 1.000 34485.113 162.042 .000 .616 
Error(Domain*Validity) Sphericity 
Assumed 
21494.397 101 212.816 
   
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
21494.397 101.000 212.816 
   
Huynh-Feldt 21494.397 101.000 212.816    
Lower-bound 21494.397 101.000 212.816    
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Experiment 5 RT:  
2 (Domain: Cross-domain, Within-domain) × 2 (Validity: True, False) 
 
Tests of Within-Subjects Effects 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Source 
Type III Sum of 





63916792.081 1 63916792.081 195.025 .000 .659 
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
63916792.081 1.000 63916792.081 195.025 .000 .659 
Huynh-Feldt 63916792.081 1.000 63916792.081 195.025 .000 .659 
Lower-bound 63916792.081 1.000 63916792.081 195.025 .000 .659 
Error(Domain) Sphericity 
Assumed 
33101358.169 101 327736.219 
   
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
33101358.169 101.000 327736.219 
   
Huynh-Feldt 33101358.169 101.000 327736.219    
Lower-bound 33101358.169 101.000 327736.219    
Validity Sphericity 
Assumed 
10037019.728 1 10037019.728 8.108 .005 .074 
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
10037019.728 1.000 10037019.728 8.108 .005 .074 
Huynh-Feldt 10037019.728 1.000 10037019.728 8.108 .005 .074 
Lower-bound 10037019.728 1.000 10037019.728 8.108 .005 .074 
Error(Validity) Sphericity 
Assumed 
125031028.522 101 1237930.975 
   
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
125031028.522 101.000 1237930.975 
   
Huynh-Feldt 125031028.522 101.000 1237930.975    
Lower-bound 125031028.522 101.000 1237930.975    
Domain * Validity Sphericity 
Assumed 
41373788.297 1 41373788.297 78.500 .000 .437 
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
41373788.297 1.000 41373788.297 78.500 .000 .437 
Huynh-Feldt 41373788.297 1.000 41373788.297 78.500 .000 .437 





53232521.953 101 527054.673 
   
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
53232521.953 101.000 527054.673 
   
Huynh-Feldt 53232521.953 101.000 527054.673    










































Rational-Experiential Inventory Items (used in Experiment 4 & 5) 
 
Rationality scale 
I try to avoid situations that require thinking in depth about something 
I'm not that good at figuring out complicated problems 
I enjoy intellectual challenges 
I am not very good at solving problems that require careful logical analysis 
I don't like to have to do a lot of thinking 
I enjoy solving problems that require hard thinking 
Thinking is not my idea of an enjoyable activity 
I am not a very analytical thinker 
Reasoning things out carefully is not one of my strong points 
I prefer complex problems to simple problems 
Thinking hard and for a long time about something gives me little satisfaction 
I don't reason well under pressure 
I am much better at figuring things out logically than most people 
I have a logical mind 
I enjoy thinking in abstract terms 
I have no problem thinking things through carefully 
Using logic usually works well for me in figuring out problems in my life 
Knowing the answer without having to understand the reasoning behind it is good enough for me 
I usually have clear, explainable reasons for my decisions 












I like to rely on my intuitive impressions 
I don't have a very good sense of intuition 
Using my gut feelings usually works well for me in figuring out problems in my life 
I believe in trusting my hunches 
Intuition can be a very useful way to solve problems 
I often go by my instincts when deciding on a course of action 
I trust my initial feelings about people 
When it comes to trusting people, I can usually rely on my gut feelings 
If I were to rely on my gut feelings, I would often make mistakes 
I don't like situations in which I have to rely on intuition 
I think there are times when one should rely on one's intuition 
I think it is foolish to make important decisions based on feelings 
I don't think it is a good idea to rely on one's intuition for important decisions 
I generally don't depend on my feelings to help me make decisions 
I hardly ever go wrong when I listen to my deepest gut feelings to find an answer 
I would not want to depend on anyone who described himself or herself as intuitive 
My snap judgments are probably not as good as most people's 
I tend to use my heart as a guide for my actions 
I can usually feel when a person is right or wrong, even if I can't explain how I know 



















Cognitive Style & Ability Measures (used in Experiment 5) 
 
Cognitive Reflection Test 
1) A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs $1.00 more than the ball. How much 
does the ball cost?  ____ cents   (5) 
 
2) If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets, how long would it take 100 machines 
to make 100 widgets?  ____ minutes  (5) 
 
3) In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles in size. If it takes 48 
days for the patch to cover the entire lake, how long would it take for the patch to cover 
half of the lake?  ____ days   (47) 
 
Base-Rate  
1. In a study 1000 people were tested. Among the participants there were 5 engineers and 
995 lawyers. Jack is a randomly chosen participant of this study. Jack is 36 years old. He 
is not married and is somewhat introverted. He likes to spend his free time reading 
science fiction and writing computer programs. What is most likely? A) Jack is a lawyer, 
B) Jack is an engineer 
2. In a study 1000 people were tested. Among the participants there were 3 who live in a 
condo and 997 who live in a farmhouse. Kurt is a randomly chosen participant of this 
study. Kurt works on Wall Street and is single. He works long hours and wears Armani 
suits to work. He likes wearing sunglasses. What is most likely? A) Kurt lives in a condo, 
B) Kurt lives in a farmhouse 
3. In a study 1000 people were tested. Among the participants there were 997 nurses and 3 
doctors. Paul is a randomly chosen participant of this study. Paul is 34 years old. He lives 
in a beautiful home in a posh suburb. He is well spoken and very interested in politics. He 
invests a lot of time in his career. What is most likely? A) Paul is a doctor, B) Paul is a 
nurse 
4. In a study 1000 people were tested. Among the participants there were 4 women and 996 
men. Jamie is a randomly chosen participant of this study. Jamie is a 36-year-old writer. 
Jamie has two brothers and one sister. Jamie likes running and watching a good movie. 
What is most likely? A) Jamie is a man, B) Jamie is a woman 
5. In a study 1000 people were tested. Among the participants there were 3 who play the 
saxophone and 997 who play the drums. Tom is a randomly chosen participant of this 
study. Tom is 20 years old. He is studying in Washington and has no steady girlfriend. 
He just bought a second-hand car with his savings. What is most likely? A) Tom plays 
the saxophone, B) Tom plays the drums 
6. In a study 1000 people were tested. Among the participants there were 996 who live in 
Los Angeles and 4 who live in New York. Christopher is a randomly chosen participant 
of this study. Christopher is 28 years old. He has a girlfriend and shares an apartment 
with a friend. He likes watching basketball. What is most likely? A) Christopher lives in 





We would like to know something about how people go about guessing words they do not know. 
On this card are listed some words. You may know some of them, and you may not know quite a 
few of them. On each line, the first word is in capital letters--- like BEAST. Then there are five 
other words. Please choose the word that comes closest to the meaning of the word in capital 
letters. For example, if the word in capital letters is BEAST, you would choose “animal” because 
it comes closer to BEAST than any of the other words. 
Circle only one number for each item below. 
EXAMPLE 
BEAST 1. afraid 2. words 3. large 4. animal 5. separate 6. don’t know 
A. SPACE 1. school 2. noon 3. captain 4. room 5. board 6. don’t know 
B. BROADEN 1. efface 2. make level 3. elapse 4. embroider 5. widen 6. don’t know 
C. EMANATE 1. populate 2. free 3. prominent 4. rival 5. come 6. don’t know 
D. EDIBLE 1. auspicious 2. eligible 3. fit to eat 4. sagacious 5. able to speak 6. don’t know 
E. ANIMOSITY 1. hatred 2. animation 3. disobedience 4. diversity 5. friendship 6. don’t know 
F. PACT 1. puissance 2. remonstrance 3. agreement 4. skillet 5. pressure 6. don’t know 
G. CLOISTERED 1. miniature 2. bunched 3. arched 4. malady 5. secluded 6. don’t know 
H. CAPRICE 1. value 2. a star 3. grimace 4. whim 5. inducement 6. don’t know 
I. ACCUSTOM 1. disappoint 2. customary 3. encounter 4. get used to 5. business 6. don’t know 
J. ALLUSION 1. reference 2. dream 3. eulogy 4. illusion 5. aria 6. don’t know 
H. AUDACIOUS 1. Daring 2. Smart 3. Brave 4. Loud 5. Outgoing 6. Don’t know 
I. ENCUMBER  1. Impede 2. Oppress 3. Gather 4. Press 5. Encompass 6. Don’t know 
 
Numeracy Scale 
i) Imagine that we flip a fair coin 1,000 times. What is your best guess about how many times the 
coin would come up heads in 1,000 flips? ____times out of 1,000. 
 
ii) In the BIG BUCKS LOTTERY, the chance of winning a $10 prize is 1%. What is your best 
guess about how many people would win a $10 prize if 1000 people each buy a single ticket to 
BIG BUCKS?____person(s) out of 1,000. 
 
iii) In ACME PUBLISHING SWEEPSAKES, the chance of winning a car is 1 in 1,000. What 






















Category Item Strength 
 
Category Item Strength 
CLOTHING cane weak 
 
VEGETABLE rice weak 
CLOTHING ring weak 
 
VEGETABLE pickles weak 
CLOTHING purse weak 
 
VEGETABLE seaweed weak 
CLOTHING stockings moderate 
 
VEGETABLE parsnip moderate 
CLOTHING tuxedo moderate 
 
VEGETABLE bean moderate 
CLOTHING shoes moderate 
 
VEGETABLE potato moderate 
CLOTHING shirt strong 
 
VEGETABLE carrot strong 
CLOTHING pants strong 
 
VEGETABLE pea strong 
CLOTHING dress strong 
 
VEGETABLE broccoli strong 
FURNITURE fan weak 
 
VEHICLE elevator weak 
FURNITURE stove weak 
 
VEHICLE camel weak 
FURNITURE telephone weak 
 
VEHICLE feet weak 
FURNITURE cabinet moderate 
 
VEHICLE boat moderate 
FURNITURE stool moderate 
 
VEHICLE jet moderate 
FURNITURE lamp moderate 
 
VEHICLE bike moderate 
FURNITURE chair strong 
 
VEHICLE car strong 
FURNITURE sofa strong 
 
VEHICLE truck strong 
FURNITURE table strong 
 
VEHICLE bus strong 
 
 
Remote Associates Test 
 
Item 1 Item 2 Item 3 Solution Item 1 Item 2 Item 3 Solution 
Sense Courtesy Place Common Basket Eight Snow Ball 
Print Berry Bird Blue Sandwich House Golf Club 
Horse Human Drag Race Pie Luck Belly Pot 
Main Sweeper Light Street Fly Clip Wall Paper 
Opera Hand Dish Soap 
Dress Dial Flower Sun 
Down Question Check Mark 
Carpet Alert Ink Red 
Flower Friend Scout Girl 
Hound Pressure Shot Blood 





Complete Correlation Table from Experiment 5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
